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For the fourth time in the past 20 years, the state of Arkansas has implemented a 
performance-funding program. Although directly referenced in the title of Act 1203 of 2011, the 
implemented performance-funding program does not include a measure of how efficiently 
institutions are converting their inputs into outputs. The purpose of this study was two-fold: (1) 
to examine, through the conceptual framework of agency theory, why the state of Arkansas 
adopted performance funding policy after experiencing three adopt-implement-abandon cycles in 
the past 20 years, and (2) to estimate the efficiency of four-year public Master’s universities in 
Arkansas in achieving one of the mandatory measures in the performance-funding program: 
number of bachelor’s degrees awarded. The institutions included in this study were Arkansas 
State University, Arkansas Tech University, and University of Central Arkansas in the larger 
group, and Henderson State University, Southern Arkansas University, and University of 
Arkansas at Monticello in the medium/smaller group. The analytical technique utilized in this 
study was based on Simar and Wilson’s (2007) double bootstrap truncated regression approach. 
This study found that the six Arkansas institutions were inefficient in the production of 
bachelor’s degrees during the 2011-2012 academic year, given the inputs included in the model 
and in relationship to the national sample of Master’s Colleges and Universities. Through the 
second-stage regression analysis, this study also found that a state’s per capita real gross 
domestic product (GDP) was a positive and statistically significant determinant of estimated 
efficiency for both groups of institutions (larger and medium/smaller). For the medium/smaller 
group, higher education’s share of total state expenditures was a negative and statistically 
significant determinant of estimated efficiency, while the share of operating revenues based on 




larger group institutions. The existence of a performance-funding program was found to not be a 
significant determinant of institutional efficiency through the second-stage regression analysis. 
Using Eisenhardt’s (1989) taxonomy of behavior- versus outcome-based contracts, this study 
also found that agency theory served as a viable conceptualization of why the state of Arkansas 
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The realities of performance-based funding in Arkansas became more palpable with this 
headline in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette: "2 Colleges Face Funding Cuts Under Formula" 
(April 26, 2014, Retrieved from http://www.arkansasonline.com). The two institutions, the 
University of Central Arkansas, a four-year university in Conway, and Southern Arkansas 
University Tech, a two-year community college in Camden, failed to earn the minimum six out 
of 10 points needed to obtain the 5% of base funding tied to performance measures outlined in 
the newly implemented performance-funding model for FY 2014. According to the article, 
extenuating circumstances may lead to the reinstatement of the funding losses to these two 
institutions. However, the recognition that failing to meet outcome thresholds established by the 
existing performance-funding model can result in funding losses is likely to serve as a reality 
check for stakeholders in higher education, as the state of Arkansas continues implementation of 
a program that will ultimately result in 25% of base funding being tied to performance measures 
in FY 2018 (ADHE, 2011). 
Context of the Problem 
Created by the adoption of Act 1203 of 2011, the newest iteration of performance-based 
funding in Arkansas is indicative of the shift toward greater external accountability that has been 
experienced in American higher education during the past 30 years. In 1985, the First National 
Conference on Assessment in Higher Education brought to the forefront a heightened focus on 
assessment, although issues such as definitions, instruments, and implementation that plagued 
the assessment movement of the 1980s remain concerns today (Ewell, 2002). More than 20 years 




commonly known as the Spellings’ Commission Report, indicated that calls for increased 
accountability require a systemic and systematic response: "To meet the challenges of the 21st 
century, higher education must change from a system primarily based on reputation to one based 
on performance. We urge the creation of a robust culture of accountability and transparency 
throughout higher education" (p. 21). A key recommendation stemming from the Spelling’s 
Commission Report was shifting from a primary reliance on input-based measures of quality to a 
performance-based system in which outcomes are central to substantiate claims of institutional 
efficacy. 
The trend for increasing higher education accountability has partially been attributed to 
policymakers recognizing that reporting requirements alone are insufficient mechanisms to 
improve operational efficiency, which has encouraged a "refocusing of attention, particularly in 
resource allocation, on outcomes of activities or programs, ideally in relation to explicit goals, 
rather than the traditional focus on inputs" (Zumeta, 2001, p. 16). The scrutiny by policymakers, 
characterized as the "crosshairs of legislative oversight" (Doyle & Noland, 2006, p. 7), is viewed 
by many policy researchers as justifiable, given that public policy and accountability are 
inextricably linked through the amount of public funds being provided to institutions of higher 
education from the state coffers (Zumeta, 2011). Heller (2011) stated that institutions of higher 
education have been scrutinized at increasing levels in recent years as more "attention has 
focused not only on what colleges and universities do, but also on how well they do it and what 
resources they use" (p. 2). 
Policymakers are not the only stakeholders calling for increased accountability of 
American colleges and universities. Many employers have witnessed first-hand a misalignment 




purportedly assure the development of educational capital needed when entering the workforce 
(Middaugh, 2010; Miller & Ewell, 2005; Miller, 2002). Parents preparing to fund their child’s 
post-secondary education are faced with the challenge of paying for tuition, room and board at 
four-year public universities that has increased more than 40% between 2001-02 ($11,744 in 
constant 2011-12 dollars) and 2011-12 ($16,789 in constant 2011-12 dollars) (NCES, 2013a). 
Various reasons have been posited for the perspectival shifts that have led to an increase 
in the view that higher education should be held more accountable. One such reason is the 
demise of an unwritten social compact between higher education and society. According to 
Burke (2005a), "Americans accepted as an unquestioned act of faith that access to a college 
education was a public good for society," as this social compact "obligated state taxpayers to 
provide adequate operating funding for public colleges and universities, which in turn would 
keep tuition reasonably low" (p. 5). Closely aligned with the relatively recent demise of the 
social compact is the perception that a college education provides more of a private benefit to the 
individual as opposed to benefiting society as a whole, even while colleges and universities are 
expected to contribute to the economic development of the state by producing well-trained 
citizens for the workforce (Burke & Associates, 2005; Wall, Frost, Smith, & Keeling, 2008). 
Based on the results of a series of national surveys, many Americans think that higher education 
is more necessary, yet less accessible to many qualified students; that institutions could increase 
the number of students educated while neither lowering the quality of education provided nor 
increasing costs for attendance; and that colleges and universities have become more corporate in 
nature, caring more about "the bottom line" as opposed to "making sure students have a good 
educational experience" (Immerwahr, Johnson, Ott, & Rochkind, 2010, p. 12). Given the existing 




higher education as deficient in its production of degreed and credentialed citizens who 
contribute to the economy. 
The consistent calls for increased external accountability are in stark contrast to the level 
of autonomy that higher education, in general, has been afforded throughout much of its history. 
Autonomy in colleges and universities stems, in part, from the level of professionalism and 
education that characterizes institutions of higher education (Burke, 2005a). Colleges and 
universities also serve a unique "dual" role in society, as institutions are "both involved and 
withdrawn; both serving and criticizing; both needing and being needed" by those constituencies 
who provide support (Berdahl, 1990, p. 169). Thus, a clash between institutional autonomy and 
public accountability has resulted, in which, "Institutions of higher education face conflicting 
pressures both to protect their independence and autonomy (on grounds of greater effectiveness 
and lower cost), and simultaneously to demonstrate their accountability (on grounds of acting in 
the public interest)" (Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008, p. 181). Zumeta (2011) argued that a lack of 
response by higher education to external accountability efforts will likely result in institutions 
losing "stock with citizens and legislators" while "jeopardizing its support and ultimately its 
autonomy" (p. 142). 
Within a climate where this autonomy-accountability tension is rising, an examination of 
productivity and quality indicators tends to support concerns expressed by various groups 
regarding the need for increased levels of accountability of colleges and universities. 
Policymakers linking educational attainment with economic viability can point to findings that 
indicate four-year college graduates annually contribute, on average, $5,900 more than high 
school graduates to local, state, and federal tax revenue, which translates to more than $177,000 




beyond tax revenue, as policymakers argue remaining competitive in a global marketplace will 
require substantial increases in the number of adults with post-secondary credentials. According 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2013), the United 
States ranks 5th in the world in the percentage (42% in 2011) of 25-64 year-old adults that have 
attained "tertiary education", but ranks only 12th in the percentage (43% in 2011) of 25-34 year-
olds in this same category. The 25-34 year-old demographic is 21 percentage points behind the 
leading country, Korea, who has a 64% tertiary attainment rate for 25-34 year-old citizens 
(OECD, 2013). In recognition of these issues, President Obama, during his State of the Union 
Address in 2009, established a goal of having the "highest proportion of college graduates in the 
world" by 2020 (USDOE, 2011b). In order for this goal to be accomplished, it is estimated that 
the U.S. needs to raise the attainment rate by 50% from the 2009 level of 39%, which would 
bring the national college attainment rate to 60% in 2020 (USDOE, 2011b). 
At the state level, Arkansas Governor Beebe utilized a similar platform in his State of the 
State Address in 2011, in which Beebe charged, "We can and must double the number of college 
graduates in Arkansas by 2025 if we are to stay competitive. This is a lofty goal aimed at the 
future, but we must begin implementing it today" (ADHE, 2011, p. 2). According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s 2011 American Community Survey results, Arkansas ranked 48th in the 
country in the percentage of 25 to 64 year-old adults with a bachelor’s degree or higher at 21.6%, 
and ranked 47th with 22.7% of 25 to 34 year-old adults with a bachelor’s degree or higher 
(NCHEMS, Retrieved from http://www.higheredinfo.org/). For Arkansas to achieve Beebe’s 
established goal, Arkansas institutions of higher education would need to increase the number of 
post-secondary credentials (bachelor’s degrees, associate degrees, and certificates) awarded 




The recognition that the state lacks an educationally-trained, competitive workforce, 
coupled with Beebe’s charge in 2011, provided the political impetus for policymakers to revisit 
performance-funding policy. These efforts resulted in the passage of Act 1203 of 2011 that 
Beebe signed into law on April 5, 2011, and which led to the creation of the performance-
funding model that currently exists in Arkansas (ADHE, 2011). The adoption of Act 1203 served 
as a continuation of Arkansas’s history of performance-funding that has been characterized as a 
"classic case of volatility" (Burke & Associates, 2005, p. 224).  
Burke (2002) provided the most extensive overview of performance-funding policy in 
Arkansas. The creation of the Productivity Fund through Act 1029 signed by Governor Jim Guy 
Tucker in April 1995 represented an endorsement of performance funding as a Not Mandated 
Program similar to those in place in Missouri and Tennessee. The Productivity Fund for the 
1995-1997 biennium included $10 million in 1996-1997 and $15 million in 1997-1998 for 
performance-based funding. The first disbursement of these funds occurred during FY 1995-
1996, with 70 percent of funds given to universities, 25 percent to two-year colleges, and five 
percent allocated for alumni/employer survey development. By 1997, the initial performance-
funding system in Arkansas was terminated, as the demise of this performance funding effort 
was an amalgamation of loss of political support following the Whitewater scandal-based ousting 
of Tucker and the new priorities under his successor, Mike Huckabee; legislative and 
institutional push-back against the Department of Higher Education; and "Inherent flaws in the 
productivity program" collectively contributed to the failure of performance funding (Burke, 
2002, p. 225). The second iteration of performance funding in Arkansas occurred with the 
passage of legislation mandating a new funding program in 2001, which was promptly 




The current iteration of performance funding in Arkansas is an example of what has been 
deemed Performance Funding 2.0 (PF 2.0). For the first 25 years of performance-based funding 
in the United States, Performance Funding 1.0 (PF 1.0) programs focused primarily on providing 
bonuses, above and beyond state-level base funding, to institutions meeting student outcome 
measures (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). Beginning in 2005, a number of states started adopting 
policies aligned with PF 2.0 principles, as these new programs shift the structure of incentives to 
reside within base funding formulas that require institutions to meet student outcome indicators 
in order to receive a portion of base funding (Jones & Snyder, 2012).  
Another distinguishing feature of PF 2.0 programs is that a larger proportion of 
incentivized funding is linked to performance outcomes. Under PF 1.0 models, institutions 
would receive between 1% and 6% of a bonus for achieving certain outcomes, whereas PF 2.0 
programs attach a significantly higher percentage of base funding to identified outcomes 
(Dougherty et al., 2014; Shin, 2010). For example, Tennessee’s performance-funding program 
links 85-90% of state appropriations to performance outcomes, and Ohio has linked 80% of state 
general funding to measures of course and degree completions (Dougherty et al., 2014). In 
Arkansas, 25% of base funding will be tied to performance indicators once the program is fully 
implemented in 2017-18 (ADHE, 2011). At present, 25 states have already implemented, and 
five more states are transitioning to, funding models that incorporate student-level outcomes (PF 
2.0) (NCSL, Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/). 
Within performance-funding models, graduation rates serve as the primary metric by 
which institutional productivity is measured, as graduation rates serve as one of the primary 
areas of concern for proponents of PF 2.0 programs (Burke, 2005b; Rabovsky, 2012). In contrast 




2013b), six-year graduation rates, defined as a calculation of the full-time, first-time 
undergraduate students completing a bachelor’s degree at their originating institution within six 
years, have increased from 52.2% for the 1991 cohort (NCHEMS, Retrieved from 
http://www.higheredinfo.org/) to 59.2% for all four-year institutions for the 2006 cohort (NCES, 
2013b). In Arkansas public four-year institutions, the six-year graduation rate for the 1996 cohort 
was 35.4% and increased to 38.7% for the 2004 cohort, with a high of 40.4% for the 2001 cohort 
(Retrieved from http://collegecompletion.chronicle.com/). 
The Chronicle of Higher Education’s College Completion Web site also provides an 
institution-level view of how four-year public institutions compare to one another across a 
variety of measures. As can be seen in Figure 1, the 10 four-year public universities in Arkansas 
exhibit dramatically different results. Six-year graduation rates in 2010 ranged from 20.8% at the 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock to 57.9% at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. The 
measures of efficiency included in the College Completion chart, "Completions per 100 
students" and "Spending per completion", indicate that the University of Arkansas at Monticello 
demonstrated the highest average number of completions per 100 students from 2008-2010 at 
24.4, and spends the smallest amount per completion at $32,370. In contrast, the University of 






Figure 1. Comparison of Arkansas Public Four-year Institutions. Adapted from 
http://collegecompletion.chronicle.com/.  
The heightened cries for greater productivity from colleges and universities are occurring 
at the same time that funding from state and local governments has been proportionally 
decreasing, resulting in essentially a do-more-with-less scenario. In terms of raw dollars, state 
and local governments have increased direct support to institutions of higher education, as 
appropriations rose from $35.3 billion in 1985 ($74.8 billion in constant 2013 dollars) to $88.9 
billion in 2008 before receding to $81.6 billion in 2013 (SHEEO, 2011, 2014). In terms of 
proportion, even with these increases, state and local support has been shrinking in the 
appropriations per FTE (full-time equivalent). In 1988, educational appropriations from state and 
local governments accounted for $8,579 per FTE (constant dollars), rising to a peak of $8,790 




(constant dollars) (SHEEO, 2014). During this period, net tuition revenue per FTE (constant 
dollars) increased by 103.9%, rising from $2,685 per FTE in 1988 to $5,475 per FTE in 2013 
(SHEEO, 2014). In 1988, net tuition revenue per FTE accounted for 23.8% of the $11,264 
(constant dollars) average cost per FTE of enrollment in public four-year institutions (SHEEO, 
2014). In 2013, net tuition revenue per FTE accounted for 47.5% of the $11,580 (constant 
dollars) average cost per FTE of enrollment in public four-year institutions (SHEEO, 2014). 
These changes in per FTE funding indicate that a greater burden for financing higher education 
is being placed on students and their parents, supporting concerns from various stakeholders that 
decreasing the affordability of higher education will reduce access that will hinder the capacity 
of American universities to reach the goals set forth by state and federal policymakers. The 
current reality provided by the national- and state-level trends revealed by the performance and 
financial data lend credence to the observation that public institutions have become "instruments 
of public policy and strategic investment" that are now "too important and too costly to be left to 
(their) own devices" (Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008, p. 181). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was two-fold:  
1. To utilize agency theory as a conceptual framework to explore the contractual 
relationship between the state of Arkansas and its public institutions of higher education 
created by the latest iteration of performance-funding policy; and, 
2. To examine the institutional efficiency of the four-year public Master’s universities in 
Arkansas toward achieving one of the mandatory outcomes, number of bachelor’s 




Performance-funding polices, which are essentially designed to increase institutional 
productivity through financial inducements (Burke, 2002; Conner & Rabovsky, 2011; 
Dougherty, Natow, Hare, Jones, & Vega, 2011), can be viewed as a contract between state 
governments and institutions (Kivistö, 2008). With its focus on the relationship between 
principal and agent, agency theory is well-suited to examine the motivations of both the 
government (principal) and institutions of higher education (agents) as it relates to achieving the 
goals and objectives desired by the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Moe, 
1984).  
With regard to the second purpose of this study, the legislation establishing the new 
performance-funding framework directly stipulates it was designed to "...ensure accountability 
and efficiency with our limited financial resources in trying economic times" (Arkansas 
Performance Funding Act of 2011, p. 7). However, the supporting documentation published by 
the Arkansas Department of Higher Education does not include any specific mechanism within 
the performance-funding model that accounts for the efficiency component of the legislation 
(ADHE, 2011). Therefore, this research applied an analytical methodology, data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), which has the potential to provide a component to Arkansas’ performance-
funding program that is currently missing: an evaluation of institutional efficiency. 
Statement of Research Questions 
In order to achieve the stated purpose, the following research questions were posited: 
1. When compared to similar institutions nationally, how efficient are four-year public 
Master’s universities in Arkansas at utilizing resources to achieve one of the mandatory 





2. Which environmental factors contribute to the estimated efficiency of the inefficient four-
year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this study? 
3. Does the existence of a performance-funding program impact the estimated institutional 
efficiency of the four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this 
study? 
4. What are the policy implications related to institutional efficiency within Arkansas' 
performance-funding program? 
Definitions 
 The definitions below are associated with agency theory, which served as the conceptual 
framework of this study, and data envelopment analysis, which was the analytical technique used 
in this study.  
 Accountability: Responsibility for one’s actions to someone or to multiple parties as a 
result of legal, political, financial, personal, or morally-based ties (Zumeta & Kinne, 
2011).  
 Adverse selection: The existence of  informational asymmetries, due to the combination 
of private information and self-interest of the agent, that exists prior to the contractual  
arrangement commencing, which can create incentive for agents to misrepresent their 
true abilities and motivations (Kivistö, 2007). 
 Agency problem: Act of entering into a contract results in the principal delegating certain 
aspects of the decision-making process to the agent, providing an opportunity for the 
agent to choose self-interested actions that may be divergent when compared to the best, 




 Behavior-oriented contract: Relies on the monitoring of agent’s actions (behaviors) and 
rewarding those actions, as the principal utilizes reporting requests, site visits, reviews, 
and evaluations as monitoring mechanisms in an attempt to overcome the agency 
problem in the principal-agent relationship (Kivistö, 2008; Lassar & Kerr, 1996).  
 DMUs: Decision-Making Units (DMUs) that are typically the unit of analysis when 
utilizing the data envelopment analysis (DEA) analytical technique, as DMU was 
originally used to delineate the application of DEA methods to public institutions as 
opposed to the private sector (Avkiran, 2001; Banker, Charnes, & Cooper, 1984; 
Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978). 
 Efficiency: A DMU attains full (100%) efficiency if and only if no inputs or outputs can 
be improved without worsening other inputs or outputs (Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2011). 
 Goal conflicts: One of the primary assumptions of agency theory, goal conflicts exist 
when there is misalignment between the goals and/or preferences of the principal and the 
goals and/or preferences of the agent in a contractual relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984; Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
 Informational asymmetries: One of the primary assumptions of agency theory, 
informational asymmetries occur when agents have more information than the principals 
in the contractual relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984; 
Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
 Input slacks: Within a DEA model using an output orientation, slacks represent an over-




 Master’s Colleges and Universities: Carnegie Classification for institutions awarding 50 
or more master’s degrees while awarding fewer than 20 research doctorates during the 
update year (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2014). 
 Moral hazard: Occurs when an agent fails to exert maximum effort in attempting to 
achieve the goals of the principal, which may include an agent either actively or passively 
avoiding his/her work responsibilities by using company time to work on personal 
projects (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 Outcome-oriented contract: Relies on incentive-based mechanisms, such as commissions 
and financial rewards that compensate agents for achieving agreed-upon outcomes that 
have the potential to reduce the agency problem by providing an incentive for the agent 
to align personal goals and actions with those of the principal in the principal-agent 
relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kivistö, 2007). 
 Performance funding: Outcome-based mechanism in which state funding is directly 
linked to campus performance on specified indicators, as the linkage between funding 
and performance is considered “tight, automatic, and formulaic” (Burke, 2005b, p. 219). 
Assumptions 
 The underlying assumptions related to agency theory were: 
1. Informational asymmetries and goal conflicts exist simultaneously in the principal-agent 
relationship between state government and institutions of higher education, creating the 
agency relationship. 
2. Principals and agents are self-interested, utility maximizers that exhibit bounded 
rationality and are risk-averse. 




4. Behavior-oriented contracts are most efficient when a long-term contractual relationship 
exists that is characterized by high-level information systems, low goal conflict and 
outcome measurability, and high outcome uncertainty and task programmability. 
5. Outcome-oriented contracts are most efficient when a short-term contractual relationship 
exists that is characterized by low-level information system, high goal conflict and 
outcome measurability, and low outcome uncertainty and task programmability.  
The underlying assumptions related to data envelopment analysis (DEA) were: 
1. DEA is able to accommodate multiple inputs and multiple outputs in a single model. 
2. DEA does not require the specification of a functional form on the production function a 
priori, but allows the inputs and outputs in the data to determine, through linear 
programming methods, the production function. 
3. DEA assumes that input and output data do not contain measurement error or noise. 
4. All deviation from the efficiency frontier is due to DMU inefficiency. 
5. DMUs are measured against only the peer DMUs included in the data. 
6. Inputs and outputs used in the DEA estimations can be different units. 
7. Inputs and outputs will be numerical and positive. 
8. DMUs are homogenous and produce the same outputs from the same inputs, albeit 
possibly in varying quantities. 
Delimitations and Limitations of the Study 
The sample selected was a primary delimitation of this study. The choice to use the six 
public, four-year Master’s universities in Arkansas, as opposed to all 10 four-year public 
institutions, was partly due to the homogeneity assumption within the DEA analytical 




homogeneity assumption would hold. The selection of institutions strictly from Arkansas 
stemmed from the state’s adoption of its new performance-funding program in 2011. This choice 
was restrictive from the standpoint that the analysis ignored previous performance-based policies 
and programs in Arkansas, as well as performance-based programs in other states. Given that 
DEA is a data-driven, deterministic technique, the selection of input and output variables in the 
DEA model, as well as the environmental variables in the second-stage regression analysis, was 
delimited based on a review of the pertinent literature and the variables needed to answer the 
research questions posited in this study. The selection of a single output variable, number of 
bachelor’s degrees awarded, was precipitated by the emphasis being placed on increasing the 
production of college graduates to meet the challenges issued by state and federal policy officials 
and other higher education stakeholders.  
Several limitations existed in this research study. From the standpoint of agency theory, 
the assumption that principals and agents are self-interested utility maximizers limited the 
consideration that other human motivations, such as altruism, belief, respect for authority, and 
need for achievement and recognition, play a role in decision-making processes. Tangential to 
the narrow view of human motivation was the parsimonious nature of agency theory due to 
minimal assumptions that can be considered a limitation of agency theory when applied to the 
context of complex policymaking environments such as higher education. 
With regard to the analytical technique used in this study, DEA assumes that all deviation 
from the efficiency frontier is due to inefficiency, which served as a limitation because statistical 
noise, such as measurement error, or stochastic factors beyond the control of the DMUs were not 
considered in the base DEA model. Additionally, the cross-sectional data used in this study was 




publicly available through IPEDS was a limitation from the standpoint of institutions and 
policymakers being restricted from utilizing results of DEA analysis within the confines of 
decision-making processes. Given that DEA is a non-parametric, deterministic approach, this 
study was also limited in its generalizability, as the inclusion of different institutions and 
different combinations of input and output variables could shift the efficiency frontier and impact 
which institutions are deemed efficient, and the distance of inefficient institutions away from that 
frontier. 
Significance of the Study 
Calls for higher education institutions to increase their productivity and efficiency have 
rang out from Main Street to Pennsylvania Avenue, as more "attention has focused not only on 
what colleges and universities do, but also on how well they do it and what resources they use" 
(Heller, 2011, p. 2). One of the policy levers used by American states during the past 35 years 
has been performance-based funding. Most of the states that have passed performance-based 
funding legislation have experienced at least one adopt-implement-abandon-cycle during this 
time frame, including Arkansas, which is now in its fourth iteration of performance-funding 
programs (Gorbunov, 2013). The logical question to ask is, Why did Arkansas’s legislators 
choose to re-vise and re-implement a policy lever that had failed three previous times, especially 
in light of numerous research studies that have shown performance-funding programs  have 
historically had minimal, if any, impact on improving institutional outcomes? (Archibald & 
Feldman, 2008; Liefner, 2003; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; Rabovsky, 2012; Sanford & 
Hunter, 2011; Sav, 2012; Shin, 2010; Tandberg & Hillman, 2014; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008).  
This study was significant from the perspective of utilizing agency theory as a conceptual 




performance-funding program in Arkansas as a contract between principal (government) and 
agent (institution). In this contractual relationship, the principal attempts to coerce the agent to 
modify institutional goals, objectives, and actions by linking a portion of state appropriations to 
the demonstrated production of outcomes designed to meet the preferred goals and objectives of 
the principal. While the application of agency theory to the context of higher education has 
increased during the past 20 years (Lane & Kivisto, 2008), few research studies have been 
conducted in which the principal-agent relationship within performance-funding policies has 
been the focus. This study served to increase the knowledge base within this specific sector of 
policymaking by exploring the dynamic relationship between state government and institutions 
of higher education within the performance-funding paradigm. 
This study also made a contribution to the extant literature by concentrating on an under-
addressed segment of higher education. Master’s universities are rarely the focus of studies in the 
higher education literature, so the selection of Master’s universities as the population under study 
expanded the collective understanding related to how these types of institutions function from an 
efficiency standpoint that has received minimal attention in the literature (Henderson, 2009). The 
findings from this research have the potential to be utilized by policymakers in the state of 
Arkansas who seek to improve the existing performance-funding program, as well institutional 
administrators functioning as sub-agents who are attempting to increase efficiency and 
productivity that will lead to achievement of the goals and objectives of the performance-funding 
program. 
Based on an extensive review of the literature, it appears that this study was one of the 
few that has utilized data envelopment analysis in the evaluation of Master’s institutions in the 




Wilson’s (2007) double-bootstrap, two-stage truncated regression approach within the context of 
higher education in the U.S. From a methodological perspective, this study was significant in 
that it added to the international literature that has utilized one of Simar and Wilson’s (1998, 
1999, 2000, 2007) bootstrap techniques in estimating the efficiency of higher education 
institutions (Johnes, 2006; Lee, 2011; Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013; Wolszczak-Derlacz 
& Parteka, 2011). The results of this study, which included comparative estimates of institutional 
efficiency for the Master’s universities in Arkansas, as well as determinants of the impact of 
environmental variables on institutional efficiency, have the potential to be useful to 
policymakers as an additional metric that can fill a gap in the existing performance-funding 
program; to campus administrators at inefficient universities seeking to identify peers at the 
national level from which to learn regarding best practices associated with institutional 
efficiency; to taxpayers and families concerned with whether the institutions they are supporting, 
through taxes or tuition, are converting inputs to outputs as efficiently as possible.  
Conceptual Framework of the Study 
Agency theory served as the conceptual framework utilized in this study. At its core, state 
governments (principals) utilize performance funding as a mechanism to incentivize desired 
actions of institutions (agents) to achieve objectives that are aligned to the government’s 
(principal’s) goals. Agency theory assumes that both the principal and agent are self-interested, 
utility maximizers who are risk-averse and make decisions that exhibit bounded rationality 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). According to agency theory, contractual relationships between principals and 
agents consist of an agency problem that results from the principal relinquishing certain aspects 
of the decision-making process to the agent, which provides the agent to act opportunistically in 




Meckling, 1976). Agency theory contends that this agency problem stems from the concurrent 
existence of two constructs: informational asymmetries and goal conflicts, both of which benefit 
the agent (Moe, 1984). Informational asymmetries occur when the agent has more and better 
information than the principal, which the agent utilizes to benefit his or her self-interests, while 
goal conflicts relate to an incongruity between the principal’s goals and objectives and those of 
the agent. These components, informational asymmetries and goal conflicts, must exist in order 
for a principal-agent agreement to be considered an agency relationship within the conceptual 
framework of agency theory. 
At its core, agency theory is concerned with the measures taken by principals in 
overcoming the agency problem, as a simple characterization of the agency problem is the 
principal "insuring that the agent does in fact act for the principal" (Mitnick, 1975, p. 27). 
Principals design and implement monitoring and incentive structures that attempt to mitigate the 
potential for issues associated with informational asymmetries, including adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when agents misrepresent their experience, abilities and 
motivations prior to entering into a contract with the principal, while moral hazard (or shirking) 
occurs during the contractual period and refers to when agents fail to exert maximum effort 
toward achieving the goals of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kivistö, 2007; Lane, 2012; Moe, 
1984). In agency theory, the monitoring activities enacted by a principal are essentially attempts 
to decrease informational asymmetry by requiring agents to provide information that may 
otherwise not be accessible to the principal (Kivistö, 2007). 
Eisenhardt (1989) argued that principals can utilize two types of contracts when 
attempting to address the agency problem: outcome-oriented contracts and behavior-oriented 




achievement of specified performance outcomes, while behavior-oriented contracts attempt to 
monitor and reward an agent’s actions toward achieving the principal’s goals and objectives 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Kivistö, 2008; Lassar & Kerr, 1996). Eisenhardt (1989) developed a 
taxonomy comparing the two types of contracts along seven variables that can be used to predict 
when each type of contract will be most efficient to implement. Table 1 below shows the 
variables included in Eisenhardt’s (1989) taxonomy and details the differences between 
outcome- and behavior-oriented contracts based on a high-low dichotomy. 
Table 1 
Variables affecting the efficiency of behavior-oriented vs. outcome-oriented contracts 
 
Behavior-based contract is 
efficient when: 
Outcome-based contract is 
efficient when: 
Information systems High Low 
Outcome uncertainty High Low 
Risk aversion Agent Principal 
Goal conflict Low High 
Task programmability High Low 
Outcome measurability Low High 
Length of Relationship Long Short 
Sources: Eisenhardt (1989) and Lassar & Kerr (1996) 
In this research study, the principles of agency theory, including Eisenhardt’s taxonomical 
representation of outcome- and behavior-based contracts typical of agency relationships, were 
applied to the context of performance-funding policies in higher education. Through the lens of 
agency theory, this study examined the adoption of a performance-funding program for the 





 This chapter addressed the context of the research problem, the purpose of the study, 
research questions, definitions, assumptions, delimitations and limitations, significance, and the 
conceptual framework to be used in this study. This research filled a gap in the literature related 
to state governments utilizing performance-funding programs as a means of incentivizing 
increased performance and efficiency, while also informing stakeholders in Arkansas pertaining 
to the institutional efficiency of the Master’s universities included in this study. The next chapter 
provides an overview of the literature relating to higher education funding, Master’s Colleges 
and Universities, performance funding, agency theory, and data envelopment analysis. This will 
be followed by the methodology chapter that outlines the sample, research design, data 
collection, variables, and data analysis processes that were used to analyze the research question 
in this study. The fourth chapter will be comprised of the results of the study, while the final 






Two libraries served as the primary resources for collecting the works cited in this 
literature review. The Mullins Library at the University of Arkansas and the Mabee Learning 
Center at Oklahoma Baptist University provided the majority of the electronic and in-print texts 
reviewed in this chapter. Numerous articles and books were supplied through the use of 
interlibrary loan at both the Mullins Library and the Mabee Learning Center. The literature 
search for articles related to the analytical technique used in this study was facilitated by the Data 
Envelopment Analysis publication database (Gattoufi, Becker, Chandel, & Sander, n.d.). Google 
Scholar (scholar.google.com) was utilized throughout the literature search for additional 
resources not available through the libraries mentioned above. The primary search terms used 
with the electronic searches included performance-based funding, higher education, principal-
agent theory, data envelopment analysis, bootstrap, and two-stage DEA. 
A review of literature pertaining to performance-based policymaking indicated that 
American higher education is in a period of transition. This shift has been keyed by states 
moving from initial performance funding 1.0 (PF 1.0) policy mechanisms, which primarily 
involved proportionately small bonuses added to state base funding, to performance funding 2.0 
(PF 2.0) models that link a percentage of base funding to a variety of institutional outcomes 
(Burke & Associates, 2005; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Jones & Snyder, 2012). Arkansas is an 
example of a state that has transitioned to the new era of performance-funding programs, as 
Arkansas' higher education sector has previously experienced a number of adopt-implement-
abandon cycles since its initial performance-funding policy adoption in 1995 (Gorbunov, 2013). 




performance-funding policy, this chapter surveys the extant literature detailing the factors 
contributing to the adopt-implement-abandon cycle that has typified PF 1.0 programs, as well as 
explores the various reasons why numerous states have adopted/re-adopted performance-funding 
models within the second generation performance-funding paradigm. 
Performance-funding policies are designed as a governmental agency's attempt to 
incentivize institutional change that leads to increased outcomes. In the case of performance-
funding policy in higher education, a contractual relationship exists between the state (principal) 
and its public colleges and universities (agents) to produce outputs (graduates). Given the 
contractual nature of states and institutions of higher education, principal-agent theory provides a 
lens through which performance funding can be examined. At its core, principal-agent theory 
addresses the resolution of two key problems associated with this contractual agreement: the 
agency problem and the risk sharing problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). This chapter will provide an 
overview of principal-agent theory while explicating how the primary agency and risk sharing 
problems are applicable within the existing performance-funding program in Arkansas. 
The latest iteration of performance-funding policy in Arkansas consists of a variety of 
mandatory, compensatory, and optional measures of institutional performance. However, 
although the term "efficiency" is included directly in the title of the legislation, the implemented 
policy has no specific means to account for an institution’s efficient utilization of resources 
(inputs) in achieving the objectives (outputs) of the policy. This study proposes the use of data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) as an analytical approach for estimating the efficiency of public 
four-year Master’s institutions in Arkansas relative to similar institutions from a national sample 
of Master’s Colleges and Universities. This chapter will explore recent developments in the 




universities, including discussing techniques that have been developed to overcome perceived 
deficiencies within the base DEA methodology. 
This literature review will be comprised of five major sections with accompanying 
subsections and a chapter summary: challenges facing Master’s Colleges and Universities, 
overview of public higher education funding, performance-funding policy, agency theory, data 
envelopment analysis, and a chapter summary. 
Challenges Facing Master’s Colleges and Universities 
 The institutions being examined in this study include the six four-year public universities 
in Arkansas that are classified as “Master’s Colleges and Universities” in the Carnegie system 
updated in 2005 (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2014). This sample 
will include Arkansas State University, Arkansas Tech University, Henderson State University, 
Southern Arkansas University, University of Arkansas at Monticello, and University of Central 
Arkansas. The collective term used to describe this general level of institution has been 
“comprehensive universities,” stemming from the designation provided by the Carnegie 
Foundation in previous iterations of the Carnegie system (Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, 2000).  Throughout the following discussion, various phrasings of 
the terms “comprehensive universities” and “Master’s Colleges and Universities” will be used 
interchangeably.  
 The six Arkansas institutions were compared to the population of 270 four-year public 
Master’s Universities and Colleges in the United States, as this category is disaggregated into 
three levels: larger programs (171 institutions), medium programs (61 institutions), and smaller 
programs (38 institutions) (Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/).  These 




research doctorates awarded during the update year (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement 
of Teaching, 2014). Institutions awarding 50-99 master’s degrees are classified as smaller 
programs; medium programs are those institutions awarding 100-199 master’s degrees; and 
institutions awarding at least 200 master’s degrees are designated as larger programs (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2014).  
This segment of higher education was selected for several reasons, one of which is that 
Master’s universities are rarely the focus of studies in the extant higher education literature 
(Henderson, 2009). Four-year public Master’s universities comprise more than 47% (270 of 571) 
of all four-year public institutions in the United States, while awarding 36% of all bachelor 
degrees granted in the U.S. by four-year public institutions (Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/). While public higher education institutions educate 
approximately 80% of all college students and 65% of all four-year college students (Ehrenberg, 
2007a), Master’s institutions educate 36% of all students enrolled in four-year public institutions 
(Statistics calculated from “Basic Classification: Enrollment by classification category and 
control” table, (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2014)).  
Comprehensive institutions also face challenges related to improving performance 
outcomes, as the average retention rate at four-year public Master’s institutions trails that of 
four-year public doctoral/research institutions by almost 8% nationally (70.24% and 78.11%, 
respectively), while graduation rates are more than 12% lower for four-year public Master’s 
campuses in comparison to four-year public doctoral and research institutions nationally (42.55% 
versus 55.11% respectively) (Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/). In Arkansas, 
the average retention rate for the six Master’s institutions in this study is 56.5%, while the 





One of the primary challenges facing comprehensive universities is related to institutional 
identity. The rapid growth in size, structure, and mission of comprehensive universities during 
the past four decades has led to institutions “struggling to attain a consistent mission that 
distinguishes them from the doctoral universities and liberal arts colleges” (Henderson & 
Buchanan, 2007, p. 523). From 1973 to 2000, the number of Master’s Colleges and Universities 
grew by 34% (456 in 1973 to 611 in 2000), which can be compared to a 51% growth in the 
number of doctoral/research universities (173 in 1973 to 261 in 2000) and a 15% decline in the 
number of baccalaureate colleges (721 in 1973 to 606 in 2000) (Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, 2000). The expansion in the number of doctoral/research universities 
has impacted comprehensive institutions in the form of “mission creep,” which occurs when 
comprehensive institutions attempt to “remake themselves in the image of prestigious 
universities” (Gonzales, 2012, p. 338).  
In their original formation, public Master’s Colleges and Universities were teacher’s 
colleges or normal schools that had as their primary mission the education of future teachers 
(Henderson, 2009; Kassiola, 2007). This mission resulted in faculty members’ primary 
responsibilities consisting of heavy teaching loads coupled with service within the community, 
as “mission creep” has resulted in institutions increasing expectations related to faculty research 
and publications (Henderson & Buchanan, 2007). Wright et al. (2004) called comprehensive 
universities “greedy institutions” for the expanding demands placed on faculty during the past 
few decades. Even though administrators have sought to re-mission comprehensives in the vein 
of research institutions, the fierce competition for federal research funding, which is largely 




prestige associated with Master’s universities (Henderson, 2009). The existence of mission creep 
has led to faculty members expressing lower levels of job satisfaction compared with colleagues 
at other institutional types, especially during the early stages of their career in which the 
preparation received during research-based graduate studies is incongruous with the heavy 
teaching loads and service expectations found at Master’s Colleges and Universities (Henderson 
& Buchanan, 2007). 
Financial Challenges 
An additional challenge facing Master’s Colleges and Universities pertains to financial 
disadvantages in comparison to doctoral/research universities, as “certain public universities 
have stronger student demand, wealthier alumni, or a better research infrastructure than other 
public institutions” that will allow them to “generate greater revenue from alternative sources” 
(Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008, p. 209). While higher education’s share of total state 
appropriations has steadily declined during the past 30 years, primarily due to increased 
appropriations to support Medicaid (Delaney & Doyle, 2007; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Okunade, 
2004; Rizzo, 2006), there is competition between types of postsecondary institutions within 
public higher education (McLendon, Mokher, & Doyle, 2009). This competition is due, in part, 
to the impact increased state funding can have on the institution, as a $1,000 increase in state 
appropriations per FTE can produces a one percentage point increase in an institution’s 
graduation rate (Zhang, 2006). In one of the only studies to examine the determinants of 
differential state appropriations by type of institution within states, McLendon, Mokher, and 
Doyle (2009) found that Carnegie-classified research institutions across 46 states received an 
average of $2,549 more in state appropriations per FTE than public non-research institutions 




versus $5,712, respectively).  Applying Zhang’s (2006) ratio from above, the $2,549 average 
difference in state funding per FTE equates to an additional 25 graduates per 1,000 students 
enrolled at research institutions. The decrease in state funding also impacts comprehensive 
institutions from the standpoint of increased privatization requirements. Many Master’s 
institutions lack the capacity to diversify funding sources in the form of tuition increases, which 
may not be supported by market forces, or increase endowments and annual alumni funding 
streams (Ehrenberg, 2007b).  
Academic Challenges 
In addition to the identity and financial challenges faced by comprehensive institutions, 
academics also serve as an obstacle for Master’s universities. Specifically, comprehensive 
colleges and universities have experienced an increase in the number of students from 
underrepresented populations, as well as the number of students who enter college academically 
underprepared (Wright et al., 2004). These students, along with first-generation students, 
comprise a category of students who are considered more “at-risk” for not persisting and 
graduating from college (Suzuki, Amrein-Beardsley, & Perry, 2012). Underprepared students are 
often placed in remedial/developmental courses, based on results of entrance examinations such 
as ACT, SAT, COMPASS, and ACCUPLACER (Fields & Parsad, 2012), that can negatively 
impact students from the perspectives of consuming time/resources and increasing 
discouragement, while failing to promote educational outcomes such as persistence and 
completion of a college degree (Bailey, Jaggars, & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Underprepared students 
pose a practical concern for Master’s universities, as these students require additional attention, 
time and resources of faculty, which reinforces the concept of comprehensive institutions being 




prepared than the undergraduates who are attracted by and admitted to flagship institutions 
(Henderson, 2009, p. 186). With non-selective public institutions, including comprehensive 
universities, providing the bulk of remediation across higher education, students underprepared 
for the rigors of credit-bearing courses pose a challenge for Master’s universities in comparison 
to their doctoral/research university counterparts (Bettinger & Long, 2009). 
Overview of Public Higher Education Funding 
 The funding of public institutions of higher education has historically been based on 
inputs going into the university, including student enrollment and credit hours attempted by 
students, as opposed to outputs produced by the university, such as retention rates, course 
completions, and number of credentials awarded (Rabovsky, 2012).  This input-oriented focus of 
funding has been progressively shifting during the past 35 years as states have adopted 
performance-funding policies that link specified portions of state funding to the achievement of 
pre-specified performance indicators (Burke, 2002, 2005b; Dougherty et al., 2014; Shin, 2010). 
The increased usage of performance-funding programs at the state level has occurred during a 
decades-long transition for funding of public higher education in general. 
One of the primary trends in higher education funding during the past 25 years has been a 
shift in responsibility for paying for college, as students and families have increasingly assumed 
a larger share of educational costs due to rising tuition and decreasing state appropriations (John 
& Parsons, 2005). During a period when full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment in U.S. colleges 
and universities has increased from 7.3 million in 1988 to 11.3 million in 2013 (SHEEO, 2014), 
educational appropriations per FTE have decreased to the point that, “Many public institutions 
have started to describe themselves as state-assisted rather than state-supported” (Hossler, 2004, 




decreased from $8,579 in 1988 to $6,105 in 2013 (in constant 2013 dollars), while net tuition 
revenue per FTE has increased from $2,685 to $5,475 during that same time span nationally 
(SHEEO, 2014). Net tuition revenue is defined as, “The gross amount of tuition and fees, less 
state and institutional financial aid, tuition waivers or discounts, and medical student tuition and 
fees…(that) reflects the share of instructional support received from students and their families” 
(SHEEO, 2014, p. 11). 
  
Figure 2. Public FTE Enrollment and Educational Appropriations per FTE, U.S., Fiscal 1988-
2013. Constant 2013 dollars adjusted by SHEEO Higher Education Cost Adjustment (HECA). 
Adapted from “State Higher Education Finance: FY 2013,” State Higher Education Executive 
Officers, 2014, p. 18. Copyright 2014 by State Higher Education Executive Officers. Reprinted 
with permission. 
Proportionally, net tuition revenue per FTE at U.S. institutions grew from accounting for 
23.8% of the $11,264 (constant dollars) average cost per FTE of enrollment in public four-year 
institutions in 1988 to 47.5% of the $11,580 (constant dollars) average cost per FTE of 




appropriations per FTE decreased from $7,961 in 2008 to $6,173 in 2013 (constant adjusted 
2013 dollars), as the share of educational appropriations accounted for by net tuition revenue 
increased from 51.2% ($4,075) in 1988 to 61.0% ($3,763) in 2013 (SHEEO, 2014). 
  The trend of an increasing proportion of educational appropriations stemming from 
tuition revenue has been coupled with a general increase in the “sticker price” of college during 
the past three decades (Heller, 1997, p. 632). Since 1973-74, the average cost for tuition and fee 
charges at public four-year institutions in the U.S. has increased from $2,710 (in constant 2013 
dollars) to $8,893 in 2013 (in constant 2013 dollars), representing a 228% increase (Baum & Ma, 
2013). During the past decade, tuition and fee charges have increased by 41% nationally ($6,322 
in 2004-2005 to $8,893 in 2013-14) (Baum & Ma, 2013). In Arkansas, tuition and fees at public 
four-year institutions increased from an average of $5,650 in 2004-2005 to $7,238 in 2013-2014, 
representing a 28% increase (Baum & Ma, 2013).  
While tuition and fees have been increasing along with a greater share of college costs 
being shifted to students and families, another trend in higher education funding has been the 
decline in the proportion of state support for public institutions in relation to a state’s total 
spending during the past three decades. Based on the National Association of State Budget 
Officers annual State Expenditure Reports since the mid-1980s, the highest portion of higher 
education’s share of state general fund expenditures was in 1986, as the higher education share 
was just over 17% (Tandberg, 2010a).  As seen in Table 2, the steady decline in higher 
education’s share of state general fund expenditures began in 1988, essentially flattening out 

























FY 1988 15.5 34.2 8.7 5.2 5.3 1.3 29.7 
FY 1989 15.2 34.5 9.0 5.3 5.1 1.3 29.7 
FY 1990 14.6 33.5 9.5 5.5 4.9 1.3 30.8 
FY 1991 14.1 33.4 10.5 5.7 5.3 1.1 29.9 
FY 1992 13.5 34.0 12.1 5.6 5.1 0.8 28.8 
FY 1993 13.1 34.8 13.3 5.7 5.1 0.9 27.2 
FY 1994 13.0 33.9 14.2 6.2 4.9 0.9 27.0 
FY 1995 12.9 33.4 14.5 6.7 4.4 0.7 27.4 
FY 1996 12.9 34.4 14.8 6.9 3.9 0.6 25.6 
FY 1997 13.0 34.5 14.6 6.8 3.6 0.8 26.7 
FY 1998 13.1 35.2 14.8 6.9 3.0 0.7 26.4 
FY 1999 12.4 35.7 14.4 7.0 2.7 0.9 26.7 
FY 2000 12.8 35.7 14.4 7.0 2.7 0.9 26.7 
FY 2001 12.7 35.2 15.2 6.9 2.3 1.2 26.6 
FY 2002 12.4 35.1 15.8 6.9 2.3 0.7 25.9 
FY 2003 12.5 35.8 17.2 7.2 2.3 0.6 24.5 
FY 2004 11.7 35.8 16.9 7.0 2.3 0.5 25.8 
FY 2005 11.6 35.4 17.1 6.9 2.2 0.5 26.2 
FY 2006 11.3 34.4 17.4 6.7 2.1 0.8 27.2 
FY 2007 11.0 34.1 16.6 6.8 2.0 1.1 28.4 
FY 2008 11.7 35.0 16.0 7.0 1.9 0.8 27.6 
FY 2009 11.5 35.2 16.3 7.2 1.9 0.7 26.8 
FY 2010 11.5 35.5 14.8 7.4 1.9 0.7 28.1 
FY 2011 11.3 35.3 16.5 7.3 1.9 0.5 27.3 
FY 2012 10.1 34.8 19.3 6.9 1.5 0.5 26.9 
FY 2013 9.9 35.1 19.0 6.8 1.5 0.6 27.2 
Source: NASBO (1997, 2013) 
The category of expenditures that demonstrated growth during this time period was 
Medicaid, which experienced a 118% increase from 8.7% of state general fund expenditure in 
1988 to 19.0% in 2013, while higher education’s share decreased by 36% during that time period 
(NASBO, 1997, 2013). Extant research has shown that the share of state spending on Medicaid 




state level (Delaney & Doyle, 2007; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Okunade, 2004; Rizzo, 2006; 
Tandberg, 2010b), as “state lawmakers may see higher education as a resource they can siphon 
when needed” due to its capacity to raise tuition and fees (Tandberg, 2010a, p. 418). Other 
factors that have contributed to the share of general fund expenditures on higher education 
include the professionalism of the legislature, which is positively associated with increased 
allocations to higher education (McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; 
Squire & Hamm, 2005; Tandberg, 2010a, 2010b); legislative party in control, as a greater portion 
of Democratic legislators typically results in an increase in higher education spending (Archibald 
& Feldman, 2006; Kane & Orszag, 2003; McLendon, Hearn, et al., 2009); and gubernatorial 
control, as higher education’s share of state funding has been found to be lower under 
Republican governs (Archibald & Feldman, 2006; McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006; 
McLendon et al., 2005; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  
 An outgrowth of the reduction in state support of higher education has been the 
expansion of privatization, as the general argument has been made that if “public authorities will 
not provide adequate funds to sustain quality institutions and their growth to meet new student 
demands, then colleges and universities should seek more private resources” (Zumeta, 2004, p. 
94).  Therefore, privatization represents a shifting of institutions’ principal funding from state 
funds to non-state sources (Whitney, 2006). These non-state sources consist of, in part, student 
tuition and fees, contracts for services and grants, private donations (Zemsky, Wegner, & 
Iannozzi, 1997), and “quasi-commercial ventures such as technology licensing or equity 
investments in spin-off companies” (Zumeta, 2004, p. 95).  (Ehrenberg, 2006) argued that 
policies constructed to support privatization have been based on the view that “forcing the 




efficiencies and the elimination of waste” (p. 49). Due to this move toward privatization, “The 
state has transitioned from a primary funding source to a major donor among many other major 
donors” (Whitney, 2006, p. 45). 
 Several consequences have stemmed from the privatization movement in higher 
education. Universities, especially flagship institutions, have sought to negotiate agreements with 
state governments for an increase in institutional autonomy as recompense for diminished state 
funding (Breneman, 1997; Ehrenberg, 2006; Morphew & Eckel, 2009; Tandberg & Ness, 2011) . 
Examples include institutions in California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin (Blake, 2006; Breneman & Kneedler, 2006; Ehrenberg, 
2006; Flannery, 2011; Jacobs, 2006; Kelderman, 2009, 2012; Leslie & Berdahl, 2008; Yamada, 
2010). Within this trend, the exchange of increased autonomy for lower state support has been 
expressed as public colleges and universities seeking freedom from governmental oversight that 
“lead(s) to inefficiencies in operations” while resulting in institutions having “freedom to make 
economic decisions that will improve their ability to compete with the privates” (Ehrenberg, 
2006, p. 49). Privatization is also seen as a way to reduce the strain on state budgets while 
serving as a stabilization mechanism for long-term institutional finances (Lyall & Sell, 2006). 
The shift toward privatization also has the potential to impact access to higher education, 
especially for students from low-income families, while concerns regarding its impact on 
curriculum, teaching, tenure structure, and institutional mission have been expressed (Lyall & 
Sell, 2006; McPherson & Schapiro, 2001). 
 Discussing privatization in terms of a paradigm shift, Whitney (2006) indicated that 
“fundamental elements of higher education…would be reconsidered” (p. 43). One example 




facilities that are not supported by state funds have been regulated similarly to those projects 
funded by state appropriations (Whitney, 2006). However, Whitney (2006) argued that within 
the privatization paradigm, the source of the funding would have control. For example, facilities 
constructed and maintained through student fees could fall under the review and approval of 
students and alumni, not legislators or governing boards (Whitney, 2006). In the privatization 
paradigm, Whitney (2006) also discussed that institutions may elect to comply with those 
mandates that are funded and would consider unfunded mandates as “recommendations”, which 
might include institutional responses to policies related to admissions, financial aid, remedial 
courses, distance education, and affirmative action (Whitney, 2006, p. 43). 
 The expansion of fundraising and university development efforts is another trend in how 
institutions of higher education are funded, as current fiscal realities make the addition of private 
funds an increasingly important portion of public institutional budgets (Nelson, 2009). Once 
considered a mechanism primarily for private institutions, fundraising has become a high priority 
for public universities seeking to off-set losses due to cuts in state funding (Hossler, 2004), 
serving as a cost-effective alternative means of generating revenue that can “substantially 
increase the amount of discretionary dollars available to institutional leaders” (Cheslock & 
Gianneschi, 2008, p. 210). According to the Digest of Education Statistics (NCES, 2013c), the 
total voluntary support for all degree-granting institutions in the United States (in constant 2010-
2011 dollars) increased from $2.3 billion in 1949-50 to more than $31 billion in 1999-2000, as 
the annual total fluctuated between a low of $29.4 billion in 2009-2010 and a peak of $33.97 
billion in 2007-2008 through the 2010-11 academic year. The 2013 version of the Voluntary 
Support of Education (Kaplan, 2013) indicated that total voluntary support in 2012 was $31 




advancement officers, which included 44% from public colleges and universities, indicated a 
median planned increase of 16% in donations, with one-quarter of institutions planning for a 
more than 25% increase, during FY 2015 (Retrieved from 
http://www.academicimpressions.com/).  
Performance-funding Policies in Higher Education 
The policy landscape in American higher education has long been dominated by three 
primary constructs: affordability, access, and accountability. Affordability and access historically 
have been coupled as essential impediments that must be overcome for sufficient numbers of 
students to successfully navigate higher education. Federal policymakers began addressing 
affordability and access in the 1940s with the passage of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act 
(G.I. Bill of Rights) in 1945, which served as the first comprehensive federal direct student aid 
program and provided financial assistance to returning veterans to attend public or private 
colleges and universities in the United States (F. K. Alexander, 2001). The federal government 
continued to address affordability concerns with the passage of the Higher Education Act of 
1965 and the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Program (Pell Grant) in 1972, which serve as 
the foundation for the existing federal student financial aid system (Heller, 2011). 
However, the past three decades have seen a significant shift in perception towards a 
greater emphasis on accountability, as "Educators and policymakers have now realized that 
access alone is not sufficient, and that there must be more emphasis on the successful completion 
of degrees and academic programs"  (Breneman, 2011). Adelman (2006) put it even more 
directly: "The core question is not about basic 'access' to higher education. It is not about 




completion of academic credentials--the culmination of opportunity, guidance, choice, effort, and 
commitment" (p. xv). 
One of the primary policy levers many states have sought to utilize in promoting an 
increase in outcomes has been performance-based funding. The era of Performance Funding 1.0 
(PF 1.0) was ushered in by Tennessee's adoption of the Performance Funding Project in 1979. 
The Performance Funding Project encompassed the 23 public colleges and universities in 
Tennessee, and was an initiative developed by the higher education community independent of a 
legislative mandate (Bogue & Johnson, 2010; Lorber, 2001). Tennessee's Performance Funding 
Project is viewed as unique in higher education funding policy, given the process that led to the 
genesis of the performance-funding era, which has been cited as one of the primary reasons why 
Tennessee's Project has remained uninterrupted since its inception 35 years ago (Bogue & 
Johnson, 2010). In fact, Tennessee stands as the only state that adopted performance funding 
prior to 2000 that has continued to maintain a performance-funding program without 
experiencing a period of latency (Gorbunov, 2013). 
Tennessee's adoption of the Performance Funding Project occurred during a time when 
the primary concerns related to state funding were governance structures, resource-based inputs, 
and the equitable distribution of state support within an expanding and diverse landscape of 
public institutions of higher education (Bogue & Johnson, 2010; McLendon et al., 2006). While 
these concerns remain in place for many in higher education, Tennessee's Project was initially 
implemented during a period where economic, political, and societal factors began to influence 
the way policymakers and the public viewed higher education. This period has been deemed the 
beginning of the "outcomes revolution" during the 1980s, which was defined by six key 




 Colleges and universities grew in size and expense during the recession of the early 
1980s, resulting in greater scrutiny of budgetary allocations; 
 Many institutions turned to business-based methods of quality improvement and cost 
control; 
 Increase in commission reports complaining about workers' skills; 
 Professionalization of state legislatures; 
 President Reagan's "crusade to 'clean up the mess at Berkeley,'" which highlighted the 
increasing scrutiny of higher education; 
 Federal government's complaints about rising costs in comparison to inflation and family 
incomes sparked policymakers and taxpayers to ask, "Why does college have to cost so 
much?" (pp. 137-138). 
Even though this "outcomes revolution" was underway in America, no other states followed 
Tennessee's lead by adopting performance funding policies during the 1980s (Gorbunov, 2013). 
As an outgrowth of the previous decade, a greater level of concern and scrutiny began to 
surface during the 1990s. Deemed the "new accountability" movement within the higher 
education policy literature, this movement was motivated, in part, by states attempting to 
"redefine relationships by pressuring institutions to become more accountable, more efficient, 
and more productive in the use of publicly generated resources" (Alexander, 2000). During this 
time, the focus began to shift from inputs to outcomes, as policymakers sought to establish 
effective governance and regulatory structures that facilitated measuring and rewarding 
performance of institutions (Breneman, 2011; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008). One of the initial 




Know and Campus Security Act of 1991, which mandated that institutions of higher education 
publish graduation rate data (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). 
A primary policy lever adopted by many states during this expanded emphasis on 
accountability in the 1990s was performance-related policies and programs. Under the "new 
accountability" movement, states began attempting to systematically link state-level funding to 
college and university performance using three primary mechanisms (Burke & Associates, 2005; 
Dougherty et al., 2013; Rabovsky, 2012; Shin, 2010):  
 Performance reporting requires institutions to detail institutional performance, as 
publicity, not funding, serves as the primary lever to incentivize institutional 
improvement.  
 Performance budgeting is a flexible, albeit uncertain, type of funding that allows 
governmental officials discretion in utilizing institutional performance as one measure 
when determining budgetary allocations to colleges and universities.  
 Performance funding is an outcome-based mechanism in which state funding is directly 
linked to campus performance, as "Performance funding is said to have the sharpest 
'teeth' because this program ties budget allocations tightly to campus performance--to the 
extent that campuses may actually lose funding should they fail to perform adequately" 
(McLendon et al., 2006). 
Historically, performance reporting has been the most popular form of performance-
based accountability, as more than 90% of all states have adopted some form of performance 
reporting policy (Burke & Associates, 2005). Recent trends have shown a shift in state policy 
adoption toward utilizing performance funding instead of either performance reporting or 




programs exist in the literature (Burke & Minassians, 2003; Dougherty, Natow, & Vega, 2012; 
Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Gorbunov, 2013; McLendon et al., 2006; Rabovsky, 2012; Tandberg 
& Hillman, 2014). Depending on how the researchers have operationalized their definition of 
policy adoption, these lists exhibit variations. Gorbunov (2013) provided one of the most 
comprehensive overviews, tracing state adoption of performance funding from 1979 through 
2009 across, in some cases, three different policy cycles. Gorbunov (2013) found that 27 states 
adopted performance funding at least once during the 30 years following Tennessee's 
Performance Funding Project, as Tennessee (1979) and Pennsylvania (2000) are the only two 
states that have not experienced at least one period of latency following the operational adoption 
of performance-based funding policy. In the case of Arkansas, the first policy cycle lasted from 
1995-1997; the second was from 1999-2001; the third was from 2007-2008, which entered a 
latent period due to a lack of funding in 2008 (Gorbunov, 2013). The latest iteration of 
performance funding in Arkansas was introduced with the adoption of Act 1203 of 2011, as the 
five-year phase-in process began during the 2013-14 academic year and will culminate with full 
implementation in fiscal year 2018. 
The Initial Era of Performance Funding 
During the 35 years since Tennessee's initial adoption of a performance-based funding 
model in 1979, the popularity of performance-funding mechanisms has ebbed and flowed, with 
numerous states cycling through adopt-implement-abandon sequences. The first phase of 
performance-based funding policies has been broadly deemed Performance Funding 1.0 (PF 1.0), 
which focused primarily on providing bonuses, above and beyond base funding by states, to 
institutions meeting specific student outcome indicators (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). Under 




for the successful achievement of performance indicators (Shin, 2010). Incentives have been 
awarded based on the achievement of student outcome indicators, input indicators, and process 
indicators, including graduation and retention rates, job placement rates, student transfers, 
licensure scores, and workforce/economic development indicators (Burke & Minassians, 2002; 
Burke, 2005b; Dougherty, Bork, & Natow, 2009). 
A variety of reasons have been posited for the shift in policymaking that led to not only 
the adoption of performance-based funding policies, but also an expanding view that higher 
education should be held more accountable for its efficient use of resources and effective 
production of degreed and credentialed citizens who contribute to the economy. Brinkman & 
Morgan (2010) provided five primary external trends impacting colleges and universities from a 
financial perspective: (1) shifting demographics; (2) "new public management" strategies that 
focus on outputs and how revenues, expenditures, and outcomes are connected; (3) perceptual 
shift from higher education being a public good to higher education being a private good; (4) 
changing revenue streams; and (5) influence of human capital theory adoption by state 
governments that frames post-secondary participation and completion rates as a key economic 
development component (p. 6). The demise of a decades-long unwritten social compact between 
higher education and society has also increased calls for greater accountability. This social 
contract was defined by a mindset in which "Americans accepted as an unquestioned act of faith 
that access to a college education was a public good for society, as well as a private good for 
students," as one of the tenets of this pseudo-contract was that states would adequately fund 
public colleges and universities, using taxpayer dollars, in order to keep tuition rates at state 




In recent years, a new social compact has arisen. The defining features of this updated 
version include an increase in the general public's understanding of the importance of college, 
coupled with the views that colleges do not mainly care about students, and that institutions 
could reduce spending, simultaneously hold down tuition and fees, while maintaining high levels 
of education (Zumeta, 2011). The rise in the public's desire for policymakers to "meet society's 
needs without spending too much taxpayer-generated money" (Liefner, 2003, p. 470) has 
coincided with the perception that a college education provides more of a private benefit to the 
individual as opposed to benefiting society as a whole (Wall et al., 2008). A series of national 
surveys indicated that many Americans think that higher education is more necessary, yet less 
accessible to many qualified students; that institutions could increase the number of students 
educated while neither lowering the quality of education provided nor increasing costs for 
attendance; and that colleges and universities have become more corporate in nature, caring more 
about "the bottom line" as opposed to "making sure students have a good educational 
experience" (Immerwahr et al., 2010). 
The Demise of First-Generation Performance-funding Policies 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, American policymakers began to move away from the 
primary structure of PF 1.0 mechanisms. The demise of PF 1.0 policies stemmed from a 
collection of factors. Over the course of the first 25 years of performance-funding policies, the 
pervasiveness of adopt-implement-abandon cycles across the policy landscape led to a view that 
performance-based policies were primarily symbolic and did not represent a high-level 
commitment by policymakers to long-term reform (Moynihan, 2008). From the perspective of 




funding policies, "Public managers often rightly perceive(d) that they can simply wait things out 
without exerting much time or energy to redesign program activities" (Rabovsky, 2012).  
In addition to the "This too shall pass" perspective, PF 1.0 policies suffered from a 
growing concern about the efficacy of these policies and programs. Shin (2010) found that states 
that had adopted performance-based accountability measures between 1997 and 2007 failed to 
see increases in institutional performance.  Rabovsky (2012) found that performance-funding 
policies had been primarily ineffective in changing state budgetary practices and had minimal 
impacts on institutional spending priorities. Tandberg and Hillman (2014) found that 
performance-funding programs had no statistically significant impact on the production of 
bachelor’s degrees during the period of 1990 to 2010. Given the complexity of institutions of 
higher education, and with student learning outcomes, such as graduation, typically taking years 
to achieve, Dougherty and Reddy (2013) argued that the relatively brief length of time that many 
PF 1.0 policies had been maintained could be viewed as a primary reason these policies had 
failed to bring about measurable changes in student learning outcomes. 
In addition to the views that PF 1.0 policies were primarily short-lived, symbolic 
mechanisms that failed to produce increased outcomes, a variety of economic factors have 
played a significant role in the demise of PF 1.0. State-level funding for higher education 
suffered during difficult economic times for states required to meet fiscal obligations associated 
with other policy domains. Policymakers, tasked with meeting required funding for Medicaid, 
correctional facilities, and K-12 education, often view higher education as a policy arena that can 
withstand financial cuts given the capacity of higher education to raise additional revenue 
through increased tuition and fees (Heller, 2011; Immerwahr et al., 2010; Wall et al., 2008). 




general fund budgets, so it is the most vulnerable target for budget cutting" (p. 85). Coupled with 
financial constraints, the instability of performance-funding levels and indicators, along with the 
small percentage of funds available in performance-funding programs, have also been cited as 
primary reasons for the demise of PF 1.0 policies (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; McLendon, 
Hearn, et al., 2009). For example, with PF 1.0 programs tying 6% or less in above-base funding 
to institutional achievement of performance indicators, institutions may not have viewed the 
bonuses as being worthy of the resource expenditure required to attain the additional funds (Shin, 
2010). 
Second-Generation Performance-funding Policies 
In part a reaction to deficiencies seen in PF 1.0, states began adopting a new form of 
performance funding (PF 2.0) policies around 2005. As of spring 2014, 25 states have already 
implemented, and five more states are transitioning to, funding models that incorporate student-
level outcomes as opposed to funding models that are exclusively enrollment driven (National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/performance-
funding.aspx). Of the existing state performance-funding policies, NCSL data indicated that 
policies in four states include only two-year institutions; five states have policies in place for just 
four-year institutions; and 16 states have adopted policies which include both two- and four-year 
institutions. 
One of the primary points of departure from first-generation programs is that new PF 2.0-
type policies include performance funding as part of the state's regular base funding instead of 
serving as a bonus awarded above and beyond base funding levels (Jones & Snyder, 2012). The 
percentage of funding tied to performance is also increasing within the new policies, and quite 




has tied 50 percent of an institution's funding to student success and completion indicators, while 
Arkansas's new system is designed to appropriate 25% of base funding tied to performance 
measures by the 2017-2018 academic year (Retrieved from 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/performance-funding.aspx). While the primary outcome 
indicator (degree completions) has carried over from PF 1.0 policies, PF 2.0 policies have 
increased the emphasis placed on intermediate achievement indicators. Course completions, 
passage of mathematics and English gateway courses, retention and progression rates, and 
students surpassing course credit thresholds have been included in many PF 2.0 programs in 
addition to the ultimate outcomes related to student attainment of credentials found in previous 
performance funding programs (Offenstein & Shulock, 2010). 
While many reasons for the original implementation of performance-funding programs 
have carried over, the intensity of these reasons has increased with the adoption of the PF 2.0 
policies. Within the social contract between higher education and the American public, colleges 
and universities experienced a great deal of autonomy (Burke & Associates, 2005). The demise 
of the social contract has resulted in a shift in the policy image surrounding post-secondary 
accountability policy, which has driven calls from various stakeholder groups for increased 
external accountability, thus reducing the level of autonomy experienced by institutions of higher 
education. The struggle for policy image characterized as an issue of whether there is a private or 
a public problem that needs to be solved (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), while Stone (1989) 
stated, "Problem definition is the active manipulation of images of conditions by competing 
political actors" (p. 299).  
In relation to PF 2.0 polices, the policy image surrounding educational attainment has 




American economy (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The impact of this change in policy image has 
resulted in various stakeholder groups viewing increased accountability of higher education via 
performance-based policies as a solution to competing in an ever-expanding global marketplace. 
American taxpayers have growing concern about the efficient use of fiscal resources by higher 
education to provide a quality undergraduate education (Nettles & Cole, 2001). Policymakers, 
responding to taxpayers' concerns, having increasingly grown to expect public colleges and 
universities to be efficient and responsive to public policy priorities and to demonstrate 
evidence-based impacts (Zumeta, 2011). By coupling rewards and sanctions within PF 2.0 
programs, "Policymakers can provide strong incentives for public agencies to reduce or eliminate 
wasteful activities and to employ entrepreneurial strategies in developing new technologies and 
methods to improve service delivery" (Rabovsky, 2012).  
Research on Impact of Performance Funding 
Recent research has struggled to find significant impacts of performance-funding 
programs. Performance funding has been researched across a variety of domains, as studies have 
explored perspectives of policy innovation and diffusion, governance structures, state budgets 
and institutional spending patterns, retention and graduation rates, and institutional efficiency 
(Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Liefner, 2003; McLendon et al., 2006, 
2005; Rabovsky, 2012; Sanford & Hunter, 2011; Sav, 2012; Shin, 2010; Tandberg & Hillman, 
2014; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008). Even considering the extant literature, "There remain 
serious gaps in our empirical knowledge about the extent to which these policies are having 
substantive impacts on budgetary processes at the state level on service delivery at the 




Liefner (2003) conducted a series of qualitative case studies from July 1998 to October 
1999 at universities in the United States (Massachusetts Institution of Technology, University of 
Texas at Austin), Switzerland (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [ETH Zurich], University 
of Basel), the Netherlands (University of Twente), and Great Britain (University of Bristol). 
Liefner (2003) applied a modified principal-agent theory in studying how resource allocation 
through various forms of payments affected the behavior of institutional personnel across the six 
institutions. Operating under the assumption of "uniform human behavior," Liefner (2003) tested 
the following two hypotheses, guided by principal-agent theory, against empirical evidence to 
determine whether principal-agent theory exhibits predictive validity:  
1. Agents that have been rather inactive before the introduction of performance-based 
resource allocation will have to work harder. 
2. With performance-based resource allocation agents will tend to avoid projects with high 
chance of failure. Departments and individuals will concentrate on activities where 
success can be expected because they will have to meet a formula's criteria or market 
demand (pp. 478-479). 
Based on interviews with 53 professors, the introduction of performance funding resulted 
in agents working harder, while professors reported the lack of performance funding encouraged 
risk-taking activities by scholars (Liefner, 2003). Further analysis indicated that professors rated 
faculty qualifications as being the most important factor in long-term success of universities, 
with the form of resource allocation and other incentives ranking below student 
ability/motivation and university culture (Liefner, 2003). While Liefner (2003) found that the 
form of resource allocation was not a factor in long-term success of universities, the author 




individuals to pay attention to the needs of governments and taxpayers, (2) help to adjust the 
organizational structures of universities more quickly to the emerging needs and opportunities, 
and (3) be used to re-allocate funds to those groups and scholars that have proved to be 
successful and to reduce the budgets of those who are not performing in an acceptable way" (p. 
486). 
In a study of spanning more than 20 years of higher education policymaking using data 
from 49 states, McLendon et al. (2005) tested eight hypotheses associated with innovation and 
diffusion of performance funding policy across three domains: general post-secondary policy 
innovation, post-secondary accountability innovation (performance funding, performance 
budgeting, and undergraduate assessment policies), and post-secondary financing innovation 
(college savings programs, prepaid-tuition programs, and broad-based merit scholarship 
programs). The authors' primary findings indicated that legislative control by Republicans was 
strongly, positively associated with general post-secondary innovation, as was the number of 
policy innovations adopted by neighboring states (McLendon et al., 2005). However, related to 
the domain that included performance funding, McLendon et al. (2005) found "the absence of 
virtually all hypothesized effects on state accountability innovation" (p. 380), as political context, 
interstate diffusion, and governance structure had minimal to no relationship with accountability 
policy innovation in this study. 
McLendon et al. (2006) studied educational attainment in 47 states, as measured by the 
percentage of adults 25 and older who had completed four or more years of college, using the 
policy innovation and diffusion framework. McLendon et al. (2006) tested 10 hypotheses related 
to intra- and inter-state characteristics in order to gauge which states were more likely to adopt 




party strength in the legislature and governance structure in higher education were the two 
statistically significant predictors of policy adoption out of the 10 hypotheses that were tested. 
For performance-funding policies, a higher percentage of Republicans in the legislature and the 
lack of a consolidated governing board resulted in a greater probability of policy adoption, while 
a lower percentage of Republicans in the legislature and a more centralized governance structure 
resulted in a greater probability for adoption of performance budgeting policies (McLendon et 
al., 2006). 
Archibald and Feldman (2008) studied the graduation rates of 187 national universities, 
comparing the typical regression-based methodology to a production frontier approach, 
specifically data envelopment analysis (DEA). In conducting their comparative analysis of 
graduation rates, Archibald and Feldman (2008) utilized four input variables: percent of students 
in the top 10% of their high school class; 25th percentile SAT score; percentage of full-time 
faculty; and cost per undergraduate. In comparing the results of the two analytic techniques, the 
authors found that the correlation between residuals produced by the regression equation and the 
technical efficiency scores produced by the DEA was .6708. Alternatively stated, the two 
techniques agreed on the placement of above average and below average institutions at a rate of 
79%. Of the 187 institutions in the study, the two techniques did not agree on 39 institutions. 
Archibald and Feldman (2008) argued that these findings support the notion that DEA is a more 
appropriate technique. For example, some institutions were rated above average under regression 
analysis, but were determined to be far below the production frontier. Such findings may be 
misleading to institutions, in that they might be satisfied with being above the average graduation 
rates in the sample, when they could be reviewing the practices of the institutions on the 




institutions rated below average by the regression equation may in fact be performing well with 
respect to their efficient use of resources determined by the production frontier. 
Shin (2010) studied the impact of performance-funding policy across 467 public four-or-
more year institutions in the United States, analyzing separately the outcome measures of student 
graduation rates and federally-funded research expenditures. Shin (2010) collected six-year 
graduation rates from the Integrated Post-secondary Education Data System (IPEDS), as he also 
chose to use expenditures of federally-funded research contracts and grants to control for 
"apparent instability in funding" due to multi-year grant awards (p. 53). Shin (2010) included 
program variables designating the length of time performance funding had been adopted, and 
whether state policy consisted of performance budgeting, performance funding, or performance 
budgeting and performance funding, along with a measure of centrality ranging from low 
centralized (neither mandated programs nor prescribed indicators) to highly centralized 
(mandated programs with prescribed indicators). The author found that the growth of graduation 
rates in states with performance-based funding programs was statistically significantly different 
than states that had not adopted any measure of performance budgeting, performance funding, or 
both. However, the effect size of new accountability programs was near zero, indicating that the 
total variance explained by the model controlling for performance-based funding type was 
exactly the same as when not controlling for PBF. In examining growth of research funding, 
Shin’s (2010) research showed that states with performance budgeting programs grew more 
rapidly than states without such programs, although the growth rate for states with only 
performance funding or both performance funding and performance budgeting policies was 
essentially the same as states with no performance-based funding policy. Shin’s (2010) overall 




factors accounted for 15% of the graduation rate performance measure as compared to 76% of 
the variance being explained at the institutional level. For research funding, the state-level 
component accounted for less than 6% of the variance in research funding, with 82% being 
accounted for by the institution-level factors. 
Rabovsky (2012) studied whether states' "adoption of performance-funding policies 
corresponds with a better link between student outcomes (graduation rates, retention, and 
bachelor's degrees produced) and state appropriations, and whether these policies have any 
noticeable effects on the way that public universities prioritize activities related to research and 
instruction" (p. 676). To address the first topic, Rabovsky (2012) explored the level of financial 
support states provided in light of other factors, such as the status of the economy and other 
competitors for state's finite resources. The second research goal of this study centered on the 
shift in resource expenditures at the institutional level to determine whether colleges moved 
funding away from research-driven activities to instructional-focused activities, which would 
support Rabovsky’s (2012) causal model assumption that restructured incentives lead to an 
administrative response that improves outcomes in order to attain the financial resources 
accompanying the performance policies. Rabovsky (2012) found that performance-funding 
policies had been primarily ineffective in changing state budgetary practices and had minimal 
impacts on institutional spending priorities. Rabovsky (2012) posited that the potential remained 
for "policies to have considerable effects on administrative behavior if policymakers could more 
effectively tie larger incentives to institutional performance," which would seem to reinforce one 
of the tenets of PF 2.0 policies (p. 694). 
In their qualitative study of three states, Dougherty et al. (2013) found that financial 




providing information about state goals, providing information about institutional performance, 
and building capacity were secondary. While Tennessee, Ohio, and Indiana each exhibited high 
levels of importance related to financial incentives under both PF 1.0 and PF 2.0, greater 
variance was seen among the states on the other policy instruments utilized (Dougherty et al., 
2013). For example, building institutional capacity was viewed by interviewees as having either 
low or medium degree of importance as part of the espoused theory of action across the three 
states. In reviewing the degree of specificity related to institutional change, the three states were 
reluctant to include specific institutional change requirements in their performance funding 
structures, preferring to mandate the outcomes to be evaluated and not the means by which those 
outcomes should be achieved. While institutional autonomy and governmental overreach were 
provided as reasons for this reluctance, Dougherty et al. (2013) quoted a higher education official 
in Ohio as an example of another issue: "We did not know what campuses should do to achieve 
the performance goals. If we did know, with certainty, we would have told them. This is to 
acknowledge that we knew we were starting an experiment, with the goal of inducing campuses 
to develop new programs and policies in response to the new incentives" (pp. 27-28). The 
complexity of higher education institutions, coupled with potential negative reactions by 
institutional faculty, administrators, and staff, resulted in "ample justification for the hesitation of 
state officials to specify in close detail what changes colleges and universities should make" 
(Dougherty et al., 2013). 
Tandberg and Hillman (2014) used a quasi-experimental research design in testing 
whether the existence of performance-funding mechanisms in states impacted the completion of 
baccalaureate degrees within those states.  Tandberg and Hillman (2014) found that 




bachelors degrees during the period of 1990 to 2010. When accounting for the interaction 
between performance funding and the number of years of the program, statistically significant 
effects of performance funding were not seen until the seventh, eighth, and eleventh years of 
implementation (Tandberg & Hillman, 2014). While the magnitude of these significant effects is 
small, as coefficients ranged from 0.035 to 0.042, their results seem to support the view 
(Dougherty & Reddy, 2013) that time is a critical contributing factor in the success of 
performance funding programs. With students typically taking four to six years to graduate from 
college, previous research may have failed to find significant improvements in outcomes in part 
due to the fact that many states abandoned their performance-funding programs long before a full 
cycle of students could progress through institutions after performance funding had been 
implemented. Of the 21 states included in this study who had adopted performance funding, just 
six sustained their programs for seven or more years, as six also ended their programs in three 
years or less (Tandberg & Hillman, 2014). 
Agency Theory: Conceptual Framework of the Study 
At its core, performance-funding policies serve as a mechanism by which legislatures and 
governing boards seek to incentivize improved institutional productivity by tying funding to 
performance across a variety of student outcomes, including retention, progression, graduation, 
and job placement rates (Burke, 2002; Conner & Rabovsky, 2011; Dougherty et al., 2013, 2011; 
Tandberg & Hillman, 2014). This relationship between state governments and colleges and 
universities can be viewed in terms of a contract (Kivistö, 2008). In exchange for resources 
(inputs), the agent agrees to produce outputs (graduates) as efficiently as possible in order to 




economy). The complexities inherent in this contractual relationship between the state and 
institutions are ideally suited for examination through the lens of agency theory. 
The Development of Agency Theory 
The genesis of agency theory can be found in the works of economist Adam Smith and 
sociologist Max Weber. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith posited that managers may have 
different motivations from those of the owner who hired them, while Weber contended that 
agents often have "specialized knowledge" that could hinder how effective the principal can be 
in monitoring agents' work (Lane, 2012). These constructs became more formalized through 
research conducted during the 1970s and 1980s in the fields of economics (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Arrow, 1971; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971) and 
political science (Klitgaard, 1988; Mitnick, 1975; Moe, 1984; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). The 
collective research has provided a standardized definition of the principal-agent relationship as 
consisting of one party (principal) entering into a contractual agreement with another party 
(agent) with the expectation that the agent will perform specific tasks that result in achieving the 
desired outcomes of the principal (Moe, 1984). Within agency theory, the contract serves two 
primary purposes: establishing the tasks that the agent agrees to complete, and determining the 
agent's compensation (Mason, Slack, & others, 2003; Perrow, 1986). 
In the most general terms, agency theory can be viewed as consisting of relatively 
minimal assumptions regarding the principal-agent relationship. Following the economic 
construct of Homo Economicus, agency theory assumes that both principals and agents are 
individuals acting as rational, self-interested maximizers (Ghoshal, 2005). Much of agency 
theory has focused on agents who engage in self-interested actions that are misaligned with the 




principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mason et al., 2003). In order for an 
agency relationship to exist, two additional components must be present at the same time: 
informational asymmetries and goal conflicts (Moe, 1984), as Waterman and Meier (1998) 
characterized these two elements as the "spark plugs that power (agency) theory" (p. 177). 
Informational asymmetry occurs when the agent knows more about his own abilities, expertise, 
and honesty than the principal, as Shapiro (2005) contended that an agent "sometimes makes 
matters worse by exaggerating talents" (p. 263). Within institutions of higher education, 
informational asymmetries exist at multiple levels due to the complexities of the organizational 
structure and the specialized expertise required in the academic work of teaching and research 
(Kivistö, 2008). Goal conflicts occur when the interests and desires of the principal and agent are 
misaligned (Kivistö, 2005). The combination of informational asymmetries and goal conflicts 
provide an opportunity for agents to shirk their contractual responsibilities, which is the essence 
of the agency problem addressed by agency theory (Waterman & Meier, 1998). Table 3 provides 






Agency Theory Overview  
Construct Description 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression, management, whistle-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989, p. 59) 
Unlike other theories or theoretical frameworks, agency theory has not resided within one 
specific academic/scholarly discipline or paradigm (Kivistö, 2008). In his exploration of the 
differences between the application of agency theory across disciplines, Kiser (1999) compared 
the main characteristics of agency theory as developed in economics, political science, and 
sociology. Table 4 shows that economic and political science implementations of agency theory 
appear to be more similar, while agency theory in sociology is generally more diverse (Kiser, 
1999). For the purposes of this study, only developments in economic and political science forms 






Main Characteristics of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology 
Characteristic Economics Political Science Sociology 
Microfoundations Parsimonious, 
rationality and self-






























culture as well 
Source: Kiser (1999, p. 148) 
Within economic agency theory, two separate, but complementary streams have 
developed: positivist theory of agency and principal-agent theory that overlap in a variety of 
ways (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Jensen (1983), "Both literatures address the contracting 
problem between self-interested maximizing parties and both use the same agency cost 
minimizing tautology (although not necessarily stated in that form)" (p. 334). The streams also 
have commonalities related to "assumptions about people, organizations, and information" 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 59), while also focusing on the principal-agent contract as the unit of 
analysis (Kivistö, 2007). While sharing components, the two streams also consist of divergent 
characteristics. The literature developed under principal-agent theory tends to be viewed as more 




mathematical, empirically oriented positivist theory of agency literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen, 1983; Kivistö, 2007).  
The two streams also diverge in the particular focus of the theories. Positivist agency 
theory is primarily concerned with "identifying situations in which the principal and agent are 
likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the 
agent's self-serving behavior", while principal-agent theory focuses on determining which 
"contract is most efficient under varying levels of outcome uncertainty, risk aversion, 
information, and other variables" (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 59-60). Even though differences exist, 
Eisenhardt (1989) argued that the two streams can be considered complementary in that 
positivist theory of agency can identify alternative contract scenarios which can then be viewed 
through principal-agent theory to determine the optimal contract for the specific instance. To this 
end, Eisenhardt (1989) developed a taxonomy comparing behavior-based and outcome-based 
contracts along with variables that can be utilized to predict contractual optimality under certain 
situations. This taxonomy will be explored further in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
Concurrent with economic agency theory developments, political scientists applied the 
concepts of principal-agent relationships to explore a key Weberian concern: "[C]an elected 
politicians control the appointed bureaucrats who implement state policies, and if not, does the 
power of unelected bureaucrats threaten democracy?" (Kiser, 1999, p. 154). In political science-
constructed agency theory, bureaucrats (agents) have the benefit of informational asymmetries 
and expertise over politicians (principals) due to being more knowledgeable of organizational 
needs and having context-specific expertise (Waterman & Meier, 1998). In order to combat 
bureaucratic shirking, politicians can utilize incentive structures when designing bureaucracies, 




actions not aligned with principal preferences (McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1989; Mitnick, 
1980; Waterman & Wood, 1993). Political scientists also view the dyadic, one-principal, one-
agent assumption of economic agency theory as unrealistic in governmental agencies, allowing 
for multiple principals within complex organizational structures (Moe, 1984). 
Recognized as one of the first political scientists to apply agency theory, Banfield (1975) 
explored the primary variables associated with corruption in governmental organizations through 
the lens of the principal-agent relationship. His analysis included a comparison of economic and 
governmental institutions along key elements of agency theory, finding that, "The structural 
features of 'typical' American governmental organization differ strikingly from those of 
business" (Banfield, 1975, p. 585).  Banfield (1975) deviated from the economic agency model 
by relaxing the rational choice assumption and allowing for additional preferences of power, 
glory and "serving in a good cause" as part of the incentive system within governmental 
organizations (p. 596). This view expanded beyond the narrow focus of agent's being self-
interest maximizers posited by economic streams of agency theory (Lane, 2012).   
Banfield (1975) also diverged from the one-principal, one-agent concept of economic 
agency theory by recognizing multiple principals are often involved throughout governmental 
agencies, which "often makes monitoring more difficult and corruption in bureaucratic agencies 
higher" (Kiser, 1999, p. 154). In political science agency theory, multiple principals can extend 
beyond elected officials, including interest groups, federal agencies, media, and public opinion 
(Waterman & Meier, 1998). The influence of multiple principals often occurs through informal 
arrangements, in addition to formal contracts that are key to economic agency theory, in 




voters "in order to assemble the authority they require to maintain and if possible increase their 
power" (Banfield, 1975, p. 597).  
In his seminal article of political science-based agency theory, Moe (1984) further 
addressed differences between applications of agency theory in business-centric economic terms 
and bureaucracy-focused political science terms. In general, Moe (1984) argued that the 
incentive structures in business settings that reward agents with pecuniary (salaries, profits, 
fringe benefits) gains do not exist in public bureaucracies, where agents have minimal 
expectation they will have a "share of the 'profit' in partial payment for their effort" (p. 763). 
While economic agency theory posits self-interest financial gain as the primary motivator for 
agents, Moe (1984) expanded the motivators associated with bureaucratic behavior to include the 
concepts of budgets, slack, policy, career opportunities, and security as motivating factors for 
agents in bureaucracies. The hierarchical control and complexity of bureaucracies also 
differentiates the economic and political science views of agency, as different "types" of 
bureaucrats will focus on control mechanisms that achieve different ends, depending on the 
salience of motivational elements within their given context (Moe, 1984). The existence of 
exogenous entities that can place constraints on principals and agents within the bureaucratic 
organization, such as being able to "dictate bureaucratic goals, impose internal structures, require 
reorganization, set resource levels, and determine types and numbers of personnel," also 
differentiates how agency theory should be applied in the public sector versus the private sector 
(Moe, 1984, p. 765). 
The Agency Problem 
Regardless of academic paradigm, the essence of agency theory contends that the act of 




process to the agent, providing an opportunity for the agent to choose self-interested actions that 
may be divergent when compared to the best, or desired, interests of the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Essential to the study of the principal-agent relationship is how principals 
attempt to coerce or incentivize agents to make choices that will maximize the potential for 
achieving the principal's goals and objectives (Lane, 2012). As Lane and Kivisto (2008) stated, 
"This tension is one of the classic dilemmas at the heart of the principal-agent framework: how 
does one empower an agent to fulfill the needs of the principal, while at the same time 
constraining the agent from shirking on their responsibilities?" (p. 142). 
At its core, agency theory attempts to deal with the agency problem in principal-agent 
relationships, as the agency problem stems from the existence of informational asymmetries and 
goal conflicts between the principal(s) and agent(s) who have entered a contractual relationship 
(Kivistö, 2008). The agency problem has been viewed as generally existing in all instances 
where organizations and cooperative behavior are involved, including firms, universities, 
governmental authorities, and unions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory assumes that 
informational asymmetries and goal conflicts benefit agents, as "The agent has his own interests 
at heart, and is induced to pursue the principal's objectives only to the extent that the incentive 
structure imposed in their contract renders such behavior advantageous" (Moe, 1984, p. 756). 
A key concept that pertains to the agency problem is moral hazard. Moral hazard, also 
referred to as shirking in the literature, occurs when an agent fails to exert maximum effort in 
attempting to achieve the goals of the principal, which may include an agent either actively or 
passively avoiding his/her work responsibilities by using company time to work on personal 
projects (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moral hazard has typically been viewed as resulting from an agent 




More broadly termed moral hazard as "hidden action" (Pratt, Zeckhauser, & Arrow, 1985, p. 43), 
claiming that the term moral hazard originated in theory from the insurance sector and is 
relatively limited in its application beyond specific cases. In addition to moral hazard, adverse 
selection contributes to the agency problem due to the "unobservability of the information, 
beliefs, and values on which the decisions of others are based" (Moe, 1984, p. 754). Referred to 
as "hidden information" by Pratt et al., (1985, p. 43), Kivistö (2007) explained adverse selection 
as being caused by information asymmetries that exist prior to the contractual relationship 
commencing, as he contributed adverse selection to the combination of private information and 
self-interest that may "create incentives for agents to misrepresent themselves opportunistically 
as something that in reality they are not" (p. 19). 
Addressing the Agency Problem 
According to Mitnick (1975), the agency problem can simply be characterized as the 
principal "insuring that the agent does in fact act for the principal" (p. 27). The principal's 
essential problem is designing a monitoring and incentive structure, given the existence of a 
relationship characterized by agent-benefiting informational asymmetry and goal conflicts that 
will mitigate the potential for issues associated with agent-driven adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Moe, 1984). Essentially, monitoring by a principal is an attempt to decrease 
informational asymmetry by requiring agents to provide information that may otherwise not be 
accessible to the principal (Kivistö, 2007). 
When attempting to address the agency problem, Eisenhardt (1989) argued there are two 
basic options for the principal within the economic agency framework: behavior-oriented 
contracts and outcome-oriented contracts. Behavior-oriented contracts rely on monitoring agent's 




requests, site visits, reviews and evaluations (Kivistö, 2008; Lassar & Kerr, 1996). Outcome-
oriented contracts are incentive-based contracts that compensate agents for achieving agreed-
upon outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989). Outcome-oriented contracts, such as commission-based 
salaries, have the potential to reduce the agency problem by providing an incentive for the agent 
to align his/her goals to that of the principal while also encouraging agents to choose actions that 
are in the best interest of the principal as well (Kivistö, 2007). 
Eisenhardt (1989) posited 10 propositions that indicated whether a particular variable is 
positively or negatively associated with type of contract. The first two propositions, from 
positivist agency theory, indicate that (1) outcome-based contracts and (2) availability of 
information to verify agent behavior each promote the alignment of agent choices with 
principal's interest and goals while reducing the opportunity for moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The remaining eight propositions, two of which address risk aversion, stem from principal-agent 
theory stream, and are represented in Table 1 included in Chapter 1 of this study. 
While most of the variables included in the taxonomy are fairly self-explanatory, two 
constructs deserve further explanation. Eisenhardt (1989) introduced the concept of task 
programmability, which is "defined as the degree to which appropriate behavior by the agent can 
be specified in advance," as "the behavior of agents engaged in more programmed jobs is easier 
to observe and evaluate" (p. 62). High levels of task programmability support behavior-based 
contracts. Risk aversion is related to the extent of an individual’s "preference for adventure 
rather than security", as it is assumed that agents are more risk-averse than principals (Kivistö, 
2007, p. 17). The risk-averse nature of agents is heightened within outcome-oriented contracts, 
as there is uncertainty regarding the outcomes produced, and subsequently, the agent's 




within a behavior-based contract for both the principal and the agent, as agent insecurity is 
lowered regarding compensation and the principal is not faced with paying a "risk premium" to 
the agent (Lassar & Kerr, 1996, p. 615). 
Given that Eisenhardt's (1989) taxonomy grew out of principal-agent theory, which is 
designed to determine the most efficient contract from available options, interpreting the 
taxonomy is fairly straightforward. Behavior-based contracts are most efficient in a long-term 
principal-agent relationship where minimal goal conflict exists, the principal can effectively 
monitor agent behavior through a combination of information systems and task observability 
(programmability). Greater outcome uncertainty, limited capacity to measure outcomes, and 
agent's risk aversion contribute to behavior-based contracts being preferred. In contrast, 
outcome-oriented contracts are more efficient when a short-term contractual relationship exists, 
outcomes are certain and can effectively be measured, and the principal is more risk averse. The 
decision to use an outcome-based contract is also more effective in situations with high levels of 
goal conflict between the principal and agent, along with the principal having a limited capacity 
to monitor agent behavior through information systems and observing tasks. 
Criticisms of Agency Theory 
Criticisms of agency theory have primarily centered on the narrow view of human 
motivation and behavior assumed to define the principal-agent relationship (Kivistö, 2007). The 
assumption that agents are solely motivated by the maximization of self-interest has been 
attacked by critics who argue for more far-reaching, complex conceptualizations of human 
behavior that incorporate other human motivations, such as altruism, belief, respect for authority, 
need for achievement and recognition, and intrinsic motivation (Donaldson, 1990). Critics also 




conjunction with self-interested motivation, as Donaldson (1990) characterized this view as 
being "overly generalized" and a "cynical" conception of human morality (p. 373). While 
offering a retort against criticisms of the motivation and behavioral assumptions, agency theory 
proponents concede its limitations: "Even though agency theory does not suggest that self-
interest and opportunism are the only motivators of human beings, part of the problem is that the 
theory fails to explain the principal's utility losses by any other factor than agent opportunism" 
(Kivistö, 2007, p. 187). 
One of the most outspoken critics of agency theory, Perrow (1986) contended the 
"principal-agent model is fraught with the problems of cheating, limited information, and 
bounded rationality in general" (p. 224), while also concluding agency theory may even be 
"dangerous" because "theories shape our world; they encourage us to see it in a certain way, and 
then we exclude other visions that direct our actions" (p. 235). Arguing from a corporate 
governance perspective, Ghoshal (2005) generally criticized agency theory as having "little 
explanatory or predictive power", consisting of "unrealistic assumptions and invalid 
prescriptions", and lacking "both face validity and empirical support" (pp. 80-81). Perrow (1986) 
also claimed that agency theory addresses no clear problems, while Schmidtlein (1999) argued 
that agency theory fails to account for interactions between principal and agent beyond those 
formally defined within economic incentives and sanctions. 
Extending into political science and public policy sectors, criticisms have been levied 
against the simplicity of agency theory within the context of complex policymaking 
environments (Gerber & Teske, 2000; Koelble, 1996; Moe, 1984). The complexity of public 
sector organizations, in which multiple principals exist and individuals may at once operate as 




agency theory to handle the possible existence of stakeholders or competing principals can 
indeed be considered to be a clear limitation of the theory" (Kivistö, 2007, p. 47). Lane and 
Kivisto (2008) also argued that agency theory has limitations, especially in the public sector 
where most institutions and bureaucracies do not have the capability to exit contracts with the 
government, because there is no "questioning the legitimacy or justification of a principal's goals 
or the task to be accomplished" (p. 165). 
Agency Theory in Higher Education 
In order to consider the government-university relationship as an agency relationship, 
Kivistö (2007) stated that the relationship must contain the following elements: (a) tasks which 
the government delegates to a university; (b) resources which government allocates to a 
university for accomplishing the tasks; and (c) government interest in governing the 
accomplishment of the tasks (p. 53). The contractual relationship consisting of these three 
elements provides an opportunity for informational asymmetries and goal conflicts to exist in the 
government-university relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984). When the 
government delegates decision-making responsibilities to the university, agency theory assumes 
the agents will act as self-interested maximizers with a proclivity for shirking the responsibilities 
outlined in the contract (Eisenhardt, 1989). Lane and Kivisto (2008) contended that the 
application of agency theory, and its focus on the concept of shirking, offers practical benefits 
for researchers in a variety of policy-related issues in higher education, including performance-
based funding programs, faculty productivity, and policy implementation. 
Within the agency theory literature applied to higher education, shirking is re-visioned as 
academic ratchet, where faculty, over time, "shift effort away from tasks such as teaching, 




endeavors that are more personally or financially rewarding" (Lane, 2012, p. 290). A 
complementary construct to academic ratchet is academic lattice, which describes how 
administrative staffs in universities tend to grow relative to faculty over time, and partially as a 
reaction to the existence of academic ratchet (Ortmann & Squire, 2000). This scenario is an 
example of an intra-organizational principal-agent relationship that typifies the complexities of 
universities, which consists of multiple agency relationships throughout the hierarchical structure 
typical of higher education institutions (Kivistö, 2008). Further complicating issues related to 
agency relationships, personnel such as deans and department chairs are at once agents and 
principals, as they receive assignments and budgetary allocations from superiors (agent) while 
being responsible for making assignments and dispensing funds (principal) in their areas of 
supervision (Liefner, 2003). Given the complex, hierarchical framework of higher education as a 
public bureaucracy, many different principal-agent relationships exist that are both endogenous 
and exogenous to the institution (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). The multi-layered, multiplicity of 
principal-agent relationships in higher education presents difficulties for classical or canonical 
agency theories, which is a limitation to using agency theory in the context of higher education 
research (Kivistö, 2008). 
The second (resource allocation) and third (governing the accomplishment of tasks) 
elements required for the government-university relationship to be considered an agency 
relationship corresponds to one of the policy mechanisms state governments have used to 
incentivize increased institutional production of outcomes: performance-based funding. Within 
agency theory, performance-based funding fits within the category of outcome-oriented contracts 
in which principals compensate agents for achieving agreed-upon outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989). 




course credit thresholds, and retention and graduation rates are examples of outcomes included in 
performance-funding models (Offenstein & Shulock, 2010). Due to the complex nature of higher 
education institutions, Liefner (2003) argued that principals have difficulty monitoring individual 
and institutional activities in the higher education sector, which has contributed to the usage of 
performance-based funding programs that incentivize particular institutional (agent) behaviors to 
meet the established goals of the principals. Outcome-based funding, in the form of 
performance-funding formulas, serve as an attempt to "reduce goal conflict by aligning the 
official and operative goals of universities with the ones of the government" (Kivistö, 2007, p. 
106). When viewed as a contractual agreement between principal (government) and agent 
(institution), agency theory provides a lens through which performance-funding policies in 
higher education can be examined (Kivistö, 2008). 
The use of agency theory within higher education research has increased during the past 
two decades (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). Prior to 2000, the application of agency theory in the 
higher education sector had been "only sparingly incorporated into the study of higher education. 
Wider application of (principal-agent theory) was seemingly ignored not only by the mainstream 
higher education researchers, but also economists and political scientists working in the higher 
education field" (Lane & Kivisto, 2008, p. 154). Much of the literature prior to the early 2000s 
has been characterized as having "acknowledged and mentioned the principal-agent relationship, 
but deeper examinations of this relationship as an agency relationship [were] left aside," while 
more recent research has sought to apply agency theory as a "conceptual framework, heuristic 
tool, or as an organising concept that aimed to offer insights related to university governance" 




Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) utilized agency theory in their examination of the 
determinants of faculty pay at universities. In order to test their 12 hypotheses, Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin (1992) collected a stratified random sample of 1,100 management professors who were 
members of the Academy of Management, as 60% of the sample was drawn from doctorate-
granting institutions and 40% from non-doctoral granting institutions. A total of 353 surveys 
were included in their final analysis. The authors examined the relationship between university 
administrators (principals) and faculty (agents) as it pertained to determining faculty pay. Due to 
the complexity and level of expertise required for academic work conducted by faculty members, 
informational asymmetries exist between faculty and administrators (Kivistö, 2007), creating a 
higher agency cost to monitor faculty behavior and work (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). Using 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis consisting of variables associated with research 
productivity and teaching performance, the authors found that faculty performance, as indicated 
by top-tier publications, had the greatest impact on faculty salary. In general, Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin (1992) suggested that "agency theory is robust and useful as an explanatory framework 
for examining monitoring issues or agency problems internal to organizations" (p. 946). 
Liefner (2003) conducted a series of qualitative case studies of six institutions across 
three countries in the late 1990s, applying a modified principal-agent model in studying how 
resource allocation through various forms of payments affected the behavior of institutional 
personnel. Operating under the assumption of "uniform human behavior", Liefner (2003) tested 
two hypotheses: (1) Agents that have been rather inactive before the introduction of 
performance-based resource allocation will have to work harder; and (2) With performance-




departments and individuals will concentrate on activities where success can be expected 
because they will have to meet a formula's criteria or market demand (pp. 478-479).  
Based on data collected through 53 interviews with professors, the author found that the 
introduction of performance funding resulted in agents working harder, while professors reported 
the lack of performance funding encouraged risk-taking activities by scholars. Further analysis 
indicated that professors rated faculty qualifications as being the most important factor in long-
term success of universities, with the form of resource allocation and other incentives ranking 
below student ability/motivation and university culture (Liefner, 2003, p. 485). While Liefner 
(2003) found that the form of resource allocation was not a factor in long-term success of 
universities, the author argued that performance funding could "(1) force universities and 
individuals to pay attention to the needs of governments and taxpayers, (2) help to adjust the 
organizational structures of universities more quickly to the emerging needs and opportunities, 
and (3) be used to re-allocate funds to those groups and scholars that have proved to be 
successful and to reduce the budgets of those who are not performing in an acceptable way" (p. 
486). 
Gornitzka, Stensaker, Smeby, and De Boer (2004) applied principal-agent theory as a 
theoretical framework in an analysis of the contractual arrangements between the state and 
higher education institutions in Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, in an attempt to address the core 
issue of the tension between effectiveness versus efficiency in higher education. They argued 
that government-university contracts, increasingly born out of a growing lack of trust, have been 
shifting from a "sort of unwritten and quite broadly specified gentlemen's agreement on the roles 
and responsibilities of the state and the higher education institutions" towards a "more formal, 




tasks, processes, and outcomes" (p. 88). Viewed through the lens of agency theory, the 
contractual arrangements serve as an attempt to overcome the agency problem of informational 
asymmetry and goal conflict existing in the government-university relationship (Gornitzka, 
Stensaker, Smeby, & De Boer, 2004). The presence of multiple principals complicates the 
agency problem, as there is growing interest in "diversifying the funding of higher education" 
through external funding sources to overcome the reduction in government-level funding 
(Gornitzka et al., 2004). The authors’ findings indicated that contractual arrangements could not 
solve the problem of informational asymmetries, as institutional agents retained the capacity to 
exhibit moral hazard and adverse selection, even within contract arrangements designed to 
clarify outcome expectations, tasks, and behaviors. However, they concluded that informational 
asymmetries could be decreased through contractual arrangements that more closely integrated 
external quality evaluations systems with other regulatory instruments and processes (Gornitzka 
et al., 2004). 
Focusing on the European higher education context, Kivistö (2005) systematically 
examined the key constructs associated with agency theory and applied each construct to the 
government-university relationship. Kivistö (2005) addressed issues related to the agency 
problem, including adverse selection, moral hazard, and informational asymmetries, as well as 
the several of agency variables (outcome measurability, outcome uncertainty, task 
programmability, and goal conflict) posited by Eisenhardt (1989). Kivistö (2005) primarily 
concluded that agency theory could be a useful framework for analyzing the government-
university relationship and explaining certain government behaviors, including why governments 
seek information from institutions prior to making funding decisions (adverse selection); why 




increasingly choosing to implement performance-based funding mechanisms (outcome-oriented 
contracts) as an alternative to behavior-oriented contracts that define input-based funding (goal 
conflict, moral hazard). 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
The estimation of production frontiers has been broadly divided into two categories: 
statistical approaches and non-statistical approaches. The primary differences between these 
categories include the "assumptions imposed on the specifications of the efficiency frontier, the 
existence of random error, and the distribution of the inefficiencies and random error" (Paradi, 
Yang, & Zhu, 2011). Statistical (or econometric) approaches, which include ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, corrected OLS (COLS), and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), 
assume a specific form of the production function, allow for the influence of stochastic (random) 
events beyond a firm's control, and capture measurement error, statistical noise, or random 
variation in the error term of the linear regression model (Greene, Fried, Lovell, & Schmidt, 
2008). In contrast to statistical approaches, non-statistical (or programming) approaches do not 
impose a specific functional form on the production function a priori, but allow the inputs and 
outputs in the data to determine, through linear programming methods, the production function 
(Johnes, 2006). Programming approaches also assume that input and output data do not contain 
measurement error or noise (Avkiran, 2001). 
One of the most utilized non-statistical methods for estimating the production frontier of 
firms is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and 
Rhodes (1978) as a non-parametric, mathematical programming-based technique that can be 
"applied to observational data [that] provides a new way of obtaining empirical estimates of 




that are cornerstones of modern economics" (Cooper et al., 2011). Essential to DEA is the idea of 
efficiency, also referred to as either Pareto efficiency or Pareto-Koopmans efficiency, which 
stipulates that a Decision Making Unit (DMU) is efficient if and only if the following 
inefficiencies do not exist: (1) A DMU is inefficient if it can increase an output without 
increasing an input or decreasing an output (output orientation); and (2) A DMU is inefficient if 
it can decrease input without increasing another input or decreasing an output (Avkiran, 2001; 
Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1981). Charnes et al.’s (1978) seminal work built on the measure of 
technical efficiency devised by Farrell (1957) that focused on the proportional change of inputs 
and outputs. The Farrell input efficiency measure provides an estimation of the level of input that 
can be proportionally reduced while producing the same output; conversely, the Farrell output 
efficiency measure is the maximum expansion of outputs for a given set of inputs (Bogetoft & 
Otto, 2010). 
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) proposed DEA as a means for measuring the 
efficiency of DMUs that could be "obtained as the maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to 
weighted inputs subject to the condition that the similar ratios for every DMU be less than or 
equal to unity" (p. 430). The Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes model, CCR as it is commonly 
known, reduces multiple outputs and multiple inputs for each DMU into a "single 'virtual' output 
and 'virtual' input" (Cooper et al., 2011). To measure DMU efficiency, a ratio is calculated using 
the virtual output to virtual input for each DMU, which is then compared to the relative 
efficiency ratios for all other DMUs in the sample. A ratio value of 1.0 indicates technical 
efficiency, while an efficiency score below 1.0 indicates technical inefficiency. The DMUs 




DMUs not operating on the efficiency frontier, i.e., demonstrating technical inefficiency, can be 
measured (Johnes, 2006). 
One of the primary assumptions in the CCR model is constant returns to scale (CRS), 
which harkens back to the proportionality constraints offered by Farrell's efficiency measures. 
Under CRS, any increase/decrease in inputs will result in a proportional increase/decrease in 
outputs. An example of CRS within the context of higher education is that doubling inputs (e.g., 
academic expenditures, full-time faculty) would linearly result in doubling outputs (such as 
graduation rates) (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). In reality, many situations exist where the 
underlying distribution of the data cannot be assumed to conform to the CRS assumption. To 
account for instances where the CRS assumption does not hold, Banker, Charnes, and Cooper 
(1984) developed the BCC model that relaxed the CRS assumption. The BCC model introduced 
the concept of variable returns to scale (VRS) that allows for increasing returns to scale (IRS) 
and decreasing returns to scale (DRS) resulting from disproportionate rise in outputs in 
comparison with inputs assumed under CRS (Thanassoulis, Portela, & Despic, 2008). The 
efficiency frontier created under the BCC model (VRS assumption) will more closely envelop 
the data set than an efficiency frontier under the CCR model (CRS assumption), as estimated 
efficiency results of the BCC model are typically higher than those estimated under the CCR 
model (Fried, Lovell, & Schmidt, 2008). 
Relaxing the CRS assumption in the BCC model allows researchers to calculate both 
VRS efficiency and CRS efficiency within a single DEA model. When combined, these 
measures provide the means to determine another measure of efficiency: scale efficiency. Scale 
efficiency specifies how close the DMU is to operating at its optimal scale size, as scale 




(Thanassoulis et al., 2008). Higher scale efficiency ratios indicate DMUs that are operating 
closer to optimal scale size. From the perspective of the DMU, the calculation of scale efficiency 
is "appealing because it provides a measure of what could be gained by adjusting the size of the 
firm" (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). 
Benchmarking 
The current scrutiny higher education institutions are receiving for their levels of 
productivity and efficiency has stemmed, in part, from stakeholders making value judgments 
regarding colleges and universities. Policymakers seek to determine the best way to allocate state 
funds to institutions, a primary impetus for renewed interest in performance-based funding, and 
parents and students want to know where they will get the "most bang for their buck." As an 
analytical technique, DEA provides a means for "benchmarking" colleges and universities 
against one another to determine who is and is not functioning at an efficient level.  
In the DEA framework, benchmarking stems from the measurement of institutional 
efficiency as the "relative ability of each DMU in producing outputs, where the term relative 
means that each organization is compared with any other homogeneous unit" (Agasisti & Dal 
Bianco, 2009, p. 486). From a performance management perspective, DEA-based results benefit 
institutions by identifying peer DMUs from which inefficient institutions can learn and 
determine ways to close the gap between themselves and comparable DMUs operating on the 
efficiency frontier (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). According to Bogetoft and Otto (2010), 
benchmarking through DEA is important to DMUs because of the perspective provided: "The 
point is, however, that it is not sufficient for a firm to improve compared to itself. The firm must 
also improve relative to others, and they have also benefited from general technological progress. 





One of the core shortcomings of the base DEA methodology is its inability to test the 
statistical significance of estimated efficiency values, given that it is a non-parametric, non-
statistical technique. Compounding this issue is that DEA has been deemed a deterministic 
technique in that a DMU's distance from the efficiency frontier is entirely accounted for by DMU 
inefficiency, with no consideration of measurement error, noise in the data, or stochastic factors 
beyond the control of the DMU (Greene et al., 2008). Although being labeled deterministic 
carries the implication that DEA models lack "statistical underpinnings," Simar and Wilson 
(2000) argued that relative efficiency estimates derived from DEA models exhibit a level of 
uncertainty attributable to sampling variation. In an effort to overcome these perceived 
deficiencies, Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 2000) developed a bootstrapping technique 
designed to account for the sensitivity of estimated efficiency scores to sampling variations by 
correcting for bias introduced by the DEA model and calculating confidence intervals for the 
bootstrapped estimates. 
Originally introduced by Efron (1979), Simar and Wilson (1998) characterized 
bootstrapping as "repeatedly simulating the data-generating process (DGP), usually through 
resampling, and applying the original estimator to each simulated sample so that resulting 
estimates mimic the sampling distribution of the original estimator" (p. 49). In DEA, the 
underlying DGP is unknown. DEA measures efficiency in relative, not absolute, terms, as the 
efficiency frontier, determined in DEA through the use of a finite sample of observed data, 
serves as an estimation of a true frontier that is unobserved (Simar & Wilson, 2000). The basic 
concept of the bootstrap method is that if the DGP produced through the bootstrap process is a 




values will approximate the original unknown DGP sampling distributions, allowing for 
statistical significance testing to occur (Simar & Wilson, 2000). Once a set of bootstrap values 
has been calculated, the empirical distribution of this set can approximate the unknown sampling 
distribution of the underlying DGP, allowing for statistical inferences and bias correction to 
occur (Kneip, Simar, & Wilson, 2011). 
In their originating article to the technique, Simar and Wilson (1998) examined the 
sensitivity of efficiency scores of 19 electric utilities from cross-sectional data collected in 1978 
in relation to the sampling variations of the DEA-estimated frontier. After initially calculating 
DEA efficiency estimates by using one output and three inputs, Simar and Wilson used the 
bootstrap method to calculate bias-corrected efficiency estimates based on 1,000 replications. 
The authors calculated separate confidence intervals from mean-centered and median-centered 
bias-corrected estimates, as the 95% confidence intervals were very similar across both 
calculations. Overall, Simar and Wilson found that DEA efficiency measures exhibited 
sensitivity to sampling variation, as the authors encouraged caution to be exercised when 
interpreting DMU efficiency based on original, biased DEA efficiency scores (Simar & Wilson, 
1998). Across the 19 DMUs in the sample, estimated bias in original efficiency scores ranged 
from 0.0111 to 0.0742. Given that efficiency estimates are ratios bounded at 0 and 1, the DMU 
with the largest amount of bias went from being deemed technically efficient, based on a value 
of 1.0 in the original efficiency estimates, to exhibiting technical inefficiency with a bias-
corrected efficiency estimate of 0.9258. 
Results also indicated that comparisons between firms can be impacted when accounting 
for bias in efficiency estimates. For example, under the original DEA estimates, DMU 1 in the 




correcting for bias, the gap between DMU 1 and DMU 2 was reduced to 0.0788 (0.8519 versus 
0.9307, respectively). Even though the authors characterized the differences between the two 
DMUs as seeming substantial, the 95% confidence intervals calculated on the bias-corrected 
efficiency estimates overlapped between the two DMUs (Simar & Wilson, 1998). This overlap 
indicated a non-statistically significant difference between the two firms, a finding that is not 
possible under the base DEA method and requires the bootstrap technique in order to 
approximate the underlying, unknown DGP. 
Simar and Wilson (2007) extended their bootstrap procedure to a two-stage, semi-
parametric model in which first-stage DEA efficiency estimates were regressed on exogenous 
variables using a second-stage truncated regression technique. In a review of 48 published 
studies that utilized a two-stage approach, Simar and Wilson reported the majority used a 
censored (Tobit) model in the second-stage regression, while others used various forms of an 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression model in stage two of the procedure. Simar and Wilson 
(2007) argued that none of these studies "described the underlying DGP," causing "some doubt 
about what is being estimated in the two-stage approaches" (p. 32). Another point of concern 
issued by Simar and Wilson (2007) was that the two-stage techniques used in these studies were 
invalid due to estimated efficiencies exhibiting serial correlation. This correlation is due to the 
relative nature of finite samples in DEA models, as changes in the DMUs residing on the 
estimated frontier will likely lead to adjustments in the estimated efficiencies for other DMUs in 
the sample (Simar & Wilson, 2007). Correlation also exists between the error terms and 
environmental variables, which can cause issues related to estimating technical efficiency and 
making inferences regarding parameters in the two-stage regression procedure (Simar & Wilson, 




scores obtained in the first stage are correlated with the explanatory variables used in the second 
stage, which makes the second-stage estimates inconsistent and biased" (p. 199). 
Simar and Wilson (2007) initially conducted a series of Monte Carlo experiments in 
which they applied both their single-bootstrap (Algorithm #1) and double-bootstrap (Algorithm 
#2) algorithms. The primary difference between the two stems from the double-bootstrap 
algorithm using a parametric bootstrap procedure during the first-stage of the two-step technique 
to provide bias-corrected estimates of efficiency that were incorporated in the second-stage 
regression model (Simar & Wilson, 2007). Across the various experiments, the two bootstrap 
algorithms consistently outperformed either Tobit regression or Truncated regression (under 
conventional inferences) as measured by the proportion of the 1,000 Monte Carlo trials in which 
the estimated confidence intervals covered the parameter values of β1, β2, and ε. Simar and 
Wilson (2007) then applied their single- and double-bootstrap techniques to a random sample of 
322 banks, plus the full data set of 6955 banks (after data cleaning) from the United States, as 
they included three inputs and four outputs in their model of cross-sectional data from 2002. The 
authors regressed DEA efficiency estimates, generated in stage one of the procedure, on the 
covariates in stage two, calculating 95% confidence intervals under conventional methods and 
Algorithm #1, while also conducting the double-bootstrap (Algorithm #2) in a separate 
procedure. Results indicated that Algorithm #2, which created bias-corrected efficiency 
estimates, produced parameter estimates and estimated confidence intervals that were different 
from either the conventional or Algorithm #1 methods, while confidence intervals from 
Algorithm #1 were different from conventional methods. In both the sample (322 banks) and full 
(6955 banks) data sets, there were numerous instances where the confidence intervals in the 




and Wilson attributed these findings, in part, to low convergence rates inherited by the second-
stage regression from the DEA estimator, as the convergence rate can be specified as 
           , where n is the number of observations in the sample. For example, based on the 
sample of 6955 banks, the convergence rate (               ) was the equivalent of making 
inferences on approximately 51 observations in a typical parametric, truncated regression 
procedure, which limits the inference-making ability of the researcher (Simar & Wilson, 2007). 
Simar and Wilson also noted that the true DGP in a non-parametric analysis is unknown, which 
can be an indication that the true DGP, as estimated by the bootstrap procedure, is different from 
the one assumed by the parametric model used in this study. 
Malmquist Index 
In addition to not allowing for statistical inferences, the base DEA technique is also 
unable to "distinguish between changes in relative efficiency brought about by movements 
towards or away from the efficiency frontier in a given year and shifts in this frontier over time" 
(Flegg, Allen, Field, & Thurlow, 2004, p. 231). To overcome this feature of DEA, the Malmquist 
index (Caves, Christensen, & Diewert, 1982) was generalized to contexts that do not have 
observed prices and where assumptions related to firms being revenue maximizers or cost 
minimizers did not hold. Malmquist indices are constructed using distance functions, which 
provide a measure of how far inefficient DMUs reside away from the efficiency frontier (Färe, 
Grosskopf, Lindgren, & Roos, 1994). The output distance function indicates the level of 
technical efficiency demonstrated by a DMU due to producing less output than is possible based 
on a set of given inputs; the input distance function suggests the level of "economic" inefficiency 
demonstrated by a DMU due to excessive inputs beyond what is needed to produce the observed 




analysis of productivity change in the Swedish hospital sector, as output-oriented models are 
utilized when the objective is to maximize outputs while not increasing the number of inputs 
above the level observed (Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013). 
In order to account for change across time periods, the Malmquist index introduces an 
initial time period t with technology Tc that serves as a benchmark against which subsequent time 
periods t+1 can be compared (Fried et al., 2008). In a basic example of a model with one input 
and one output with two time periods t and t+1, productivity change is determined by first 
calculating the ratio of output to input for each time period, and then taking the ratio of these 
ratios (Färe, Grosskopf, & Margaritis, 2011). Under the constant returns to scale assumption and 
an output orientation, the Malmquist index provides a measure of total factor productivity (TFP), 
as a value greater than one represents positive TFP growth, while a value less than one indicates 
TFP decline from period t to period t+1 (Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013). 
One of the benefits to utilizing Malmquist productivity indices is that they can be 
decomposed into technical efficiency change and technological change components, which are 
the two primary components associated with TFP progress or regress (Färe et al., 2011; Parteka 
& Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013). Changes in technical efficiency are associated with a DMU getting 
closer to or moving away from the efficiency frontier, while technological change represents a 
general shift in the production frontier as a whole. Changes in technical efficiency, also known 
as the "catching-up" effect, can further be decomposed into changes in scale efficiency and pure 
efficiency to more closely identify main sources of change (Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013; 





DEA Studies of Higher Education Institutions 
Analyzing the efficiency of higher education institutions is challenging from a variety of 
perspectives. Johnes (2006, 2008) noted that universities are typically non-profit making, do not 
consist of output and input prices, and produce multiple outputs from multiple inputs. To 
overcome these constraints, DEA is an appropriate method of measuring efficiency of HEIs, 
given that distance function approaches require neither input/output prices nor assumptions 
regarding the cost minimization or profit/revenue maximization behavior of the DMUs (Coelli, 
Rao, O’Donnell, & Battese, 2005). Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka (2011) also argued that DEA 
is appropriate in analyzing efficiency of universities from the standpoint that DEA "allows the 
researcher to capture multiple inputs and multiple outputs at the same time, focusing on the non-
parametric treatment of the efficiency frontier" (p. 890). 
While widespread in different industries, the use of non-parametric techniques to estimate 
efficiency levels of DMUs has had relatively limited application in the higher education sector 
(Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011). According to a web site dedicated to maintaining a 
searchable bibliography of DEA-related publications in scientific journals 
(http://www.deabib.org, as of December 2, 2011), 4,055 DEA-based journal articles were 
published from 1950 - 2010. A search of the database performed on July 9, 2014 with Version 
0.8.1 returned 224 unduplicated citations using search terms "university", "universities", 
"schools", and "higher education", indicating that approximately 5.5% of published journal 
articles apply DEA to the higher education sector. A similar search of the database by 
Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka (2011) of publications ranging from 1950 to 2007 showed that 
3.5% of the studies pertained to higher education issues, as the proportional increase seems to 




body of literature is primarily international in nature, with relatively few DEA studies published 
that analyze efficiency and productivity of higher education institutions in the United States 
(Sav, 2012). 
Due to the non-parametric, deterministic nature of DEA, the selection of inputs and 
outputs to include in any model is a vital step in the implementation of a DEA-based procedure. 
One of the problems surrounding this issue is the lack of definitive research related to selecting 
inputs and outputs for inclusion in a DEA model within the education sector (Avkiran, 2001). A 
search through recent literature failed to provide specific guidelines related to initial input/output 
selection, as the focus of DEA is typically not on the inputs and outputs included in a model 
(Worthington & Lee, 2008). However, as seen in Table 5, a survey of recent publications 
indicates there is a certain level of consistency in the selection of input and output variables in 
DEA-based research of higher education.  
Most of these studies included outputs that serve as proxies of teaching and research 
quality, while service is rarely utilized as an output in DEA studies of higher education. Primary 
examples of outputs include the number of degrees awarded/graduates (teaching), amount of 
grants awarded (research), and number of publications (research). Inputs exhibit greater variance, 
although the number of students, number of faculty/academic staff/administrative staff, 
expenditures (academic, capital, auxiliary), and measures of incoming student quality are the 
primary types of inputs used across these studies. 
While many DEA-based applications in other industries rely on input-oriented models, 
the majority of higher education DEA-based research have used output-oriented models 
(Worthington & Lee, 2008). An output orientation has typically been used in this sector given 




i.e., students and revenues, in a short period of time (Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013). This 
emphasis on increasing efficiency through output maximization within the confines of existing 
input levels mirrors the emphasis of policymakers and other stakeholders who are pressuring 
higher education institutions to become both more productive and more efficient within given 
resource constraints. 
Research Studies 
 Johnes (2006) used DEA methodology to study the efficiency of 100 higher education 
institutions spanning three categories in England during the 2000-2001 academic year. Using an 
output-oriented approach, Johnes (2006) conducted a single-stage DEA procedure that included 
three outputs (weighted total number of first degrees awarded, total number of higher degrees 
awarded, and value of recurrent grants for research) and six inputs (undergraduate quality, 
number of FTE postgraduate students, number of full-time academic staff, capital expenditures, 
library/information expenditures, and administrative expenditures). Following the initial DEA 
with the full set of variables, Johnes conducted the Pastor’s test (Pastor, Ruiz, & Sirvent, 2002) 
to determine which variables were significant, as the Pastor’s test indicated the staff and 
library/information expenditures variables could be removed. Johnes applied the full and reduced 
models on each subgroup, finding that the sample of English universities demonstrated very high 
general efficiency. The average efficiency estimates ranged from 93% to 95% across the two 
models applied to the three subgroups, as the number of institutions found to be efficient ranged 
from 51 to 61 across the models and subgroups. Statistical tests (F-test and Kruskall-Wallis test) 
did not indicate statistically significant differences in the mean efficiency estimates (technical 
efficiency or scale efficiency) across groups. In order to assess the differences in estimated 




(Simar & Wilson, 1998, 2000, 2011) to estimate 95% confidence intervals, finding "no overlap 
between the 22 lower performing HEIs and those HEIs which have the maximum efficiency 
score" (p. 280), suggesting that DEA "can discriminate between the worst- and best-performing 
HEIs" (p. 286). 
In mirroring components of the US News and World Report ranking system, Archibald 
and Feldman (2008) conducted a cross-sectional study of 187 American "national" institutions in 
which the output variable was the institution's 6-year graduation rate in 2003-2004. The four 
input variables in the study were the percent students enrolled who were in the top 10% of their 
high school class, the 25th percentile SAT score, the percentage of full-time faculty, and the cost 
per undergraduate. One of the unique aspects of this study was the comparison of methodologies, 
as the authors analyzed the same data using both regression and DEA techniques. The DEA 
analysis generated a mean technical efficiency score of 0.896 for the 187 institutions in the 
sample. A quadrant analysis was conducted, in which institutions' residuals were plotted along 
the x axis while their technical efficiency scores were plotted along the y axis, with the middle of 
the residuals set at 0 and the technical efficiency dividing line set at the mean value of 0.9. When 
comparing the residuals with the technical efficiency scores, the authors found a correlation of 
0.6708. The two techniques agreed in 79% of the cases on the placement of institutions on the 
plot with quadrants, with 79 institutions being rated "above-average" on both measures, and 69 
institutions being rated "below-average" on both measures. Archibald and Feldman (2008) 
argued that the 21% of discordant results between the two methods highlights the advantages of 
using a production frontier approach, given that the 12 institutions that exhibited an above-
average residual with below-average technical efficiency score might be "satisfied" when they 




estimated efficiency. Similarly, the 27 institutions that demonstrated above-average technical 
efficiency scores, but had below-average residuals, would be viewed as inferior under 
regression-based techniques, but are actually "...on or very close to the production frontier. 
Given their inputs, they are doing very well" (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). In summarizing their 
findings, Archibald and Feldman (2008) provided a detailed list of why they prefer DEA over 
parametric, regression-based techniques (p. 93): 
1. While the two techniques often provide similar results, they don't always. 
2. Production frontier analysis is more intuitively appealing because it compares institutions 
to best practice, not average practice. 
3. DEA is less restrictive because it does not impose a functional form on the production 
surface. 
4. DEA is based on comparisons width institutions in the neighborhood of the institution 
being rated and not on average based on the entire data set. 
5. None of its judgments are based on extrapolations outside of the observed data. 
6. Production frontier analysis provides several useful measures, like technical efficiency 
and input slacks that tell an institution how it differs from its close neighbors that are 
efficient. 
7. DEA creates peers for every inefficient institution so that it is easy to identify the 
institutions with potentially superior practices. 
Flegg et al. (2004) studied efficiency of 45 HEIs in the United Kingdom from 1980-81 to 
1992-93, a period defined by the combined shifts related to public funding and student:staff 
ratios. Flegg et al. (2004) incorporated three output (income from research and consultancy, 




four input variables (number of staff, undergraduate students, postgraduate students, and 
aggregate departmental expenditure) in their DEA model that was based on an output orientation. 
Initial results of estimating HEI technical efficiency showed a trend toward homogeneity of HEIs 
based on unweighted arithmetic mean efficiency estimates over time, as the standard deviation of 
technical efficiency scores dropped from 0.144 in 1980/81 to 0.077 in 1992/93, and the 
minimum technical efficiency score estimated in the sample rose from 0.488 to 0.742 on a 0 to 1 
scale (Flegg et al., 2004). Accounting for student population density at individual HEIs, the 
authors also calculated weighted arithmetic mean and weighted geometric mean technical 
efficiency scores, which demonstrated a similar pattern across the years considered in the study. 
A decomposition of technical efficiency into component parts (pure technical efficiency, 
congestion efficiency, and scale efficiency) indicated that the weighted geometric means of the 
45 institutions under study were relatively stable over time. Flegg et al. (2004) also calculated 
Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index scores to evaluate whether increased efficiency 
scores were due to improve performance in terms of technical efficiency of the institution, 
simply a change in technology relative to an overall shift in the efficiency frontier. The results 
showed that TFP increased 51.5%, with the technology frontier increasing 39.1% and technical 
efficiency increasing 8.8% during the 13 years of the study. These findings were interpreted as 
indicating that most of the increase in TFP can be attributed to an "outward shift in the efficiency 
front rather than by enhanced technical efficiency" that would signal improvement in HEIs that 
were becoming more efficient (Flegg et al., 2004). 
Johnes (2008) conducted a study of 112 higher education institutions in England in which 
efficiency and productivity were estimated in order to compare HEI subgroups across the UK. 




(undergraduate degrees/qualifications awarded, postgraduate degrees/qualifications awarded, and 
research income) and five inputs (full-time academic staff, administrative expenditures, 
academic expenditures, FTE undergraduate enrollment, and FTE postgraduate enrollment). 
Johnes initially analyzed all HEIs in the sample, secondarily segmenting by institution type (pre-
1992, post-1992, and SCOP) and conducting the analysis, finding that estimated efficiency 
scores were typically higher when analyzing data at the subgroup level as opposed to all HEIs 
being analyzed together. Overall technical efficiency was high, with the mean score ranging 
from 88 to 95 percent across the various models. Johnes (2008) applied a Kruskal-Wallis test to 
two sets of results: overall, pure, and scale efficiency scores, and indexes consisting of technical 
efficiency change, technology change, and Malmquist total factor productivity change. Results 
indicated the subgroups differed at a statistically significant level (p< 0.05) in overall technical 
and scale efficiency, and in technology change distributions. Johnes (2008) also found that 
annual productivity increases were attributable to changes in technology as opposed to increases 
in institutional technical efficiency. 
Worthington and Lee (2008) studied 35 Australian universities from 1998-2003, 
estimating productivity growth through an output-oriented DEA model that included six outputs 
(undergraduate completions, postgraduate completions, PhD completions, national competitive 
grants, industry and other grants, and publications) and five inputs (FTE academic staff, FTE 
non-academic staff, non-labour input expenditure, actual undergraduate student load, and actual 
postgraduate student load). In their analysis of the full sample of institutions, Worthington and 
Lee (2008) found a mean annual productivity growth of 3.3%, as decomposition of Malmquist 
index scores indicated most of this improvement was due to technological progress as opposed to 




and teaching-only), the research-only institutions averaged a 6.3% increase in productivity 
growth, while the teaching-only institutions' productivity increased by 2.9% annually from 1998-
2003. Research gains in productivity were primarily associated with increased technical 
efficiency rather than technological improvement, while increased productivity in teaching-only 
institutions was primarily due to technological improvements rather than technical efficiency 
(Worthington & Lee, 2008). 
Agasisti and Johnes (2009) utilized a three-step process to study the estimated efficiency 
levels of 57 Italian and 127 English HEIs in a cross-country analysis of data spanning academic 
years from 2001-02 to 2004-05. Agasisti and Johnes (2009) used an output-oriented framework 
that included four inputs (number of students, amount of financial resources/incomes, number of 
PhD students, and number of academic staff) and three outputs (bachelor graduates, masters 
graduates, and amount of external grants and contracts for research). In step one, the authors 
analyzed English and Italian institutions separately, finding that the mean efficiency score within 
countries was in excess of 0.80 in all three measures of efficiency (BCC, CCR, and Scale). These 
results did not hold for Italian institutions when data were pooled across the 184 HEIs in the 
dataset. While all of the English institutions' mean efficiency scores remained above 0.80, the 
mean efficiency scores for Italian institutions ranged from 0.64 (CCR) to 0.84 (Scale). These 
results highlight the "relative" nature of DEA-based research. A closer examination of the returns 
to scale data revealed that 61% of English institutions and 84% of Italian institutions in the study 
exhibited decreasing returns to scale, an indicator that these institutions might benefit from 
"diminishing the scale of their operations" (Agasisti & Johnes, 2009, p. 70). Steps two and three 
involved Agasisti and Johnes conducting a dynamic analysis across academic periods ranging 




separating the institutions by country. Italian institutions experienced overall growth in 
performance with a Malmquist index score of 1.094 for the whole period, primarily because of 
their change in technical efficiency of 1.775. English institutions demonstrated relatively stable 
performance on both technical efficiency and Malmquist index measures. In general, positive 
changes in estimated efficiency for individual English universities was due to improvements in 
technology (frontier shifts), while improvements in Italian universities were attributed to 
institutions improving their technical efficiency as opposed to frontier shifts across the sample of 
institutions. 
In their analysis of teaching reforms in Italy stemming from the Bologna Process 
introduced in 1999, Agasisti and Dal Bianco (2009) analyzed the efficiency performance of 74 
universities (60 public and 14 private) spanning the 1998-99 to 2003-2004 academic years. Their 
initial output-oriented model included two outputs (graduates and graduates in four or five year 
courses) and six inputs (total enrollments, first-year students scoring high (9/10) on secondary 
school exam, total number of regular students, total number of students, total staff, and 
facilities/structures). Agasisti and Dal Bianco (2009)  initially applied the DEA model to all 
institutions in the dataset, utilizing the Pastor’s (Pastor et al., 2002) test and Spearman 
correlation tests to assess the variables included in the model, which resulted in the removal of 
total enrollments and total number of regular students being dropped from the model. Results 
from the revised model being applied to the full dataset indicated a sharp one-year decline in 
pure efficiency and scale efficiency in 2002-03, the year after the Bologna teaching reforms were 
enacted in 2001-02. Agasisti and Dal Bianco (2009) interpreted this finding as stemming from a 
disproportionate increase in enrollment, due to teaching reforms, as compared to the outputs of 




similar levels of 2001-02. The authors also conducted separate analyses for public and private 
institutions, finding that private institutions were more efficient than their public counterparts 
(Agasisti & Dal Bianco, 2009). 
Agasisti, Dal Bianco, Landoni, Sala, and Salerno (2011) employed a two-step DEA 
methodology in their analysis of the research efficiency of 75 university departments at 
institutions located in the Lombardy Region of Italy. The authors incorporated three inputs 
(laboratories, highly-qualified human resources, and administrative personnel) and five outputs 
(regional/national revenues, international revenues, order-based revenues, yearly number of 
publications, and number of doctorates in cooperation with external funding bodies) in their 
analysis using data from 2004-2007. A first-step analysis of university departments' research 
efficiency using data from 2007 indicated CRS efficiency to be 0.75 and VRS efficiency to be 
0.79, as the mean scale efficiency score was 0.94. Even with relatively high mean efficiency 
scores, standard deviations for the efficiency scores (CRS = 0.24 and VRS = 0.22) indicate 
differentiation exists within the departments. A second step involved the calculation of 
Malmquist index scores for data from 2004 to 2007, as the mean Malmquist index of 1.06 across 
the four years indicated relatively minimal improvement in productivity. However, when the 
Malmquist index was decomposed into technical efficiency and technological efficiency scores, 
the departments in the study collectively exhibited strong technical efficiency change (1.67) 
coupled with a worsening technology frontier (0.65). Having defined technology as the "bundle 
of policies that should help in improving research efficiency" (p. 280), Agasisti, et al., (2011)  
interpreted the low technology frontier value as indicating an "opportunity for a regional 
government to be involved in this sector", and, alternatively, as reflecting that the "policies 




step of their analysis, Agasisti, et al., (2011) evaluated the possible impact of a variety of 
external factors on research efficiency by using the Kruskal-Wallis test for each factor, finding 
no statistically significant influence of Metropolitan location, subject mix, university effects, 
tenured staff proportion, or departments' age on the research efficiency of the university 
departments under study. 
Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka (2011) conducted a multi-national analysis of 259 HEIs 
from seven European countries with the purpose of "not only evaluat(ing) the relative technical 
efficiency of European higher education institutions in a comparative setting, but also to reveal 
external determinants of their performance" (p. 888). Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka (2011) 
utilized the two-stage DEA analysis approach developed by Simar and Wilson (2007) that 
involves an initial estimation of DEA scores that are then regressed on exogenous variables in a 
stage two bootstrapped truncated regression. Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka (2011) used an 
output-oriented CRS efficiency model that incorporated two outputs (number of graduations and 
number of scientific publications) and three inputs (total academic staff, number of students, and 
total revenues). The first stage DEA produced a mean estimated efficiency score of 1.55 for the 
full sample, which is interpreted as meaning the institutions collectively would have to improve 
their output by as much as 55% to reach efficiency. In the full sample, only 5% of HEIs were 
100% efficient as determined by an estimated efficiency score of 1.0. Using the bootstrapped 
method, Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka (2011) calculated unbiased efficiency estimates that 
showed a reduction in the mean efficiency levels of countries in the sample when compared to 
the original biased estimates in step one. In step two of the analysis, Wolszczak-Derlacz and 
Parteka (2011) used a parametric model in order to regress the estimated efficiency scores 




efficiency levels. Five of the six exogenous variables included in the truncated regression were 
highly statistically significant, as regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita did not 
significantly impact estimated efficiency scores when accounting for the other variables in the 
regression model. Three of the significant variables (number of faculty, existence of 
medical/pharmacy faculty, and ratio of women to total faculty) promoted an increase in 
estimated efficiency, while younger institutions and a higher percentage of revenues from core 
funding were negatively associated with HEI technical efficiency. A variety of robustness 
checks, including the comparison of restricted DEA models (3 inputs/2 outputs versus 2 inputs/2 
outputs), the use of a double bootstrap procedure, and using alternative truncation points, 
supported the original findings of the two-stage DEA procedure. 
Lee (2011) implemented Simar and Wilson’s (2007) DEA bootstrap technique to conduct 
a two-stage, input-oriented variable returns-to-scale (VRS) DEA model in estimating efficiency 
scores for 37 universities in Australia using data from 2006-2009. The stage one DEA model 
included two inputs (FTE staff and capital expenditures) and five outputs (national competitive 
grants, industry grants, other public sector grants, research publications, and number of 'Master's' 
and 'Doctorate students). Results from stage one indicated that 20 universities were technically 
efficient under VRS, while 14 were considered scale efficient, which is an indicator of "ideal 
scale of operations" (Lee, 2011). In stage two, Lee (2011) conducted a truncated regression 
analysis using bootstrapped bias-corrected efficiency scores generated from stage one, regressing 
these estimates on four exogenous variables: student load factor, university location (city or non-
city), proportion of Associate Professors and Professors to total academic staff, and the 
Institutional Grants Scheme. All four exogenous variables were determined to be statistically 




efficiency, while the other three variables were positively, significantly associated with the 
bootstrap estimated efficiency scores (Lee, 2011). 
Sav (2012), in one of the few published studies that has applied DEA methodology with 
panel data to U.S. institutions of higher education, studied 133 research and doctoral universities 
to estimate DEA efficiency scores and Malmquist total factor productivity scores for academic 
years 2005-2009. Sav (2012) adopted an output-oriented model that included full academic year 
of credit-hour production as the lone output, stating the measure "is consistent with the subsidy 
model under which public universities receive state support revenues in return for credit hour 
production, not conferred degrees" (p. 20). Sav modeled credit-hour production against three 
labor inputs (teaching and research faculty, administrative faculty, and academic support) and 
two capital inputs (expenditures on capital equipment and auxiliary equipment). All data were 
collected from IPEDS. Sav (2012) found that universities exhibited decreases in CRS (3.5%), 
VRS (4.5%) and Scale efficiency (0.8%) scores from 2005-06 to 2008-09. Additionally, the 
percentage of universities deemed efficient (estimated efficiency score of one) dropped from 
27% to 20% under CRS and from 42% to 33% under VRS for the time period under study. 
Calculation of Malmquist TFP change scores resulted in a mean index score of 0.987, indicating 
a "slight regress in average university productivity over the four academic years," which was 
primarily attributed to a shift in the production frontier (technology) as opposed to gains in 
technical efficiency of the institutions (pp. 23-24). 
Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz (2013) studied the efficiency of 266 public higher 
education institutions from seven countries in Europe, including Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, across the 2001-2005 academic years. The 




productivity changes across universities from several countries analyzed within a common 
methodological framework, and (ii) methodological issues concerning the significance of the 
results obtained with Malmquist indices have not been appropriately addressed" (Parteka & 
Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013). The authors applied Simar and Wilson's (2007) bootstrap DEA 
technique in order to "obtain bias-corrected estimates of Malmquist indices (and their 
components) and their confidence intervals" (Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013). The output-
oriented model assumed constant returns to scale in order to calculate the Malmquist indices and 
components, and included two outputs (number of publications and number of graduates) and 
three inputs (number of students, total academic staff, and total revenues). After estimating the 
Malmquist indices, Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz (2013) performed the bootstrap method with 
2000 replications (B = 2,000) in order to compare the mean square errors (MSEs) of the original 
and bootstrapped estimates. Results showed that the bias-corrected (bootstrapped) estimates of 
Malmquist indices increased the MSE in comparison to the original (non-bootstrapped) 
estimates, a finding similar to Simar and Wilson (1999) and defined as plausible by Efron & 
Tibshirani (1994). As such, the authors utilized original estimates in additional analyses, except 
for using the bias-corrected, bootstrapped estimates to calculate confidence intervals and 
determine statistical significance. Across the full dataset, 90% (963 of 1,064) of the annual 
estimates of total factor productivity growth were "statistically different from unity (at a standard 
5% level of significance) so the majority of HEIs registered statistically significant changes in 
productivity" (Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013). Institutions also annually exhibited a 4.5% 
average increase in productivity, due primarily to changes in technical efficiency more so than 




found that 28 of the 266 European institutions in the sample demonstrated statistically significant 
growth in productivity for each of the years in the study. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter has provided a review of the literature associated with performance-funding 
policies in higher education, agency theory, and data envelopment analysis. Following a review 
of challenges facing Master’s institutions and an overview of trends in higher education funding, 
the third section consisted of a review of performance-funding policy in higher education in the 
United States, tracing the progression of performance funding from its inception in Tennessee in 
1979 to the current movement of what has been deemed Performance Funding 2.0 programs. 
Section two detailed the literature associated agency theory. The agency theory section included 
the key constructs across all iterations of agency theory, including the agency problem, 
informational asymmetries, goal conflicts, moral hazard, and adverse selection, while also 
detailing differences in how agency theory has been applied across academic disciplines and 
paradigms, primarily economics and political science. Agency theory will serve as the 
conceptual framework for examining the existing performance-funding policy in Arkansas as a 
contractual relationship between the state (principal) and institutions of higher education 
(agents). The final section of this chapter detailed data envelopment analysis (DEA) and much of 
the research that has applied DEA in higher education. As the analytical technique being used in 
this study, DEA provides a means for estimating the efficiency of four-year public institutions in 
Arkansas in comparison to similar institutions nationally. The utilization of the DEA technique 
provides a method that can be used to overcome a gap in the Arkansas performance funding 




following chapter will detail the methodology for this study that will be used to answer the 







The purpose of this study was to examine the institutional efficiency of four-year public 
universities in Arkansas with the Carnegie classification of Master’s Colleges and Universities in 
achieving productivity outcomes specified in the state's newly implemented performance-
funding program. The Arkansas performance-funding program includes three levels of 
performance measures for four-year institutions: mandatory (bachelor credentials, total 
credentials, STEM credentials, and progression), optional (course completion rate, high demand 
credentials, minority student credentials, non-traditional student credentials, remedial student 
credentials, regional economic needs programs credentials, transfer student credentials, 
expenditure of federal awards, patents, and new company startups), and compensatory 
(percentage of undergraduate students receiving Pell grants) (ADHE, 2011). As constructed, the 
measures included in Arkansas's performance funding program do not directly address the issue 
of efficiency, even though efficiency is specifically referenced within the legislation: "An act to 
promote accountability and efficiency at state-supported institutions of higher education" 
(Arkansas Performance Funding Act of 2011). This chapter explains the research design used to 
address this gap in the performance-funding program related to estimating the efficiency of 
public four-year institutions in Arkansas. This research was deemed exempt for review and 
approval by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Arkansas (see Appendix I). 
Sample 
The performance-funding program in Arkansas provided the policy environment for this 
study, and as such, four-year public universities in Arkansas served as the initial population from 




institutions in the state, including the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, the sample 
considered in this study included the six institutions with Carnegie classifications of “Master’s 
Colleges and Universities.” The Master’s-level institutions in Arkansas in this study included 
one smaller program (University of Arkansas at Monticello), two medium programs (Henderson 
State University, Southern Arkansas University), and three larger programs (Arkansas State 
University, Arkansas Tech University, and University of Central Arkansas) (Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/).  
The national sample used in this study consisted of 270 four-year public institutions 
classified as Master’s Colleges and Universities that were separated into the three sub-categories: 
171 in larger programs, 61 in medium programs, and 38 in smaller programs. Master’s Colleges 
and Universities comprise more than 47% (270 of 571) of all four-year public institutions in the 
United States, while awarding 36% of all bachelor degrees granted in the U.S. by four-year 
public institutions of all classifications (Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/). 
Based on descriptive data of undergraduate populations included in Table 5, the Master’s-level 
institutions in Arkansas exhibited a number of differences when compared with national 
averages of four-year public institutions in each Carnegie category. Overall, the Arkansas 
institutions were relatively similar to national averages in gender distribution and average ACT 
scores, and the larger Arkansas institutions are similar in undergraduate enrollment to national 
averages. However, the medium Arkansas Master’s institutions are smaller in undergraduate 
enrollment than both the national average for the medium category as well as the smaller 
category. All Arkansas institutions in the sample exceeded the national averages for percentage 
of White, non-Hispanic undergraduates enrolled and the percentage of students receiving Pell 





Table 5  
Comparison of Undergraduate Education at Master’s Universities and Colleges in Arkansas 






























Larger        
ASU 10168 73 61 48 20 26 39 
ATU 10089 81 56 46 18 25 41 
UCA 9604 69 60 39 20 26 41 
National 
(n=171) 
10129 61 60 41 19 24 46 
Medium        
HSU 3365 68 57 54 18 24 36 
SAU 2865 65 60 55 18 24 35 
National 
(n=61) 
5882 60 59 42 19 24 42 
Smaller        







4706 59 60 43 19 24 39 
Source: National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/)  
a
Abbreviations for Arkansas institutions: ASU-Arkansas State University Main Campus; ATU-
Arkansas Tech University; UCA-University of Central Arkansas; HSU-Henderson State 
University; SAU-Southern Arkansas University Main Campus; and UAM-University of 
Arkansas at Monticello. 
b
Pell Grants is the percentage of all undergraduate students receiving Pell grants in 2011-2012. 
c
Average ACT represents the Average ACT Composite score for the 25th percentile and 75th 
percentile of entering freshmen in Fall 2012. 
d
6-yr Grad Rate represents the percentage of first-time, full-time students who began studies in 
Fall 2006 and received a degree or award within 150% of “Normal Time” to completion for their 
program. 
e
UAM is an open admissions campus and does not report ACT scores of entering freshmen.  
 
A comparison of the medium and smaller program characteristics in Table 5 indicated a 
high degree of similarity between the two program levels in the national samples, with 
undergraduate enrollment the main source of differentiation. Given that these designations were 




efficiency at the undergraduate level, along with the identified similarities between program 
designations, the medium and smaller categories were collapsed into a single “medium-smaller” 
classification. Therefore, separate analyses were conducted for the 171 larger programs and the 
99 medium-smaller programs. These group sizes exceeded the generally accepted DEA 
convention that the minimum number of DMUs in a DEA analysis should be more than three 
times the number of outputs plus inputs, which was a minimum of 18 [3(1+5)] institutions in this 
study (Lee, 2011).  
Research Design 
 The analytical technique utilized in this study was data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
Specifically, the DEA portion of this analysis consisted of an output-oriented model that 
assumed variable returns to scale (VRS). The key construct in DEA methodology is technical 
efficiency. In an output-oriented DEA model, Farrell’s (1957) measure of technical efficiency is 
defined as the “maximum radial expansion in all outputs that is feasible with given technology 
and inputs,” as Farrell’s technical efficiency is the reciprocal of the Shephard (1953, 1970) 
distance function (Fried et al., 2008, p. 20). Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) proposed DEA 
as a means for measuring the efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs) that could be 
"obtained as the maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to the 
condition that the similar ratios for every DMU be less than or equal to unity" (p. 430).  DMUs 
with a ratio of 1.0 are considered to demonstrate technical efficiency, as these institutions create 
a piecewise linear efficiency frontier against which institutions with a ratio below 1.0, i.e., 
demonstrating technical inefficiency, can be measured (Johnes, 2006; Thanassoulis et al., 2008). 
The Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (CCR) model assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), while 




allowing for variable returns to scale (VRS) that permits both increasing and decreasing returns 
to scale. The efficiency frontier created under the BCC model (VRS assumption) will more 
closely envelop the data set than an efficiency frontier under the CCR model (CRS assumption), 
as estimated efficiency results of the BCC model are typically higher than those estimated under 
CCR (Fried et al., 2008). 
The efficiency scores generated by the two models differ in what they specifically 
represent. CRS-based efficiency scores indicate technical efficiency (TE) and measure 
inefficiencies caused by the configuration of inputs and outputs plus the size of the DMU, while 
VRS-based efficiency scores represent pure technical efficiency (PTE), which is a measure of 
efficiency without scale efficiency incorporated (Avkiran, 2001). Although a CRS model can be 
used instead of VRS, the two models can be used in conjunction, as the simple division of 
technical efficiency (CRS) by pure technical efficiency (VRS) provides the scale efficiency (SE) 
of a DMU (Agasisti & Johnes, 2009). According to Thanassoulis et al. (2008), “The larger the 
divergence between VRS and CRS efficiency ratings, the lower the value of scale efficiency and 
the more adverse the impact of scale size on productivity” (p. 290). With PTE and SE 
determined, additional analyses can be conducted to determine whether a DMU is experiencing 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRS) (Thanassoulis et al., 2008). 
Determining local returns to scale is accomplished by re-running the DEA model with non-
increasing returns to scale (NIRS) and comparing those results to the VRS efficiency scores; a 
DMU exhibits DRS if VRS scores equal NIRS scores, while a DMU exhibits IRS if VRS scores 
are not equal to NIRS scores (Avkiran, 2001). For the DMUs experiencing IRS or DRS, the 
Most Productive Scale Size (MPSS) can be calculated in order to determine the optimal scale 




Due to the primary research questions concerning the estimation of institutional 
efficiency, DEA provided an additional benefit of being able to “benchmark” colleges and 
universities against one another to determine who is and is not functioning at an efficient level 
(Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). Given that DEA is a deterministic technique that relies on the data 
within the sample to distinguish between which institutions are operating on the efficiency 
frontier from those that are inefficient, DEA allows researchers and practitioners to identify 
benchmark institutions from which inefficient DMUs can learn (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; 
Sav, 2012). Within the performance-funding policy environment being examined in this study, 
the capacity of DEA to provide benchmark results has the potential for impacting how colleges 
and universities are viewed as it pertains to efficiency. 
 Similar to the methodological approach utilized by Wolszczak-Derlacz and Parteka 
(2011) in their study of higher education institutions across seven European countries, the DEA 
methodology used in this study incorporated Simar and Wilson’s (1998, 2000, 2007) double-
bootstrap technique within a two-stage, semi-parametric model in which efficiency estimates 
generated in stage one are regressed on exogenous variables in a second-stage truncated 
regression analysis.  Variable returns to scale (VRS) was assumed in the study, as VRS is 
appropriate in instances where the DMU cannot adjust its scale of operation in the short-term, 
which is the case with colleges and universities (Lee, 2011). VRS also allows for the comparison 
of similar-sized institutions in order to determine variability in efficiency due to scale differences 
(Banker et al., 1984; Färe, Grosskopf, & Logan, 1983). An output orientation, as opposed to an 
input-oriented approach, was selected for this analysis, as the majority of higher education DEA-
based research has used output-oriented models due to colleges and universities having limited 




Simar, 2006; Worthington & Lee, 2008). Efficiency in an output orientation is determined by the 
ratio of a DMU’s observed output to the maximum output achievable under existing input levels 
(Farrell, 1957). Within the current performance-funding policy environment, an institution’s 
ability to maximize output within input constraints (i.e., efficiency) could be seen as a valuable 
measure of performance, a measure that is provided by the DEA methodology.  
 The purpose for using the two-stage approach in an output-oriented DEA model is to 
distinguish between inputs that an institution can control and those that are non-controllable 
(Johnes, 2006). In general, the use of two-stage approaches have followed an assumption that the 
non-controllable exogenous (environmental) variables serve as constraints related to input and 
output choices made by the institution (Simar & Wilson, 2007). The primary difference between 
a one-stage and a two-stage procedure is the assumption in the one-stage procedure that all 
inputs impact the process of producing outputs from inputs, whereas the assumption of the two-
stage procedure is that environmental variables included in the second stage affect the efficiency 
of producing outputs from inputs (Lovell, 1993). 
Simar and Wilson (2007) proposed the two-stage, semi-parametric DEA technique that 
incorporated a double-bootstrap algorithm as a means of addressing concerns related to DEA-
based research found in the literature. The base DEA technique, because it is a non-parametric 
method, does not allow for either testing the statistical significance of the estimator that 
generates efficiency scores or understanding whether the estimator is consistent or biased (Simar 
& Wilson, 2008). Through the use of bootstrapping to generate a reasonable estimator of the 
unknown underlying data generating process (DGP), statistical analyses of the sampling 
distribution and bias adjustment of efficiency scores can occur, and inferences related to the 




2008). Specifically, the bootstrapping procedure provides for the estimation of 95% confidence 
intervals for each institution’s efficiency score, which allows for the determination of whether 
estimated efficiencies differ at a statistically significant level between universities (Johnes, 
2006).  
Simar and Wilson’s methodology seeks to overcome deficiencies in the extant literature 
related to the studies that do not describe the underlying data generating process (DGP).  Simar 
and Wilson (2007) argued that the lack of description of the underlying DGP provides “some 
doubt about what is being estimated in the two-stage approaches…that would make such 
regressions sensible” (pp. 32-33). Simar and Wilson’s statistical model (i.e., the DGP) is 
considered to be “logically consistent with regressing non-parametric DEA efficiency estimates 
in a second stage regression on covariates (environmental variables) that are different from the 
inputs in the first stage” (Alexander et al., 2010, p. 102). The specification of a statistical model 
(DGP) also accounts for the censoring of the dependent variable (estimated efficiency scores) in 
the second stage regression analysis (Alexander et al., 2010).  
Simar and Wilson’s approach also attempts to address concerns related to what they 
argue have been invalid applications of ordinary least squares (OLS) and censored (Tobit) 
regression techniques in the majority of two-stage approaches in the literature (Simar & Wilson, 
2007). The primary arguments against the validity of OLS and Tobit regression approaches are 
based on two types of correlation: DEA efficiency estimates generated in stage-one are serially 
correlated in an unknown fashion (Alexander et al., 2010), and the error term is correlated with 
the exogenous variables in the second-stage regression due to inputs and outputs from the stage-
one DEA model being correlated with the environmental variables (Wolszczak-Derlacz & 




and Wilson (2007) provides a means for dealing with both types of correlation caused by the 
other two-stage regression techniques primarily utilized in the literature.  
The double-bootstrap technique used in this research was based on Algorithm #2 
introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007). This procedure includes a series of steps that are first 
delineated and then explicated further in the Research Questions section below. Alexander et al. 
(2010, p. 102) described the steps in non-technical terms as consisting of the following: 
Step 1: Apply the DEA procedures to estimate efficiency scores for each institution. 
Step 2: Carry out a truncated normal regression with the maximum likelihood method, 
regressing estimated efficiency scores on the environmental variables. 
Step 3: Program a bootstrap from the truncated empirical normal distribution of the 
estimated efficiency scores. 
Step 4: Calculate bias-corrected efficiency scores with the bootstrap results. 
Step 5: Use bias-corrected efficiency scores to re-estimate the marginal effects of the 
environmental variables in the second-stage regression. 
Step 6: Apply a second (double) bootstrap based on the empirical distribution of the bias-
corrected second-stage regression. 
Step 7: Construct bootstrap-based 95% confidence intervals for each parameter estimate. 
Collection of Data 
 The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/) 
served as the primary source for the collection of data used in this study. IPEDS is administrated 
by the National Center for Education Statistics and serves as the gatekeeper of data related to 
colleges and universities in the United States and includes several hundred continuous, string, 




admissions and test scores, fall enrollment, graduation rates, and finance. Data for the institutions 
in this study were collected via the IPEDS Data Center (http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/) 
through the “Compare Individual Institutions” portal. All data collected through the IPEDS Data 
Center was considered “final release data,” which includes “revisions to the provisional release 
data that have been made by institutions during the subsequent data collection year” (NCES, 
2014, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/login.aspx). A three-step process was utilized for 
collecting data through the IPEDS Data Center: Select Institutions through the “By Group” 
feature, Select Variables through the “Browse/Search Variables” feature, and Output data that 
will be downloaded as a comma-separated values (CSV) file. 
 Four additional data sources were consulted for specific variables used in the second-
stage procedure. The National Center for Higher Education Management Systems (NCHEMS) 
Information Center (http://www.higheredinfo.org/) was utilized to determine the percentage of 
adults 25- to 34-years-old with a bachelor’s degree or higher. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm) was 
accessed for the per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) by state data. Gorbunov’s (2013) 
exhaustive list of cycles pertaining to adoption and latency of performance-funding policies was 
consulted to determine which states had performance-funding programs in existence during the 
2011-2012 academic year under consideration in this study. Data from the “State Expenditure 
Report: Examining Fiscal 2011-2013 State Spending” (NASBO, 2013) provided data related to 
the higher education share of total state appropriations.  
Output and Input Variables 
The utilization of a two-stage approach requires the specification of input and output 




the stage-two truncated regression analysis. Given that DEA is an efficiency estimation 
technique, the terms "inputs" and "outputs" will be used in place of the typical "independent" and 
"dependent" variable designations, respectively. In the stage-two procedure, environmental 
variables, also referred to as exogenous variables, are the equivalent of “independent” variables 
in common use, while the “dependent” variable in the regression model was the stage-one DEA-
estimated efficiency score for each institution in the sample. 
Due to the non-parametric, deterministic nature of DEA, the selection of inputs and 
outputs to include in any model is a vital step in the implementation of a DEA-based procedure. 
One of the problems surrounding this issue is that "there is no definitive study to guide the 
selection of inputs/outputs in educational applications of DEA" (Avkiran, 2001). A search 
through recent literature failed to provide prescriptive guidelines related to initial input/output 
selection, as the focus of DEA is typically not on the inputs and outputs included in a model, but 
the efficient conversion of inputs into outputs (Worthington & Lee, 2008). While not specific in 
nature, general categories of inputs and outputs in higher education literature have been 
observed, as typical inputs include number of staff (academic and non-academic), number of 
students, and expenditures (non-labor, library, computing), while outputs include number of 
graduates, number of research projects, and publication-related (quantity and quality) measures 
(Katharaki & Katharakis, 2010).  
Stage One: Output Variable 
 Although university output can be categorized in three domains (teaching, research, and 
service), performance-funding programs are primarily concerned with outputs that directly relate 
to the effectiveness of teaching at institutions of higher education. In the Arkansas performance-




specified, as Governor Mike Beebe’s primary goal for higher education in Arkansas is doubling 
the number of college graduates by the year 2025 (ADHE, 2011). Across the DEA literature, 
number of graduates at various levels is by far the most often used output variable included in 
efficiency estimation analyses. Given the political and policy climate surrounding higher 
education, as well as research in the extant literature, the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded 
by a university during the 2011-2012 academic year was the single output that served as a proxy 
for teaching output at the universities included in the study (Agasisti & Dal Bianco, 2009; 
Agasisti & Johnes, 2009; Agasisti, 2011; Flegg et al., 2004; Johnes, 2006, 2008; Parteka & 
Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013; Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011; Worthington & Lee, 2008). 
Stage One: Input Variables  
The input variables included in the DEA estimation included factors associated with the 
general categories found throughout the DEA literature: students, staff, revenue, and 
expenditures. The following input variables were used in this study: total number of 
undergraduate students (Agasisti & Dal Bianco, 2009; Agasisti & Johnes, 2009; Flegg et al., 
2004; Johnes, 2006, 2008; Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013; Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 
2011); full-time equivalent academic staff (Agasisti & Johnes, 2009; Flegg et al., 2004; Johnes, 
2006, 2008; Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013; Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011; 
Worthington & Lee, 2008); full-time equivalent administrative staff (Avkiran, 2001; Flegg et al., 
2004; Lee, 2011; Worthington & Lee, 2008); total revenues (Agasisti & Dal Bianco, 2009; 
Parteka & Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2013; Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011); and total education 




Stage Two: Environmental Variables 
Selecting environmental variables to be included in the second-stage regression offered a 
greater challenge than the stage-one input and output variables. While environmental variables 
used in the stage-two regression analysis are “primarily non-discretionary and expected to have 
some influence on the efficiency of universities” (Lee, 2011, p. 198), the general process of 
selecting these variables was hindered primarily due to the fact that the “distinction between 
decision-maker controlled and environmental variables is not always distinct” (McMillan & 
Chan, 2006, p. 11). Sav (2013) highlighted the complex nature of higher education research as it 
relates to estimating efficiency, indicating factors such as the source and proportion of financial 
support can be viewed as being “quasi environmental factors” that can be considered both 
“partially exogenous and partially under the control of university management” (p. 64). The lack 
of clear delineation between controllable and non-controllable factors in higher education served 
as a challenge in selecting which to include as inputs in stage one or environmental variables in 
stage two.  
Additionally, published research specifically applying Simar and Wilson’s (2007) 
approach to the context of higher education is sparse, especially in the United States. Wolszczak-
Derlacz and Parteka (2011) conducted one of the few studies that utilized Simar and Wilson’s 
(2007) approach in higher education research, as their study of institutions across seven 
European countries included six exogenous variables in their second-stage truncated regression: 
country gross-domestic product (GDP), number of faculties, a dummy variable for the existence 
of a medical school, year the institution was founded, proportion of women employed in 
academic positions, and proportion of university revenues from non-governmental sources. The 




with DEA estimated efficiency scores, as these values failed to fall within the 99% confidence 
interval estimates (Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011). Lee (2011) also used Simar and 
Wilson’s technique in studying Australian universities, including student load factor, university 
location (city or non-city), proportion of Associate Professors and Professors to academic staff, 
and Institutional Grants Scheme as exogenous variables in the stage-two regression. Lee (2011) 
found that all four variables were statistically significantly (p < .05) related to institutional 
efficiency as measured by the stage-one DEA estimates.  
A broader search of the literature including two-stage regression approaches using 
different regression techniques (Tobit and OLS) provided additional studies from which 
environmental variables could be considered for this study. In their study of the efficiency of 72 
German institutions, Kempkes & Pohl (2010) regressed DEA efficiency estimates on three 
environmental factors: regional GDP per capita, and the presence of engineering and/or medical 
departments at the institution, finding that all three exogenous factors were statistically 
significant at their designated threshold (p < 0.10). Agasisti (2011) compared efficiency of 
national higher education systems across 18 countries in Europe and included five exogenous 
variables: GDP per capita, expenditure per student, percentage of students in public universities, 
percentage of public funding compared to total resources, and average years of education. Of 
these five environmental variables, GDP per capita (p < 0.05) and average years of education (p 
< 0.01) were the variables that were found to be statistically significant when all variables were 
considered in the model (Agasisti, 2011). Using three financial quasi-exogenous variables 
(percentage of funding from tuition charges, government appropriations, and investment 
income), Sav (2013) found that greater dependency on tuition-based funding led to greater 




complementary construct of a higher proportion of government funding led to higher levels of 
efficiency at the institutional level, albeit not at a statistically significant level (Sav, 2013).  
The primary objective of the second-stage regression procedure is to “associate variation 
in producer performance with variation in exogenous variables characterizing the environment in 
which production occurs” (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003, p. 261). Within this conceptualization, 
and based on a review of literature associated with the primary domains considered in this study 
(performance-funding policy, principal-agent relationship, privatization of higher education, and 
single-stage DEA and two-stage regression approaches), the following environmental variables 
were included in the second-stage truncated regression model:  
 per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) by state during 2012 (Agasisti et al., 2011; 
Kempkes & Pohl, 2010; Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011); 
 net tuition share of operating revenues in 2011-2012 (Sav, 2012); 
 percentage of the state’s population (25 – 34 years old) with a bachelor’s degree or higher 
in 2012 (Agasisti et al., 2011); 
 higher education’s share as a percent of state’s total expenditures in 2012; and, 
 existence of state performance-funding program during 2011-2012. 
The last four variables, while either minimally or not specifically found in the cited DEA 
research as environmental variables, were important in being able to explore the impact these 
variables have on institutional efficiency and explaining the inter-relationship between the 
primary areas of concern in this study. While Sav (2012) included net tuition share of operating 
revenues as a statistically significant factor in his analysis, this environmental variable will also 
address growing concerns in higher education policy regarding increased privatization and 




(Hossler, 2004; John & Parsons, 2005; SHEEO, 2014). Although Agasisti et al. (2011) 
considered percentage of the state’s population with a bachelor’s degree as an output variable in 
their DEA estimation, this study will incorporate this variable as a factor that might explain some 
of the variance in institutional efficiency when considering the environmental situations in which 
these institutions operate. Restricting this variable to 25- to 34-year-olds addresses the 
demographic group that has been identified as one of the United States’ primary concerns related 
to international competition, as the U.S. ranks 12th internationally in the percentage (43% in 
2011) of 25- to 34-year-old adults that have attained “tertiary education,” which is 21 percentage 
points behind Korea, the leading country in this category (64% in 2011) (OECD, 2013).  
Including higher education’s share of state total expenditures served as a measure of the 
state’s commitment toward supporting higher education, an important environmental factor 
which has steadily decreased over the past three decades (Delaney & Doyle, 2007; McLendon, 
Hearn, et al., 2009; NASBO, 2013; Okunade, 2004; Rizzo, 2006; Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). 
The existence of an active performance-funding program in states during 2011-2012 provided an 
avenue for exploring whether there is a link between performance-funding and institutional 
efficiency, as most existing research has concentrated on the effect of performance funding on 
state budgetary practices, institutional spending priorities, graduation rates, research funding, 
budget allocation, and policy innovations (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Hearn, Lewis, Kallsen, 
Holdsworth, & Jones, 2006; McLendon et al., 2005; Rabovsky, 2012; Shin, 2010). Appendix B 
provides the variables, including definitions and source, used in both stages of analysis. 
Research Questions 
This section details how results from the 7-step procedure adapted from Simar and 




included in this study. Due to the grouping of institutions into two categories (larger and 
medium/smaller), the full multi-step process was carried out separately for each group of 
institutions in this study. From a practical data analysis perspective, all statistical analyses in this 
study will be conducted using R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing (R: A 
Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, 2014), as the primary R packages that will 
be used include FEAR 2.0.1 (Wilson, 2008), Benchmarking in R (Bogetoft & Otto, 2013), and 
truncreg: Truncated Gaussian Regression Models (Croissant & Zeileis, 2013). The following 
section includes a restatement of the research questions posited in chapter 1, with a detailed 
description of the analytical processes that will be followed to answer each particular question. 
Question 1: When compared to similar institutions nationally, how efficient are four-year public 
Master’s universities in Arkansas at utilizing resources to achieve one of the mandatory 
measures (bachelor’s degrees awarded) required by the new performance-funding program? 
In order to estimate the efficiency of the Arkansas universities under consideration, steps 
1, 3, 4, and 5 of the 7-step process outlined in the “Research Design” section of this chapter were 
completed. Step 1 provided the original DEA estimates of CRS-based technical efficiency and 
VRS-based pure technical efficiency for each institution in this study. From these efficiency 
estimates, institutions can be compared based on their pure technical efficiency score, which will 
serve as an indicator of how efficient the Arkansas universities in this study were in comparison 
to similar institutions nationally. To determine whether differences in efficiency among 
institutions are statistically significant, Steps 3-5 will be conducted in order to make statistical 
inferences regarding the estimated efficiency scores generated in the original DEA procedure. 




bootstrapped technical efficiency estimates created in Steps 3-5 enhanced the results of this study 
by correcting for bias in the original DEA estimation procedure (Simar & Wilson, 1998).  
Question 2: Which environmental factors contribute to the estimated efficiency of the inefficient 
four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this study? 
All seven steps in the double-bootstrapped, two-stage truncated regression analysis were 
utilized in order to answer this research question. While other regression techniques, primarily 
censored (Tobit) and OLS regression, have been utilized in two-stage procedures that regress 
stage-one DEA estimated efficiencies on environmental variables, Simar and Wilson (2007) 
argued that previous analytical approaches failed to describe the underlying, unknown data 
generating process (DGP), causing “some doubt about what is being estimated in the two-stage 
approaches” (p. 32). Typically used two-stage techniques have also failed to account for the 
serial correlation of DEA efficiency estimates that arise in finite samples, essentially invalidating 
these inference-making approaches (Simar & Wilson, 2007). Simar and Wilson conducted a 
Monte Carlo experiment with 1,000 trials in order to compare Tobit regression and truncated 
regression techniques within the Algorithm #2 procedure, finding that the Tobit regression model 
was severely mis-specified, resulting in estimated confidence intervals that were not near the true 
values (Simar & Wilson, 2007).  
The determination of which environmental factors contributed to institutional efficiency 
was made through an examination of the parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals 
resulting from the double bootstrap truncated regression analysis. The efficiency scores created 
in stage one of the procedure served as the dependent variable in the truncated regression 
analysis, as the environmental variables that were per capita GDP by state, net tuition revenue, 




expenditures, and the existence of performance-funding program during 2011-2012. The 95% 
confidence intervals constructed in Step 7 will provide data that will allow for statistical 
inferences to be made regarding the impact of these environmental variables on institutional 
efficiency. The threshold for statistical significance was established at p < .05. 
Question 3: Does the existence of a performance-funding program impact the estimated 
institutional efficiency of the four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this 
study? 
In order to answer this research question, the results of the analysis performed to answer 
question #2 were used to determine whether a link exists between the existence of a 
performance-funding program and institutional efficiency estimated through the DEA procedure 
in Step 1. The parameter estimate and 95% confidence interval constructed in Steps 4, 5, 6, and 7 
served as the data that were examined to explore the impact of the existence of performance-
funding programs on institutional efficiency. The threshold for statistical significance was 
established at p < .05. 
Question 4: What are the policy implications related to institutional efficiency within Arkansas' 
performance-funding program? 
The conceptual framework utilized in this study was agency theory. Agency theory 
examines the contractual relationship between a principal and agent that is characterized by both 
parties acting as rational, self-interested maximizers (Ghoshal, 2005). At the core of agency 
theory is the agency problem, which results from the principal delegating aspects of the decision-
making process to the agent, which also provides an opportunity for the agent to choose self-
interested actions that may diverge from the goals and interests of the principal (Jensen & 




(Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 177) are informational asymmetries and goal conflicts, as agency 
theory is primarily concerned with understanding how principals attempt to coerce or incentivize 
agent actions that will maximize the potential for achieving the principal’s goals and objectives 
(Lane, 2012). Within institutions of higher education, informational asymmetries exist at 
multiple levels due to the complexities of the organizational structure and the specialized 
expertise required in the academic work of teaching and research (Kivistö, 2008).  
This study explored the key constructs of agency theory as represented by the contractual 
relationship between state government and institutions of higher education found in the 
performance-funding program in Arkansas. Arkansas’s re-implementation of a performance-
funding program, along with the expansion of performance outcomes and the restructuring of 
performance-based allocations being tied to base funding (25% in 2017-2018) (ADHE, 2011), 
were conceptualized as an attempt by the principal to decrease informational asymmetries and 
goal conflicts by designing a monitoring and incentive structure that mitigates the potential for 
agent-driven adverse selection and moral hazard (Moe, 1984).  
One of the primary policy implications of this research was related to establishing peer 
institutions against which Arkansas’ universities can be benchmarked. One of the primary 
benefits of DEA-based techniques is that institutions are compared to peers that represent “best 
practices” related to institutional efficiency, as compared with regression-only techniques that 
compare institutional efficiency to average practice (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). The 
benchmarking process was achieved through the calculation of DEA efficiency estimates in 
stage-one of the two-stage analytical procedure. Through the application of the DEA procedure 
in Step 1, an efficiency frontier was estimated that was comprised of institutions that 




on an efficiency score below 1.0) were located away from this efficiency frontier. Based on 
where inefficient institutions reside beneath the efficiency frontier, peer institutions can be 
determined, which provide an opportunity for inefficient institutions to learn from institutions 
that are operating efficiently.  
Another policy implication examined was the determination of which exogenous 
variables contribute to the estimated efficiency of Arkansas institutions. The stage-two truncated 
regression analysis determined whether and to what extent these variables had a statistically 
significant impact on institutional efficiency during the 2011-2012 academic year. Sav (2013) 
argued that public institutions have had to shift their financial dependency due to state funding 
reductions, as the “new pressures have been brought to bear on university management to seek 
ways of improving operating efficiencies with ever tighter budgetary constraints” (p. 63). The 
results of the second stage regression analysis provided policymakers with information related to 
which of the environmental factors included in the regression analysis promote efficiency at 
public institutions, as this information could be utilized in future decision-making processes. 
In general, the analytical technique used in this study could serve as a model that could be 
incorporated into the performance-funding mechanism that currently exists in Arkansas. At 
present, all of the mandatory, optional, and compensatory measures included in the performance-
funding program address various performance outcomes and do not include a measure of how 
efficiently institutions achieve those outcomes. This study demonstrated an analytical technique 
that has the potential to be an addition to the existing performance-funding program that will 





 This chapter has explicated the details concerning the analytical technique that will be 
utilized in this study. The sample institutions examined consisted of the four-year public 
universities in Arkansas that have the Carnegie Classification of “Master’s Colleges and 
Universities.” The six Arkansas institutions were compared to the national population of 
Master’s Colleges and Universities spanning all three categories: larger programs, medium 
programs, and smaller programs. Due to similar characteristics, the 99 medium and smaller 
programs were analyzed together, with the 171 larger programs analyzed in a separate group. 
Building on the methodology introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007), this study used a 7-step 
procedure to conduct a double-bootstrap, two-stage truncated regression analysis. Grounded in 
data envelopment analysis (DEA), institutional efficiency was initially estimated in Step 1 within 
an output-oriented framework with an assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS). This stage-
one procedure produced an efficiency frontier comprised of institutions demonstrating technical 
efficiency (based on a ratio score of 1.0), as institutions not located on this frontier were 
considered to be demonstrating technical inefficiency (based on a ratio score < 1.0). The 
estimation of pure technical efficiency under the VRS assumption, coupled with technical 
efficiency under the constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption, allowed for the calculation of a 
variety of measures related to institutional efficiency: scale efficiency, non-increasing returns to 
scale, increasing returns to scale, and decreasing returns to scale. Steps 2-7 of the analytic 
approach used in this study provided a means for estimating the influence of environmental 
variables on institutional efficiency, as the DEA-based efficiency estimates were regressed on 
five exogenous variables in the second-stage truncated regression model. Bootstrap procedures 




correct for bias inherent in the non-parametric DEA estimations, as well as provide for statistical 
inferences through the construction of 95% confidence intervals around both the stage-one 
efficiency estimates and the stage-two parameters. The following chapter presents results of the 








In 2011, the Arkansas legislature passed Act 1203, which served to re-institute, for a 
fourth time, a performance-funding program for higher education in the state. This new iteration 
holds several tenets of what has been deemed Performance Funding 2.0: 
 Shifted performance-based funds from a bonus structure to being incorporated in base 
funding; 
 Increased the proportion of funding tied to performance outcomes to 25% of base 
funding once fully implemented in FY 2018; 
 Created mandatory measures for four-year institutions that included the number of 
bachelor’s degrees, total credentials, and STEM credentials awarded, along with a 
new progression measure that accounted for the successful progression of all 
credential-seeking students. 
This performance-funding program serves as heightened accountability for increasing production 
of these educational outcomes within a context of proportionally declining levels of state 
financial support. The concept of increasing outputs without increasing inputs is a simple 
definition of improving efficiency. Although efficiency was mentioned in Act 1203, even 
appearing in the title of the legislation, a measure of efficiency was not included in the 
implemented program. This study sought to estimate the efficiency of four-year Master’s 
universities in Arkansas while providing a measure of institutional efficiency that could be 
included in future modifications of the performance-funding program in Arkansas. In order to 
examine the results of this study, this chapter includes major sections and subsections that 




Summary of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to explore the contractual relationship between the state of 
Arkansas and its public colleges and universities through the lens of agency theory, while also 
estimating the efficiency of a segment of those institutions (public Master’s universities) in 
producing one of the mandatory measures included in the performance-funding program: number 
of bachelor degrees awarded. This study is significant in that it utilized agency theory as a 
conceptual framework to explain how the new iteration of performance-funding in Arkansas can 
be viewed as a contractual agreement between the state and higher education institutions, in 
which the state (principal) is attempting to coerce institutions (agents) via incentives to increase 
the production of degreed and credentialed citizens in order to meet the economic and workforce 
needs of the state.  This study is also significant in that it applied an analytical methodology that, 
to the best of my knowledge, has not been used in a study of Master’s colleges and universities 
in the United States. 
Research Design 
The analytical technique utilized in this study was based on Simar and Wilson’s (2007) 
two-stage double bootstrap truncated regression technique. This technique combines the use of 
data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is a non-statistical, non-parametric approach to 
estimating efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs), with bootstrapping and regression-based 
methods that provide a means of overcoming deficiencies in the base DEA technique. Through 
bootstrapping, bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates can be calculated, allowing for 
statistical inferences regarding the underlying data generating process to be made. The second-




are generally beyond the control of the DMU, on the DEA efficiency estimates in order to 
determine which, if any, environmental variables influence estimated efficiency scores.  
The DEA portion of this analysis consisted of an output-oriented model that assumed 
variable returns to scale (VRS). The double-bootstrap technique used in this methodology was 
based on Algorithm #2 introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007). The technique used in this study 
included the following steps (based on Anderson’s (2010) non-technical description of the 
approach): 
Step 1: Apply the DEA procedures to estimate efficiency scores for each institution. 
Step 2: Carry out a truncated normal regression with the maximum likelihood method, 
regressing estimated efficiency scores on the environmental variables. 
Step 3: Program a bootstrap from the truncated empirical normal distribution of the 
estimated efficiency scores. 
Step 4: Calculate bias-corrected efficiency scores with the bootstrap results. 
Step 5: Use bias-corrected efficiency scores to re-estimate the marginal effects of the 
environmental variables in the second-stage regression. 
Step 6: Apply a second (double) bootstrap based on the empirical distribution of the bias-
corrected second-stage regression. 
Step 7: Construct bootstrap-based 95% confidence intervals for each parameter estimate. 
Data Collection 
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/) 
served as the primary source for the collection of data used in this study. IPEDS is administrated 
by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which maintains data related to colleges 




string, and categorical data points spanning variable categories that include institutional 
characteristics, admissions and test scores, fall enrollment, graduation rates, and finance. For the 
calculation of the input variable net tuition share that was used in the second-stage regression 
analysis, this study followed the calculation conducted by the Delta Cost Project, using variables 
collected through IPEDS (http://www.deltacostproject.org/). This variable was not available 
through the Delta Cost Project’s dataset, which currently includes data through FY 2010.  Data 
were also collected from four additional sources: the National Center for Higher Education 
Management Systems (NCHEMS) Information Center (http://www.higheredinfo.org/); the U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm); Gorbunov’s (2013) exhaustive list of cycles pertaining 
to adoption and latency of performance-funding policies; and the National Association of State 
Budget Officers’ “State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2011-2013 State Spending” 
(NASBO, 2013).  
Data Collection Results 
 Data were collected for the national population of 270 four-year public institutions in the 
United States that are classified as Master’s Colleges and Universities by the Carnegie 
Foundation. Master’s institutions are those which produce fewer than 20 doctoral research 
degrees annually, as the Carnegie classification system delineates Master’s programs into three 
categories based on annual awarding of master’s degrees: smaller (50-99 master’s degrees), 
medium (100-199 master’s degrees), and larger (at least 200 master’s degrees) programs 
(Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2014). The national population of four-




 An initial data set was constructed for the stage-one output (bachelor_degrees) and input 
variables (undergraduates, academic_staff, admin_staff, revenues, and expenditures), and the 
stage-two environmental variables (GDP, net_tuition, attainment, share, and 
performance_funding). An initial review of demographic and academic preparation 
characteristics of medium and smaller institutions indicated a high level of homogeneity between 
the groups. Given these similarities and that the two medium institutions in Arkansas (Henderson 
State University and Southern Arkansas University) have undergraduate enrollments below the 
mean for the programs classified as smaller Master’s institutions in the national population, the 
medium and smaller programs were grouped together throughout the analyses conducted in this 
study. Due to missing data, there were four institutions excluded from the Master’s larger 
campus group, reducing the analyzed sample to 167 larger group institutions. The 
medium/smaller category was reduced by six institutions that had missing data, resulting in the 
analysis of 93 institutions in this combined grouping. Each of the 260 institutions with complete 
data were included in both the stage-one estimation of DEA efficiency and the stage-two 
truncated regression analysis. 
Data Analysis 
 The following section is comprised of two subsections: the first includes a presentation of 
descriptive statistics and initial results for the larger and medium/smaller groups of institutions, 
and the second subsection includes answers to the research questions based on results from the 
multi-step procedure used in this study. From a practical data analysis perspective, all statistical 
analyses in this study were conducted using R: A Language and Environment for Statistical 
Computing (2014), as the primary R packages used included FEAR 2.0.1 (Wilson, 2008), 




Models (Croissant & Zeileis, 2013). The double bootstrap truncated regression Algorithm #2 
(Simar & Wilson, 2007) was conducted via a function written in R by H. S. Nghiem (personal 
communication, August 20, 2014).  
Descriptive Statistics for Institution Groups 
 After removing institutions for missing data, the sample included in the study represented 
97.7% of all larger programs (167 of 171) and 93.9% of all medium/smaller programs (93 of 99) 
classified as four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities in the United States. Appendix 
B presents descriptive statistics by group for each of the stage-one output and input variables, as 
well as the stage-two environmental variables. For the medium/smaller group, the average annual 
production of bachelor’s degrees during the 2011-2012 academic year was 928 and ranged from 
a minimum of 106 to a maximum of 2,691. The average undergraduate population in this group 
was 4,962 students with a range spanning from 1,102 to 18,481 students. The average revenue, 
as defined in the study, was $51.89 million with a minimum revenue of $8.75 million and a 
maximum revenue of over $202 million, while total education and general expenditures ranged 
from a minimum of $21.83 million to a maximum of $184.76 million with an average 
expenditure of $76.26 million for the institutions in the medium/smaller group. Institutions in the 
larger group produced an average of 1,917 bachelor’s degrees (range of 198 to 7,044) in 2011-
2012. The undergraduate population at the larger Master’s institutions included in this study 
ranged from 1,450 to 31,747, as the average undergraduate enrollment was 9,918 for this group. 
The average revenue for the Master’s larger group of institutions was $104.73 million in 2011-
2012, with a minimum revenue of $8.36 million and a maximum revenue in excess of $339.92 
million. Total education and general expenditures for the larger group institutions ranged from 




By comparison, Table 6 shows the original values for the output, input, and 
environmental variables for the six Arkansas Master’s institutions included in the study. In the 
stage-two truncated regression analysis, the environmental variables included for the Arkansas 
institutions for the state’s per capita real GDP during 2012 was $38,336; higher education’s 
share as a percentage of the state of Arkansas’s total expenditures in 2012 was 16.2%; and the 
percentage of the state’s population (25-34 years old) with a bachelor’s degree or higher in 2012 
(attainment variable) was 23.08%.  
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics of Output, Input, and Environmental Variables for Arkansas Institutions, 


























       
ASU  1,687 9,455 551 61 88,943,766 153,765,289 69.17 
ATU 1,214 8,369 383 64 66,521,807 88,948,308 55.48 





     
HSU 507 3,365 197 26 21,178,555 44,629,743 48.62 
SAU 406 2,682 180 31 17,935,095 35,161,884 51.18 
UAM 380 3,280 180 35 17,918,502 43,273,638 30.32 
 a
Abbreviations for Arkansas institutions: ASU-Arkansas State University Main Campus; ATU-
Arkansas Tech University; UCA-University of Central Arkansas; HSU-Henderson State 
University; SAU-Southern Arkansas University Main Campus; and UAM-University of 
Arkansas at Monticello. 
 
DEA Efficiency Estimations for Institution Groups 
 The two-stage procedure used in this study produced, in part, both original DEA 
technical efficiency estimates and bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates that included 




technical efficiency scores contained within the 95% confidence interval bands indicating 
statistical significance. For each group, the original technical efficiency estimates were 
correlated with the bias-corrected estimates, as the larger group estimates were correlated at 0.98, 
while the medium/smaller group estimates were correlated at 0.97. Due to these initial findings, 
the remainder of the presentation of results from the DEA-based analyses will consist of the 
original DEA technical efficiency estimates.  
The DEA model used in this study assumed an output orientation with variable returns to 
scale (VRS). An output-oriented model was selected due to the majority of DEA-based research 
in higher education having used output-oriented models, as colleges and universities have limited 
capacity to increase the quantity and quality of inputs in the short-term (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; 
Worthington & Lee, 2008). VRS was appropriate in this study, as VRS is used when DMUs 
cannot adjust their scale of operations in the short-term, which is the case with colleges and 
universities (Lee, 2011). Constant returns to scale (CRS) were calculated in order to determine 
scale efficiency (SE) scores, and non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) were calculated in order 
to determine whether institutions exhibited increasing returns to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns 
to scale (DRS). 
 In order to demonstrate graphically the differences between the three types of returns to 
scale, Figure 3 was created for the 93 institutions that comprised the medium/smaller group in 
this study. Figure 3 consists of one input (expenditures) and one output (number of bachelor’s 
degrees awarded) included in the DEA model. As can be seen in Figure 3, the efficiency frontier 
under the VRS assumption more closely envelopes the data than does the line produced by the 
CRS assumption, which represents a primary difference between the two types of returns to scale 




reaching the initial efficient institution on the frontier as determined under CRS. The efficiency 
frontier in the output-oriented model, which is comprised of institutions with a technical 
efficiency score of 1.0, has only four institutions in the one input/one output model shown in 
Figure 3, although more institutions were found to exhibit technical efficiency within the full 
DEA model. The relationship between efficient and inefficient institutions will be further 
explored in the discussion below.  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of returns to scale for medium/smaller programs in the study.  
Determination of Scale Efficiencies in Stage-One DEA Model 
In order to further analyze the efficiency of the Master’s institutions included in this 
study, additional DEA estimates were calculated under the assumption of constant returns to 
scale (CRS). Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for VRS, CRS, and scale efficiency (SE) for 
each group in the study. SE is calculated as 
   
   
, such that lower SE scores represent a greater 




institutional productivity (Thanassoulis et al., 2008). Given that efficiency scores under the CRS 
assumption, by definition, include scale inefficiencies, CRS estimates will always be lower than 
VRS, given that VRS estimates do not include scale inefficiencies when calculated (Agasisti & 
Johnes, 2009). Each of the efficiency measures in Table 7 are comprised of ratios between 0 and 
1. For VRS and CRS technical efficiency estimates, institutions with an efficiency score of 1.0 
are considered technically efficient and define the efficiency frontier against which the 
inefficient institutions (efficiency < 1.0) are measured.  
Table 7 





Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Larger Group (n=167) 
     VRS 0.755 0.156 0.757 0.326 1.000 
CRS 0.738 0.155 0.741 0.296 1.000 
SE 0.977 0.031 0.990 0.855 1.000 
Medium/Smaller Group (n=93) 
     
VRS 0.715 0.197 0.711 0.284 1.000 
CRS 0.640 0.180 0.640 0.219 1.000 
SE 0.905 0.114 0.938 0.219 1.000 
 
The average VRS score, based on the Shephard (1970) output distance function, for the 
larger group of institutions was 0.755 (sd=0.156) and was 0.715 (sd=0.197) for the 
medium/smaller group. For the larger group of institutions, 9% (15 of 167) exhibited technical 
efficiency with a VRS score of 1.0, while 12% (11 of 93) of the medium/smaller institutions 
were technically efficient. These technical efficiency estimates suggest that the larger group and 
the medium/smaller group institutions, if they were collectively producing bachelor’s degrees on 
the efficiency frontier, could respectively utilize only 76% and 72% of their existing inputs to 




an output-oriented approach, the DEA technique provided for the calculation of the proportional 
decrease in inputs needed for institutions to become technically efficient given their existing 
level of output. Based on the mean VRS scores in Table 7, larger institutions could, on average, 
reduce the amount of each input included in the DEA model by at least 24.5% [(1-VRS)*100%] 
in order to produce the same number of bachelor’s degrees efficiently, while the collective 
medium/smaller institutions could decrease each input by an average of 28.5% in order to 
produce the same number of bachelor’s degrees efficiently. 
A complement to the Shephard output distance function efficiency estimates is Farrell 
technical efficiency, which is calculated by taking the reciprocal of the Shephard-based 
estimates. Under an output-orientation, institutions with a Farrell technical efficiency score of 
1.0 are deemed technically efficient, while efficiency scores above 1.0 indicates technical 
inefficiency. The Farrell technical efficiency score, under an output-oriented DEA approach, 
allows for the calculation of how much an inefficient DMU would need to increase its output(s), 
based on given inputs, in order to reach the efficiency frontier (Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 
2011). This percentage increase is calculated as [(Farrell efficiency score – 1)*100%] 
(Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011). The mean Farrell technical efficiency score was 1.392 
(sd=0.345) for larger institutions and 1.530 (sd=0.504) for medium/smaller institutions. From an 
output maximization perspective, the institutions in the larger group could increase their output 
(bachelor’s degrees) by 39.2% given existing levels of inputs, while medium/smaller institutions 
could, on average, increase their output of bachelor’s degrees by 53% while keeping input levels 
stable. Across both groups in the study, the maximum Farrell technical efficiency score was 




by 252.6% within the existing levels of inputs in order to reach the efficiency frontier as 
determined by the DEA model used in this study.  
Table 7 also provides results from the calculation of scale efficiency (SE) of institutions 
included in this study, as SE is a measure of “how far the scale size of a unit is away from 
‘optimal’” (Thanassoulis et al., 2008, p. 290). The mean scale efficiency (SE) score for larger 
institutions was 0.977 (sd=0.031) and for medium/smaller institutions was 0.905 (sd=0.114). The 
high level of scale efficiency demonstrated by both groups indicated that, on average, the 
institutions in this study were operating close to their optimal size. For the larger institution 
group, 6.6% (11 of 167) of institutions had an SE score of 1.0, while 3% (3 of 93) of the 
medium/smaller institutions had an SE score of 1.0. 
Determination of Peers in Stage-One DEA Model 
 One of the primary benefits and distinguishing features of DEA-based approaches is the 
ability to benchmark inefficient DMUs against efficient DMUs that are operating on the 
efficiency frontier. From a practical perspective, the selection of benchmarks, i.e., peers, is of 
great importance to DMUs who desire to learn from other institutions that are technically 
efficient (Hougaard & Tvede, 2002). The estimation of efficiency in the stage-one DEA model 
provided a set of peers and peer weights that consisted of the 11 medium/smaller institutions that 
were deemed technically efficient with a VRS efficiency estimate of 1.0, while 15 peers were 
identified in the group of larger institutions. Table 8 identifies the peers in each group, as well as 
the number of times each efficient institution served as a peer in the DEA model. Two 
institutions (State University of New York at New Paltz and California State University-Chico) 
served as peers for more than 100 of the 167 institutions in the larger group, while three 




The Evergreen State College) were peers for 60 or more of the 93 institutions included in the 
medium/smaller group. 
Table 8 
Frequency with which an efficient institution appeared as a peer in the DEA model 
Institution Name 
Number of times 
institution is a peer 
Larger Group  
State University of New York at New Paltz 105 
California State University-Chico 102 
Fort Hays State University 89 
Texas A & M University-Texarkana 72 
California State University-Fullerton 31 
University of Houston-Victoria 30 
Governors State University 24 
California State University-East Bay 15 
California State University-Bakersfield 6 
California State University-Fresno 4 
California State University-Sacramento 3 
Peru State College 3 
California State Polytechnic University-Pomona 2 
California State University-Long Beach 2 
California State University-Northridge 1 
Medium/Smaller Group  
Metropolitan State University 76 
University of South Florida-Sarasota-Manatee 65 
The Evergreen State College 60 
Central Washington University 13 
The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey 11 
Southwest Minnesota State University 8 
Weber State University 4 
Eastern Oregon University 4 
Cheyney University of Pennsylvania 3 
University of Alaska Southeast 2 
Northwestern Oklahoma State University 2 
 
In order to explore the peer concept graphically, Figure 4 was created to show the 
relationship between peers, inefficient institutions, and the efficiency frontier. As seen in Figure 




Master’s universities are demarcated by a red square. In the DEA modeling phase of this study, 
peers were determined based on results of the full model consisting of all five input variables and 
one output variable. In Figure 3 below, the plot utilizes just one input (undergraduate enrollment) 
and one output (number of bachelor’s degrees awarded) to construct the efficiency frontier based 
on an output-oriented, VRS model in order to demonstrate the concept. Five of the seven peers 
identified in Figure 3 lie directly on the efficiency frontier. The two institutions located just 
below the efficiency frontier, while not 100% efficient with a single input variable 
(undergraduate enrollment) in the model, were deemed technically efficient by the full model 
with all five input variables included. Figure 3 also highlights the relative nature of the DEA 
technique, in which efficiency and inefficiency are determined relative to the other institutions 
included in the model. 






Determination of Slacks in Stage-One DEA Model 
After peers were determined, slacks were calculated for each institution in each group of 
the study. Within a DEA model using an output orientation, slacks represent an on over-
utilization of inputs (i.e., input slack) that can be reduced in order to achieve efficiency (Avkiran, 
2001). The presence and amount of input slack can be determined for each input variable 
included in the DEA model. Table 9 shows descriptive statistics for the input slacks of the 
inefficient institutions in each group as the percentage of reduction for each input variable 
required for inefficient institutions to achieve efficiency within the construction of the DEA 
model used in this study. In general, institutions in the larger group could reduce the percentage 
of full-time equivalent academic staff by 15%, full-time equivalent administrative staff by 32%, 
revenues by 22%, and expenditures by 7% while producing the existing levels of output, as 
measured by the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded. For the medium/smaller group, 
institutions could, on average, reduce the percentage of full-time equivalent academic staff by 
22%, full-time equivalent administrative staff by 14%, revenues by 28%, and expenditures by 
21% while maintaining the existing levels of output as measured by the number of bachelor’s 
degrees awarded. There were no output slacks found for any institution included in this study. 
Appendices F and G include institution-level data pertaining to input slacks for each input 












Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Larger Group (n=152) 
     undergraduates 0.35 1.67 0.00 0.00 10.22 
academic_staff_FTE 15.15 11.35 13.91 0.00 42.42 
admin_staff_FTE 31.76 24.62 33.91 0.00 87.12 
revenues 21.97 18.17 21.77 0.00 68.06 
expenditures 6.63 10.74 0.00 0.00 44.36 
Medium/Smaller Group (n=82) 
     
undergraduates 1.14 4.72 0.00 0.00 29.90 
academic_staff_FTE 22.17 12.38 23.80 0.00 46.12 
admin_staff_FTE 13.84 19.61 0.00 0.00 81.06 
revenues 27.64 22.64 26.94 0.00 82.47 
expenditures 21.01 15.97 19.78 0.00 68.63 
 
Institution-Level Data 
In addition to the group-level statistics calculated through the stage-one DEA, institution-
level data are provided for each institution included in this study. Appendices B and C provide 
three efficiency scores (VRS, CRS, SE) along with Returns to Scale values for each institution in 
the Master’s medium/smaller group and larger group, respectively. Returns to scale is related to 
the impact of scale size on average production of outputs under efficient operation by a decision-
making unit (DMU), as DMUs can exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale 
(Thanassoulis et al., 2008). Using the method proposed by Färe & Lovell (1985), returns to scale 
were calculated for each institution in this study. For the group of larger institutions, 50% (84 of 
167) exhibited decreasing returns to scale; 43% (72 of 167) exhibited increasing returns to scale; 
and 7% (11 of 167) exhibited constant returns to scale. For the medium/smaller group of 
institutions, 81% (75 of 93) exhibited decreasing returns to scale; 16% (15 of 167) exhibited 




returns to scale serves as an indicator that institutions might benefit from reducing the scale of 
their operations (Agasisti & Johnes, 2009), while increasing returns to scale serves as an 
indication that institutions could, if feasible within their context, benefit from the expansion of 
the size of their operations, as increased input requirements would be off-set by increased output 
(Thanassoulis et al., 2008). Constant returns to scale occurs when DMUs are operating at both 
technical and scale efficiency, as 5% (14 of 270) of all institutions in this study exhibited 
constant returns to scale. 
Research Questions and Results 
Research Question 1: When compared to similar institutions nationally, how efficient are four-
year public Master’s universities in Arkansas at utilizing resources to achieve one of the 
mandatory measures (bachelor’s degrees awarded) required by the new performance-funding 
program?  
 Table 10 provides institution-level data pertaining to the estimation of efficiency in the 
DEA procedure for the six Arkansas universities included in this study. All six institutions were 
operating near optimal levels of scale size, based on scale efficiency calculations above the 0.9 
threshold on the 0-to-1 ratio scale. Although four institutions exhibited decreasing returns to 
scale, and two exhibited increasing returns to scale, the scale efficiency scores near 1.0 indicated 
each institution is operating at near optimal scale size and would only minimally benefit from an 
increase or decrease in scale size. These scale efficiency scores, when compared with the VRS 
efficiency scores, served as an indication that inefficiency is more so related to pure technical 
inefficiency at the institutional level as opposed to institutions exhibiting inefficiency based on 
the size of the institution.  
Table 10 










Larger Group (n=167)     
ASU  0.664 0.664 1.000 drs
b
 
ATU 0.600 0.599 0.997 irs 
UCA 0.692 0.692 0.999 irs 
Medium/Smaller Group (n=93)     
HSU 0.531 0.524 0.987 drs 
SAU 0.515 0.492 0.956 drs 
UAM 0.407 0.382 0.940 drs 
a
Abbreviations for Arkansas institutions: ASU-Arkansas State University Main Campus; ATU-
Arkansas Tech University; UCA-University of Central Arkansas; HSU-Henderson State 
University; SAU-Southern Arkansas University Main Campus; and UAM-University of 
Arkansas at Monticello. 
b
ASU demonstrated decreasing returns to scale based on a CRS value of 0.6640, which was 
0.0003 lower than the VRS value of 0.6643. 
 
Table 11 provides input slack data for each of the six Arkansas universities included in 
this study. The bottom row of Table 11 shows the average percentage reduction for each input 
variable across all Arkansas institutions. Collectively, the Arkansas institutions had input slack 
of 24.78% for the full-time equivalent academic staff input variable, and 15.06% slack for the 
full-time equivalent administrative staff input variable. The Arkansas institutions had less than 
10% slack for revenues (5.25%) and expenditures (4.35%), while demonstrating no input slack in 
the number of undergraduate students enrolled on campus. The individual institutional results 






Input Slacks for Inefficient Institutions, Arkansas Institutions 
 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4
 
x5 
Larger Group (n=152)      
ASU  0.00 13.86 15.17 1.21 0.00 
ATU 0.00 23.60 50.03 8.57 0.00 
UCA 0.00 29.66 0.00 1.91 0.00 
Medium/Smaller Group (n=82)      
HSU 0.00 27.20 0.00 16.84 14.26 
SAU 0.00 32.63 2.45 2.99 0.00 
UAM 0.00 21.76 22.72 0.00 11.81 
Average for AR institutions 0.00 24.78 15.06 5.25 4.35 
Input Variables: x1=undergraduates; x2=academic_staff_FTE; x3=admin_staff_FTE; 
x4=revenues; x5=expenditures 
 
Individual Institutional Analyses 
The following discussion will present results from the stage-one DEA analysis for each 
of the six Arkansas institutions independently, as the order of presentation is in descending order 
based on technical efficiency score for each Arkansas institution in the larger group and then the 
medium/smaller group.  
Larger Institutions: University of Central Arkansas 
The University of Central Arkansas (UCA) had a technical efficiency score of 0.69 on the 
output-oriented DEA model with the VRS assumption. This efficiency score can be interpreted 
as meaning that UCA could reduce the amount of each of the five inputs in the model by at least 
31% while producing the same amount of output (number of bachelor’s degrees). The peer 
institutions that serve as benchmarks for UCA included California State University-Chico, Fort 
Hays State University, State University of New York at New Paltz, and University of Houston-




for UCA to produce its 1,619 bachelor’s degrees efficiently given the type and levels of inputs 
included in the DEA model.  
UCA’s technical efficiency score was converted to a Farrell output technical efficiency 
estimate by taking the reciprocal of the Shephard-based efficiency estimate (
 
    
 , which 
converted to a Farrell efficiency score of 1.45. From an output maximization perspective, UCA 
could increase its production of bachelor’s degrees by as much as 45% [(Farrell efficiency score 
– 1)*100%] while keeping its existing inputs stable (Wolszczak-Derlacz & Parteka, 2011). If 
applied to the data in this study, a 45% increase in output would have raised the number 
bachelor’s degrees awarded by UCA from 1,619 to 2,348 during the 2011-2012 academic year 
given the level of inputs included in the model. Based on the data in Table 11, UCA would need 
to reduce full-time equivalent academic staff by 29.66% and revenues by 1.91% in order for 
UCA to project to the efficiency frontier.  
Larger Institutions: Arkansas State University 
Arkansas State University-Main Campus (ASU) had an efficiency score of 0.66 in the 
DEA model. In order for ASU to reach the efficiency frontier based on the production of 1,687 
bachelor’s degrees in 2011-2012, the university would need to reduce each of the five inputs in 
the DEA model by 34%. The peer institutions identified for ASU through the DEA procedure 
included California State University-Chico, Fort Hays State University, and State University of 
New York at New Paltz. In order to determine what level of output production is possible for 
ASU at existing input levels during 2011-2012, the VRS efficiency estimate was converted to a 
Farrell technical efficiency score. The reciprocal of 0.66 equaled 1.52, indicating that ASU could 
produce 52% more bachelor’s degrees given the existing types and levels of inputs included in 




output would represent 877 additional bachelor’s degrees, which would bring the total to 2,564 
bachelor’s degrees, which represented the level of production required for ASU to be deemed 
efficient given its existing levels of inputs. A review of input slacks for ASU in Table 11 
indicated the institution would need to reduce full-time academic staff by 13.85%, full-time 
equivalent administrative staff by 15.17%, and revenues by 1.21% in order to project to the 
efficiency frontier given existing output level.  
Larger Institutions: Arkansas Tech University 
Arkansas Tech University (ATU) had the lowest estimated efficiency score for the larger 
group institutions from Arkansas with a value of 0.6. ATU would need to reduce its five inputs 
included in the DEA model by 40% in order to reach the efficiency frontier occupied by its peer 
institutions, which included Fort Hays State University, State University of New York at New 
Paltz, and University of Houston-Victoria. From the perspective of increasing their output given 
existing inputs, ATU’s Farrell technical efficiency score calculated from the reciprocal of the 
Shephard estimated efficiency score of 0.6 was 1.67, indicating a 67% increase in outputs 
possible while keeping inputs stable. This level of increase would be the equivalent of graduating 
an additional 813 students above the 1,214 awarded bachelor’s degrees during 2011-2012. From 
an output maximization perspective, the 67% increase in bachelor’s degrees to 2,027 would 
result in ATU reaching technical efficiency in relation to its weighted peers and residing on the 
efficiency frontier given existing levels of inputs. A review of input slacks for ATU in Table 11 
indicated ATU would need to reduce full-time academic staff by 23.60%, full-time equivalent 
administrative staff by 50.03%, and revenues by 8.57% in order to project to the efficiency 
frontier given existing output level. 




For the medium/smaller group institutions in Arkansas, Henderson State University 
(HSU) had the highest technical efficiency score of 0.53, which can also be interpreted indicating 
47% inefficiency. In order for HSU to produce its existing level of output (507 bachelor’s 
degrees awarded during the 2011-2012 academic year), HSU would need to reduce each of the 
five inputs in the DEA model by 47%. The combination of these decreases in inputs would place 
HSU on the efficiency frontier with their peer institutions: University of South Florida-Sarasota-
Manatee, Metropolitan State University, and The Evergreen State College. Converting HSU’s 
0.53 estimated efficiency score to a Farrell output efficiency score resulted in a value of 1.89, 
indicating an 89% increase in bachelor’s degrees could be produced with the existing input levels 
during 2011-2012. An 89% increase in bachelor’s degrees would result in HSU graduating 451 
more undergraduate students in addition to the 507 students that received degrees in 2011-2012, 
resulting in a projected total of 958 bachelor’s degrees. A review of input slacks for HSU in 
Table 11 indicated the institution would need to reduce full-time academic staff by 27.20%, 
revenues by 16.84%, and expenditures by 14.26% in order to project to the efficiency frontier 
given existing output level. 
Medium/Smaller Institutions: Southern Arkansas University 
Southern Arkansas University (SAU) was just below HSU with a technical efficiency 
estimate of 0.52, which indicated an inefficiency level of 48% for the 2011-2012 academic year. 
Due to the proximity to HSU in the output-oriented model, SAU also had the same peer 
institutions: University of South Florida-Sarasota-Manatee, Metropolitan State University, and 
The Evergreen State College. SAU’s Farrell technical efficiency score was 1.92, indicating that 
SAU could produce 92% more bachelor’s degrees while maintaining input levels. A 92% 




undergraduates to 780 bachelor’s degrees in 2011-2012. This increase of 374 students 
completing their undergraduate degree program would be required for SAU to be considered 
technically efficient given their existing levels of inputs included in the model. Input slacks for 
ATU in Table 11 indicated the institution would need to reduce full-time academic staff by 
32.63%, full-time equivalent administrative staff by 2.45%, and revenues by 2.99% in order to 
project to the efficiency frontier given existing output level. 
Medium/Smaller Institutions: University of Arkansas at Monticello 
The University of Arkansas at Monticello (UAM) exhibited the lowest technical 
efficiency score of Arkansas institutions in the medium/smaller group at 0.407. With an 
efficiency score of 0.41, UAM would have to reduce its five inputs included in the DEA model 
by 59% in order to reach the efficiency frontier that is occupied by the same peer institutions as 
those of HSU and SAU: University of South Florida-Sarasota-Manatee, Metropolitan State 
University, and The Evergreen State College. From an output maximization approach, UAM’s 
DEA estimated efficiency score of 0.407 was converted to a Farrell efficiency score of 2.46, 
which indicated UAM could increase its output of bachelor’s degrees by 146% while 
maintaining the 2011-2012 level of inputs. A 146% increase would result in the original output 
of 380 bachelor’s degrees in 2011-2012 for UAM growing to 935 bachelor’s degrees being 
awarded. UAM’s input slacks included in Table 11 indicated UAM would need to reduce full-
time academic staff by 21..76%, full-time equivalent administrative staff by 22.72%, and 
expenditures by 11.81% in order to project to the efficiency frontier given existing output level. 
In summary, the Arkansas Master’s universities included in this study were inefficient in 




DEA model and in relation to the near population-level national sample of Master’s Colleges and  
Universities included in this study.  
Research Question 2: Which environmental factors contribute to the estimated efficiency of the 
inefficient four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this study? 
 In the second stage of the analytical technique used in this study, DEA efficiency 
estimates produced in stage one were regressed on five environmental variables using Simar and 
Wilson’s (2007) Algorithm #2 double bootstrap truncated regression approach. This technique 
overcomes the inherent non-statistical nature of DEA methodologies while also accounting for 
serial correlation stemming from the relative nature of finite samples in DEA models, as well as 
the correlation between the estimated efficiency scores determined in stage one and the 
environmental variables used in the stage two procedure (Simar & Wilson, 2007). The bootstrap 
method also corrects for bias existing in the DEA estimates and provides for constructing more 
precise confidence intervals used in statistical inferences (Haug & Blackburn, 2013). The 
regression model can be expressed as: 
 
where is the bootstrapped bias-corrected efficiency score; net_tuition refers to the net tuition 
share of operating revenues; perf_fund is a dichotomous variable indicating the existence of an 
active state performance-funding program during 2012; GDP refers to the state’s per capita real 
gross domestic product; share is higher education’s share as a percentage of state’s total 
expenditures; and attainment is the percentage of the state’s population (25-34 years old) with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. In order to aid in meaningful interpretation of the results of the 




Based on the guidelines in Simar and Wilson’s (2007) Algorithm #2, the institutions 
included in the second-stage truncated regression analysis were the inefficient institutions with 
an original DEA estimated efficiency score < 1.0. As such, this portion of the analysis included 
82 (out of 93) medium/smaller institutions and 152 (out of 167) larger institutions that exhibited 
technical inefficiency with a VRS score < 1.0. Table 12 shows the bias-corrected coefficients 
with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the inefficient institutions in each institution 
group. A positive sign in front of the bias-corrected coefficient indicates that, ceteris paribus, a 
one-unit increase in the corresponding variable will increase efficiency, while a negative sign in 
front of the bias-corrected coefficient indicates that, with the other variables held constant, a one-
unit increase in the corresponding variable will decrease estimated efficiency. Statistical 
significance of the bias-corrected coefficient was determined by whether the value of zero fell 
within the confidence interval corresponding to the coefficient under consideration. 
Table 12 
Determinants of Estimated Efficiency Scores for Inefficient Institutions by Group 











Variables Low High Low High 
net_tuition 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0039 0.0021* 0.0004 0.0032 
perf_fund -0.0096 -0.0708 0.0523 0.0053 -0.0355 0.0045 
GDP 0.0075* 0.0019 0.0120 0.0090* 0.0045 0.0117 
Share -0.0077* -0.0127 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0044 0.0023 
attainment 0.0035 -0.0038 0.0010 -0.0024 -0.0069 0.0025 
* Value of zero does not fall within 95% confidence interval. 
Constants are not reported. Results based on 2,000 replications in double bootstrap procedure. 
 As presented in Table 12, two environmental factors were statistically significant for each 
group of institutions, albeit not the same two variables in each group. For both groups, the state’s 
per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) was associated with an increase in efficiency at a 




result in a 0.75 percentage point increase in estimated efficiency, while a $1,000 increase in GDP 
would result in a 0.90 percentage point increase in estimated efficiency for the inefficient 
institutions in the larger group included in this study.  
The other variable that was significant in the medium/smaller group was higher 
education’s share of the state’s total expenditures (share), as a one percentage point increase in 
share would result in a 0.77 percentage point decrease in institutional efficiency. While not 
statistically significant, share was also found to have a negative impact on efficiency in the larger 
group as well. For the larger group institutions, the other significant variable was the share of 
operating revenues based on net tuition, as a one percentage point increase in net tuition would 
result in a 0.21 percentage point increase in estimated efficiency. For the medium/smaller group, 
net tuition was also positively associated with increased efficiency, although not at a statistically 
significant level. 
Given that the 95% confidence interval values for the statistically significant 
environmental variables were so close to zero, additional analyses were conducted to confirm the 
existence of statistically significant findings. The robustness of these findings was tested by re-
running the double bootstrap truncated regression procedure with 10,000 replications for each 
group. The findings of statistical significance for the variables held when increasing the 
bootstrap replications from the original 2,000 to 10,000 replications as part of the robustness 
checking process. This supports the statistically significant findings for the four variables across 
groups that were included in Table 12. 
Based on the results of the second-stage truncated regression analysis, the environmental 
variables that were statistically significant determinants of estimated efficiency scores in the 




state appropriations (negative association), while GDP and net_tuition share of overall revenues 
were both positively associated in the larger group of institutions.  
Research Question 3: Does the existence of a performance-funding program impact the estimated 
institutional efficiency of the four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this 
study? 
 During the 2011-2012 academic year, 12 of the 41 states that were represented in this 
study had a performance-funding program in place (Gorbunov, 2013). A dichotomous variable 
was included in the truncated regression model that indicated the existence of a performance-
funding program, as 35% (33 of 93) of institutions in the medium/smaller group and 29% (49 of 
167) of institutions in the larger group had a value of 1 for performance funding in the overall 
analysis. Based on the results in Table 12, the existence of performance funding was not a 
significant factor related to estimated efficiency for either the medium/smaller or larger group of 
institutions. Interestingly, the signs in front of the bias-corrected coefficient for performance 
funding were opposite between groups (-0.0096 for medium/smaller institutions and 0.0053 for 
larger institutions). For the medium/smaller institutions, holding other variables constant, the 
existence of a performance-funding program decreased efficiency by 0.96 percentage points, 
while the existence of performance funding increased efficiency by 0.53 percentage points for 
larger institutions. Possible reasons for this discrepancy between the groups on the performance 
funding variable will be explored in the discussion section of Chapter 5.  
Therefore, the existence of a performance-funding program did not have an impact on the 





Research Question 4: What are the policy implications related to institutional efficiency within 
Arkansas' performance-funding program? 
 The current performance-funding program in Arkansas is comprised of a variety of 
mandatory and optional measures that can be used to determine whether public colleges and 
universities have performed sufficiently to be awarded the portion of base funding directly tied to 
performance outcomes. For the public four-year institutions in Arkansas, the mandatory 
measures consist of the number of bachelor’s degree credentials awarded, the total number of 
credentials awarded, the number of STEM credentials awarded, and a percentage-based 
progression measure. However, missing within the implemented performance-funding system is 
a measure related to how efficiently public institutions of higher education in Arkansas are 
converting inputs into outputs. Within the current context of higher education, which includes 
greater levels of institutional privatization as universities seek to off-set proportionally 
decreasing state support, institutions are being asked to generate higher levels of output (degrees 
and credentials) within existing, if not decreasing, fiscal constraints. Therefore, how efficiently 
institutions are creating outputs from inputs should be a point of consideration for policymakers, 
institutions, taxpayers, parents, and students alike.  
One policy implication stemming from this research was the creation of an efficiency 
measure based on an analytical technique that could be incorporated directly into the existing 
mandatory measures used in the performance-funding program. The efficiency estimates 
calculated in this research were based on nearly the entire population of public Master’s Colleges 
and Universities in the United States. Given that DEA-based efficiency estimates are calculated 




98% of all larger Master’s universities and almost 94% of all medium/smaller Master’s 
universities adds reliability to the results of the DEA findings of this study.  
The straightforward interpretation of DEA efficiency estimates provides a meaningful 
measure of efficiency that can easily be communicated to a variety of stakeholders. Because the 
technical efficiency scores calculated in this study were on a 0 to 1 ratio scale, the scores can be 
interpreted directly as a percentage of efficiency in converting the inputs into outputs that were 
included in the model. If the same model, including inputs, outputs, and institutions, was updated 
annually with new data, the percentage of efficiency for each institution could be tracked across 
years to determine whether institutional efficiency was improving, static, or declining over time. 
Using this process would follow the existing structure of Arkansas’s performance-funding 
system that compares institutional performance from year-to-year in order to award funding 
based on a comparison of that institution’s previous performance, as opposed to inter-
institutional comparisons of performance. 
An additional policy implication of this study’s findings was the determination of peer 
institutions for each of the Arkansas Master’s universities included in the study. These peer 
institutions were deemed to be operating efficiently in producing bachelor’s degrees using the 
combination of input variables included in the DEA model. The identification of efficiently 
operating peer institutions provides administrators at inefficient universities with a set of 
institutions from which to learn. For example, the three Arkansas institutions in the 
medium/smaller group (Henderson State University, Southern Arkansas University, and 
University of Arkansas at Monticello) had the same three peers: University of South Florida-
Sarasota-Manatee, Metropolitan State University, and The Evergreen State College. On average, 




than the three Arkansas institutions during the 2011-2012 academic year. The peer institutions 
had higher levels on four input variables than the Arkansas universities: 38% more 
undergraduates (4302 versus 3109); 52% more full-time equivalent administrators (47 versus 
31); 83% more revenue ($34.8 million versus $19 million); and 39% more in expenditures ($56.9 
million versus $41 million). On the fifth input, full-time equivalent academic staff, the three peer 
institutions actually had an average of 2% fewer personnel (182 versus 186) than the Arkansas 
institutions. Based on an average difference, the efficient peer institutions produced 177% more 
outputs with just over 42% more inputs. The capacity of the DEA-based analytical technique to 
specifically identify efficiently operating peer institutions carries with it the implication that 
institutional administrators can consult with these peers to determine ways in which the 
inefficient institution can improve.  
There are also implications associated with the conceptual framework utilized in this 
study, as agency theory served as the policy lens through which the performance-funding 
program in Arkansas was reviewed. At its most basic level, agency theory posits that the 
existence of a contractual relationship between a principal and an agent creates an agency 
problem that stems from two primary constructs that are beneficial to the agent: informational 
asymmetries and goal conflicts. Informational asymmetries are caused by the agent having 
better, more complete, and oftentimes specialized information that is “hidden” from the principal 
(Pratt et al., 1985). Goal conflicts arise when the agent chooses to “shirk” job-related 
responsibilities due to being a self-interested, utility maximizer who seeks personal goals and 
objectives at the expense of the goals and objectives of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lane, 
2012; Moe, 1984; Pratt et al., 1985). In agency theory, the measures the principal takes to 




by requiring agents to provide information that may otherwise not be accessible to the principal, 
which also serves as a mechanisms for aligning the goals of the agent with those of the principal 
(Kivistö, 2007). 
The existing performance-funding program in Arkansas can be described in terms of the 
state (principal) entering into a contractual relationship with institutions of higher education 
(agents) to produce outputs that will achieve the goals established by the state (more citizens 
with post-secondary degrees and credentials). Through the inclusion of annual performance 
measures that are tied to an increasing proportion of base funding, the state of Arkansas has 
attempted to reduce the informational asymmetries that exist between it and the public 
institutions in the state. With the percentage of base funding tied to performance increasing to 
25% in 2017-2018, the state’s policy construction can be explained by agency theory in terms of 
the state coercing/incentivizing colleges and universities to align their institutional goals, 
priorities and actions with those of the state. Through the combination of monitoring 
performance on specified outcomes and tying funding to the achievement of those outcomes, the 
state of Arkansas has attempted to mitigate the potential for institutions to shirk their perceived 
responsibilities of ensuring a well-educated citizenry that contributes to the workforce and 
economic development efforts of the state. 
Eisenhardt (1989) posited that principals had two options when determining the 
mechanisms to be used in overcoming the agency problem within a contractual relationship with 
an agent: behavior-based contracts and outcome-based contracts. Table 13 provides the 
taxonomy that Eisenhardt (1989) originally developed and was slightly modified by Lassar and 




apparent that the outcome-based contract created by the performance-funding program has merit 
from a conceptual perspective: 
 Given the complexities, specialization, and hierarchical nature of institutions of higher 
education, high levels of informational asymmetries typically exist, making it difficult for 
information systems at the state level to comprehensively capture all of the relevant 
information needed to overcome the agency problem.  
 Due to the typical stability of institutions of higher education coupled with the multi-year 
time frame for increasing certain types of outcomes, there is a fairly low level of outcome 
uncertainty involved in the performance-funding program.  
 With 25% of base funding being tied to performance outcomes within the next four years, 
the aversion to risk is increasing for colleges and universities, meaning that the principal 
can pass some of the risk associated with funding allocations for higher education to the 
institutions by imposing outcome-based contractual agreements. 
 At the heart of agency theory is goal conflict. In the relationship between states and 
institutions of higher education, not only are institutional goals sometimes at odds with 
state goals, but individual faculty/staff goals may be at odds with both the institutional 
and state goals passed down through hierarchical chains of command.  
 Due to the specialized nature of teaching and research, there is a very limited opportunity 
for the state to use task programmability as means for ensuring agents’ actions promote 
the goals and objectives of the principal.  
 Within the new performance-funding program in Arkansas, there is a high level of 
outcome measurability, as four specific mandatory measures have been delineating, as 




 Within this taxonomy, the length of the relationship between the state and its public 
institutions of higher education seems to be the only variable in which a behavior-based 
contract would be more efficient. 
Table 13 
Variables affecting the efficiency of behavior-oriented vs. outcome-oriented contracts 
 
Behavior-based contract is 
efficient when: 
Outcome-based contract is 
efficient when: 
Information systems High Low 
Outcome uncertainty High Low 
Risk aversion Agent Principal 
Goal conflict Low High 
Task programmability High Low 
Outcome measurability Low High 
Length of Relationship Long Short 
Sources: Eisenhardt (1989) and Lassar & Kerr (1996) 
 Given the results of the analytical analysis and the application of agency theory as the 
conceptual framework used in this study, the policy implications stemming from this research 
include the following: the provision of a measure of efficiency that can be incorporated directly 
into the existing performance-funding program; the creation of a list of peer institutions for each 
Arkansas Master’s university from which to consult and learn; and agency theory, especially 
through the lens of Eisenhardt’s (1989) taxonomy, was a viable conceptual framework for 
understanding why the state of Arkansas adopted performance-funding policy for the fourth time 
in 20 years.  
Chapter Summary 
  This study sought to examine the institutional efficiency of public four-year Master’s 
universities in Arkansas in comparison to a national population of similarly classified 
institutions.  Data were collected through publicly available sources, primarily the Integrated 




statistics, the Master’s programs classified as medium and smaller by the Carnegie Foundation 
were collapsed into a single group, while the larger Master’s colleges and universities served as a 
second group. Due to missing data, the full population of 270 four-year, public Master’s 
institutions (171 larger and 99 medium/smaller) was reduced to 167 larger and 93 
medium/smaller institutions that were grouped separately for the analyses conducted in the 
study. The Arkansas institutions in the medium/smaller group were Henderson State University, 
Southern Arkansas University, and University of Arkansas at Monticello. The larger group 
institutions in Arkansas included Arkansas State University, Arkansas Tech University, and 
University of Central Arkansas. 
 The analytical technique used to answer directly three of the research questions included 
in this study was the double bootstrap truncated regression procedure specified as Algorithm #2 
by Simar and Wilson (2007). In general, the procedure involved the calculation of bias-corrected 
technical efficiency scores with 95% confidence intervals in stage one, and the regressing of 
bias-corrected technical efficiency scores on environmental variables in stage two of the 
procedure. The original efficiency estimates in Step 1 of Algorithm #2 were constructed using 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). Technical efficiency (TE) scores were calculated using an 
output-oriented model under the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS), as additional 
efficiency estimates were calculated under the constant returns to scale (CRS) to facilitate the 
decomposition of efficiency into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency (SE).  
In response to research question #1 related to the estimated efficiency of Arkansas’s 
Master’s universities, the six Arkansas institutions all demonstrated high levels of scale 
efficiency, with SE scores above 0.94, which means that the greatest portion of technical 




operations. The three larger group institutions in Arkansas had TE scores under the VRS 
assumption ranging from 0.600 (ATU) to 0.664 (ASU) to 0.692 (UCA). In the medium/smaller 
group, the Arkansas institutions had TE scores ranging from 0.531 (HSU) to 0.515 (SAU) to 
0.407 (UAM). Based on input slacks, the Arkansas institutions would need to, on average, 
reduce full-time equivalent academic staff by 24.78%, full-time equivalent administrative staff 
by 15.06%, revenues by 5.25%, and expenditures by 4.35% in order to project to the efficiency 
frontier given existing levels of output. 
The second and third research questions were answered through Simar and Wilson’s 
(2007) double bootstrap truncated regression procedure that sought to address determinants of 
technical inefficiency in the inefficient institutions in each group. For the medium/smaller 
institution group, two environmental variables were found to be statistically significant at the .05 
level: the state’s per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) and higher education’s share of 
state’s total expenditures (share). GDP was positively associated with technical efficiency while 
share was negatively associated with technical efficiency. For the larger institution group, GDP 
was also a positive, statistically significant factor at the .05 level, while net tuition share of 
institutional revenues was positive and statistically significant for the larger group of institutions. 
The existence of a performance-funding program was not a statistically significant determinant 
of estimated efficiency, although this variable had a negative effect on efficiency estimation for 
the medium/smaller group while having a positive effect on efficiency in the larger group of 






CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 For the fourth time in the past 20 years, the state of Arkansas has implemented a 
performance-funding program for its public institutions of higher education. Act 1203 of 2011 
was signed into law by Governor Mike Beebe on April 5, 2011. This legislation was 
distinguished from previous policy efforts in that it shifted funding based on performance from 
being a bonus above base funding to being included in the amount of base funding allocated to 
institutions. The 2013-14 academic year served as the initial year of the five-year implementation 
process in which the percentage of funding tied to performance outcomes will increase 
incrementally by 5% each year until 2017-18, at which point 25% of base funding will be 
allocated on the basis of institutions demonstrating successful achievement of a variety of 
outcome measures. 
This new performance-funding program was developed, in part, as a response to 
Governor Beebe’s challenge issued during his State of the State Address in 2011, in which he 
charged, "We can and must double the number of college graduates in Arkansas by 2025 if we 
are to stay competitive. This is a lofty goal aimed at the future, but we must begin implementing 
it today" (ADHE, 2011, p. 2). Based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 American Community 
Survey results, Arkansas ranked 48th in the country in the percentage of 25 to 64 year-old adults 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher at 21.6%, and ranked 47th with 22.7% of 25 to 34 year-old 
adults with a bachelor’s degree or higher (NCHEMS, Retrieved from 
http://www.higheredinfo.org/). For Arkansas to achieve Beebe’s established goal, Arkansas 




(bachelor’s degrees, associate degrees, and certificates) awarded annually from 17,200 in 2011 to 
34,400 in 2025 (NCHEMS, 2011). 
 The latest iteration of performance-funding policy in Arkansas provided the context in 
which this study was conducted. While numerous mandatory and optional measures have been 
specified in program documentation, a gap exists from the standpoint that no specific measure 
holding institutions accountable for the efficient use of resources was included in the 
implemented performance-funding program (ADHE, 2011). This omission from the 
implemented policy is interesting from the perspective that the very title of the legislation 
includes the words, “An Act to Promote Accountability and Efficiency at State-Supported 
Institutions of Higher Education” (Act 1203 of 2011). This study filled the gap by providing a 
measure of efficiency that can be implemented within the existing performance-funding 
program. 
This chapter focuses on the findings of this study and the delineation of a set of 
conclusions that can inform future policy practice and policy research. This chapter begins with a 
summary of the study, which is followed by a brief discussion of findings with clarifying points, 
the explication of conclusions and limitations, as well as future policy and research 
recommendations. The chapter ends with a brief summary. 
Summary of the Study 
 The purpose of this quantitative study was to estimate the efficiency of four-year public 
Master’s universities in Arkansas in achieving one of the mandatory outcomes specified in the 
state’s performance-funding program: number of bachelor’s degrees awarded. This study also 
utilized agency theory as a conceptual framework to explore the contractual relationship between 




funding. This study is significant in that the results of the analytical technique, specifically the 
technical efficiency estimates, could be directly incorporated into the existing performance-
funding program, which fills a gap between the designed policy and the implemented policy. In 
the larger context of higher education literature, this is one of the few studies that has specifically 
examined the efficiency of institutions that are categorized as Master’s Colleges and Universities 
by the Carnegie Foundation. This study is also significant from the perspective of explicating, 
through the lens of agency theory, possible reasons for the state’s adoption of a performance-
funding program for the fourth time in less than 20 years. Four primary research questions 
guided this study: 
1. When compared to similar institutions nationally, how efficient are four-year public 
Master’s universities in Arkansas at utilizing resources to achieve one of the mandatory 
measures (bachelor’s degrees awarded) required by the new performance-funding 
program?  
2. Which environmental factors contribute to the estimated efficiency of the inefficient four-
year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this study? 
3. Does the existence of a performance funding program impact the estimated institutional 
efficiency of the four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this 
study? 
4. What are the policy implications related to institutional efficiency within Arkansas' 
performance-funding program? 
In order to answer these research questions, data were collected from a variety of publicly 
available sources. The primary data collection occurred through the Integrated Post-secondary 




provided specific data points that served as variables in this study: the National Center for 
Higher Education Management Systems (NCHEMS) Information Center 
(http://www.higheredinfo.org/); the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm); Gorbunov (2013); and the National 
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO, 2013). Data were collected for the 2011-2012 
academic year, which is the most recent year that data for a number of financial variables was 
available through these data sources.  
The population of interest in this study was public four-year Master’s Colleges and 
Universities in the United States. These institutions face a variety of challenges, including 
“mission creep” (Gonzales, 2012, p. 338) that has conflated the institutional identity unique to 
comprehensive institutions; greater privatization of higher education funding streams due to 
reduced state support; and increased percentages of students from underrepresented populations 
and students who are academically underprepared (Wright et al., 2004). The total population of 
four-year public Master’s Colleges and Universities in the United States was 270 institutions, 
which included 171 larger programs, 61 medium programs, and 38 smaller programs, as these 
sub-categories are based on the number of master’s degrees awarded during the Carnegie 
reclassification year combined with fewer than 20 research doctorates awarded in that year 
(Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2014). In Arkansas, three institutions 
are classified as larger programs (Arkansas State University-Main Campus (ASU), Arkansas 
Tech University (ATU), and University of Central Arkansas(UCA)), two are considered medium 
programs (Henderson State University (HSU) and Southern Arkansas University-Main Campus 
(SAU)), and one is classified as a smaller program (University of Arkansas at Monticello 




groupings, it was determined that the medium and smaller institutions were more homogenous 
than dissimilar, so they were collapsed into a single group. Due to missing data, the final sample 
used throughout this study consisted of 167 larger institutions and 93 medium/smaller 
institutions. 
Agency theory was utilized as the conceptual framework through which the existence of 
a fourth iteration of performance funding in Arkansas was examined. Agency theory posits that 
within a contractual relationship, the principal abdicates certain decision-making responsibilities 
to the agent, creating the potential for the agency problem to exist (Moe, 1984). This agency 
problem is primarily comprised of two co-existing constructs: informational asymmetries and 
goal conflicts. Informational asymmetry occurs when the agent knows more about his or her own 
abilities, expertise, and honesty than the principal, as Shapiro (2005) contended that an agent 
"sometimes makes matters worse by exaggerating talents" (p. 263). Goal conflicts occur when 
the interests and desires of the principal and agent are misaligned (Kivistö, 2005). The 
combination of informational asymmetries and goal conflicts provide an opportunity for agents 
to shirk their contractual responsibilities, which is the essence of the agency problem addressed 
by agency theory (Waterman & Meier, 1998). Through the lens of agency theory, this study 
posited that the state of Arkansas used its newest performance-funding policy and program as a 
means for coercing and incentivizing the alignment of goals and actions by public institutions of 
higher education with the goals and objectives of the state. The policy lever consisted of linking 
a percentage of base funding to the demonstration of performance on a variety of measures. Once 
fully implemented in 2017-2018, 25% of institutional base funding from the state will be directly 





The analytical technique utilized in this study was Simar and Wilson’s (2007) Algorithm 
#2 double bootstrap truncated regression analysis. The base methodology in this technique is 
data envelopment analysis (DEA), which provides a means for estimating the efficiency of 
decision-making units (DMUs) by comparing the inputs and outputs in the data and calculating 
an efficiency estimate relative to the DMUs included in the data set. In its base form, DEA is a 
non-parametric, non-statistical methodology that suffers from the inability to make statistical 
inferences of DEA estimates directly. The bootstrapping procedures used by Simar and Wilson 
overcoming this deficiency through numerous replications of the data, from which statistical 
inferences, including 95% confidence intervals, can be constructed. The base DEA technique 
also fails to identify which specific variables serve as determinants of technical efficiency as 
determined through DEA. The second-stage truncated regression approach, in which bias-
corrected efficiency estimates are regressed on environmental variables in Simar and Wilson’s 
Algorithm #2, provides a means for examining which variables contribute most to the efficiency 
(inefficiency) of institutions in the data set. Coupling bootstrapping with truncated regression 
also increases the accuracy of the confidence intervals constructed around the coefficients 
determined through the truncated regression procedure. 
Conclusions 
Conclusion #1: The six public Master’s universities in Arkansas were inefficient in producing 
bachelor’s degrees given the inputs included in this study and in comparison to an almost 
complete sample of the national population of institutions in the same Carnegie classifications 
during the 2011-2012 academic year. 
 Through the analyses conducted, each of the six Arkansas institutions included in this 




assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS). Institutions with an estimated efficiency score of 
1.0 are considered technically efficient, while institutions with an estimated efficiency score < 
1.0 are considered technically inefficient. Institutions exhibiting technical efficiency comprise 
the efficiency frontier against which inefficient institutions are measured. Subtracting the 
technical efficiency score from 1.0 provides a measure of proportional decrease in inputs an 
institution would have to make in order to reside on the efficiency frontier given existing output.  
All six Arkansas institutions exhibited technical inefficiency with scores < 1.0. In the 
larger group, UCA had the highest technical efficiency score of the Arkansas institutions at 
0.692, as ASU’s efficiency estimate was 0.664 and ATU’s efficiency score was 0.600. UCA 
would have to reduce each of the five inputs in the model by almost 31%, while ASU would 
need to reduce inputs by over 33% and ATU by 40% in order to reach the efficiency frontier. For 
the medium/smaller group, HSU had an efficiency score of 0.531, which indicated that HSU 
would need to reduce each input by almost 47% in order to produce the same number of 
bachelor’s degrees efficiently in comparison to the efficient peer institutions residing on the 
efficiency frontier. SAU had a technical efficiency score of 0.515, indicating an almost 49% 
reduction in inputs would be required to obtain efficiency in producing bachelor’s degrees at the 
same level. UAM would need to reduce input levels by almost 60%, based on a technical 
efficiency score of 0.407, in order to produce efficiently the same number of bachelor’s degrees 
as were awarded in 2011-2012. 
Conclusion #2: The six public Master’s universities in Arkansas were operating at near optimal 
scale size during the 2011-2012 academic year. 
 By conducting a DEA model based on the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS), 




Scale efficiency serves as an indicator of the extent to which scale size impacts institutional 
efficiency. The scale efficiency scores for each Arkansas institution were 1.000 for ASU, 0.999 
for UCA, 0.997 for ATU, 0.987 for HSU, 0.956 for SAU, and 0.940 for UAM. The high scale 
efficiency scores of the Arkansas institutions included in this study support the conclusion that 
each institution is operating at near optimal scale size given the inputs and output measures, and 
in relation to the other institutions included in this study. 
Conclusion #3: The state’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was a positive, significant 
predictor of technical efficiency in the two groups of Master’s Colleges and Universities 
included in this study. 
 The results of the second-stage truncated regression analysis indicated that the bias-
corrected coefficient for state GDP was positive and statistically significant for each group of 
institutions, as the value of zero did not fall within the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval 
constructed for the GDP coefficient. In the medium/smaller group, the GDP coefficient of 0.0075 
can be interpreted as meaning a $1,000 increase in the state’s GDP would increase technical 
efficiency of institutions in that group by 0.75 percentage points, with the other variables in the 
model held constant. For the larger group of institutions, the 0.0090 coefficient represented a 
0.90 percentage point increase for every $1,000 increase in state-level GDP. The significant 
finding related to the impact of state GDP on institutional efficiency has been found in other 
research in which GDP has been conceptualized as an environmental variable that can be 
beneficial to universities due to “spillover” effects stemming from an institution’s location 




Conclusion #4: The percentage of the state’s total expenditures dedicated to higher education 
was negatively associated with technical efficiency in both groups in the study, and was 
statistically significant in the medium/smaller group. 
 With higher education’s share of total state expenditures having fallen from a peak of 
17% in 1986 to 9.9% in 2013 (NASBO, 1997, 2013; Tandberg, 2010b), the second-stage 
truncated regression analysis included the percentage of the state’s total expenditures on higher 
education (share) as one of the five environmental variables included in the model. The 
regression results indicated that the share of state appropriations had a negative impact on 
technical efficiency for both groups, but at a statistically significant level for the medium/smaller 
group in the analysis based on the value of zero not falling within the 95% confidence interval 
constructed for the share coefficient. The bias-corrected coefficient for the share variable was     
-0.0077 for the medium/smaller group, meaning a 1% increase in the share of state 
appropriations allocated to higher education would reduce the efficiency of medium/smaller 
institutions by 0.77 percentage points.  While not a significant determinant of technical 
efficiency, the share coefficient was negative for the larger group as well (-0.0014), indicating a 
1% increase in higher education’s share of state appropriations would result in a 0.14 percentage 
point reduction in technical efficiency for the institutions in the larger group. 
Conclusion #5: The percentage of an institution’s revenue generated through net tuition was 
positively associated with technical efficiency in both groups in the study, and was statistically 
significant in the larger group.  
 Due to the decreasing proportion of state support for higher education, colleges and 
universities have been seeking ways to off-set losses of state appropriations by privatizing 




and grants, and private donations (Whitney, 2006; Zemsky et al., 1997; Zumeta, 2004). To 
account for the potential impact of privatization on institutional efficiency, the net tuition 
(net_tuition) variable was included in the second-stage truncated regression model as a share of 
operating revenues based on net tuition received. For both groups in this study, the net_tuition 
coefficient was positive. For the larger group, net_tuition was statistically significant with a 
value of 0.0021, indicating that a 1% increase in the share of net tuition would result in a 0.21 
percentage point increase in institutional efficiency, while holding the other variables constant. 
While not statistically significant in the medium/smaller group, the coefficient was actually 
higher at 0.0022, as a 1% increase in net_tuition would result in a 0.22 percentage point increase 
in institutional efficiency for this group, holding other variables constant. 
Conclusion #6: Performance funding was not a significant determinant of technical efficiency in 
the two groups of Master’s Colleges and Universities included in this study. 
The policy environment for this study was the state of Arkansas’s fourth adoption of a 
performance-funding program in 2011. In the second-stage regression analysis, a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether a performance-funding program was in existence during 2011-2012 
was included as an environmental variable. The existence of performance funding was found to 
not be a significant determinant of estimated efficiency in either group included in this study. In 
the medium/smaller group, the perf_fund coefficient was -0.0096, indicating that institutions 
within states with a performance-funding program had an estimated efficiency score that was 
0.96 percentage points lower than institutions not residing in a state with a performance-funding 
program. However, for the larger group, the sign in front of the performance-funding coefficient 
was flipped (0.0053), as larger Master’s institutions residing in states with performance funding 




without a performance-funding program. The combination of non-significance in the model and 
flipped signs before the coefficient for each group is consistent with previous research that has 
failed to find significant impacts of performance-funding programs across a variety of research 
domains (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Liefner, 2003; McLendon et 
al., 2006, 2005; Rabovsky, 2012; Sanford & Hunter, 2011; Sav, 2012; Shin, 2010; Tandberg & 
Hillman, 2014; Volkwein & Tandberg, 2008).   
Conclusion #7: Agency theory provided a viable conceptual framework for exploring the fourth-
generation adoption of a performance-funding program by the state of Arkansas in 2011.  
 Viewed through the lens of agency theory, the performance-funding program in Arkansas 
can be conceptualized as a contract between the state and its public institutions, who are tasked 
with increasing performance in exchange for a percentage of base state funding. With Arkansas 
ranked in the bottom 10% of all states in the percentage of adults with a bachelor’s degree or 
higher nationally (NCHEMS, Retrieved from http://www.higheredinfo.org/), the performance-
funding program can be viewed as the state attempting to coerce, through financial incentives, 
increased outputs by universities to meet the workforce and economic development demands of 
the state. The assumptions and tenets of agency theory, which seek to explain the mechanisms 
principals use to overcome agency problem, served as a viable framework through which to 
explain why the state of Arkansas adopted a performance-funding program for the fourth time in 
the past 20 years.  
Limitations 
Several limitations existed in this study. Due to missing data, the analyzed sample of 
Master’s Colleges and Universities was reduced by 2.3% of larger institutions and 6.1% of 




medium/smaller institutions. The use of a national sample, while increasing the robustness of the 
data, provided an additional limitation in this study: time-lagged data. Because the most recent 
financial data available in IPEDS were from the 2011-2012 academic year, the results of this 
study is limiting from the standpoint of policymakers and institutional decision-makers having 
more recent data that can be used within decision-making processes. An additional limitation 
related to the analytical methodology used in this study was the lack of generalizability of 
efficiency estimates. Data envelopment analysis is a non-parametric, deterministic approach that 
relies strictly on the data included in model. Therefore, the addition or removal of data points or 
decision-making units from the analysis has the potential to impact which institutions are found 
efficient and those that are inefficient. Another limitation was the use of a single output variable 
in the stage-one DEA model, a limitation that was due primarily to data availability.  
Recommendations for Future Practice and Research 
The results of estimating the efficiency of public four-year Master’s universities in 
Arkansas could be incorporated into the existing performance-funding program as an additional 
mandatory measure. Results from the 2011-2012 academic year included in this study could 
serve as a baseline for the Master’s institutions, while the technique could be utilized to calculate 
efficiency estimates for the other public four-year institutions in Arkansas that were not included 
in this study. With a baseline established, the same technique, consisting of the same inputs, 
outputs, and institutions, could be applied on an annual basis to update technical efficiency of 
each institution in order to make comparisons to previous years in order to determine whether 
growth had occurred.  
Additionally, one of the primary benefits of utilizing DEA-based methodology was the 




practical application perspective, representatives from inefficient institutions could use the listing 
of peer institutions that were found to be technically efficient in this study. These institutional 
representatives could contact efficient peer institutions to discuss ways in which inefficiencies 
could be reduced based on the best practices exhibited by those institutions operating on the 
efficiency frontier.  
One of the primary recommendations for future research would concern the inclusion of 
panel data as opposed to the cross-sectional data utilized in this study. While a single-year 
snapshot of data provided a point-in-time calculation of estimated efficiency, multi-year panel 
data would allow for the estimation of efficiency change over time and would provide a more 
comprehensive, robust set of results from which additional analyses could be conducted. Due to 
the long-term nature of institutional change in higher education, the capacity to track changes 
across multiple years would also provide an improvement over analyses conducted with single-
year, cross-sectional data. 
Future research could also include additional output variables in the analysis. One of the 
benefits of the DEA-based analyses is that multiple outputs can be modeled directly due to 
minimal assumptions placed on the data. In the context of the Arkansas performance-funding 
program, the mandatory progression measure is a novel approach to capturing institutional 
effectiveness in retaining students. The progression measure tracks a cohort of credential-seeking 
students who enroll in six or more credit hours during a fall semester over two academic years to 
see what percentage of those students earned 18 or more credit hours during that time period 
(ADHE, 2011). This approach differs from the typical IPEDS-based retention rate calculation 




pertains to Arkansas, could determine a means for collecting the data necessary to include the 
Arkansas progression measure as a second output within the stage-one DEA estimation model.  
Specifically related to Simar and Wilson’s (2007) double bootstrap truncated regression 
approach used in this study, other segments of higher education could be studied using this 
technique. While several researchers have applied the procedure to study efficiency and 
determinants of efficiency of post-secondary institutions internationally, few researchers have 
applied this technique to the context of higher education in the United States. With the emphasis 
in higher education policy on increasing the number of adults with post-secondary credentials, 
studying the efficiency of two-year colleges using Simar and Wilson’s technique might provide 
additional insights into how to increase not only the production, but also the efficiency, of this 
segment of higher education in the United States. 
With regard to performance-funding policy research, an area of inquiry could be the 
discrepancy in resource levels between inefficient institutions in states that have performance-
funding programs and those that do not. This element was discovered through additional 
analyses following the stage-two truncated regression conducted in this study that showed the 
existence of performance funding had a positive impact on the larger group of institutions while 
having a negative impact on the medium/smaller group of institutions.   
Discussion 
This study used an output-oriented DEA model based on Shephard’s (1970) output 
distance function under the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS). Within this frame, 
efficient DMUs are those with a technical efficiency score of 1.0, while inefficient institutions 
have a technical efficiency score below 1.0. In the DEA technique, the efficient institutions 




output (number of bachelor’s degrees awarded during 2011-2012) and five inputs (total number 
of undergraduate students, full-time equivalent academic staff, full-time equivalent 
administrative staff, total revenues, and total education and general expenditures) were included 
in the stage-one analysis. Based on the results of the analytical techniques used in this study, the 
Arkansas Master’s institutions, in comparison to their respective larger and medium/smaller 
group peers, were all deemed inefficient with a technical efficiency score below 1.0. The 
Arkansas institutions exhibited high levels of scale efficiency with scores above 0.94 on a 0 to 1 
ratio scale, suggesting that inefficiency at these Master’s universities was primarily due to pure 
technical inefficiency within institutions in converting the inputs included in the DEA model into 
output.  
In the larger group, UCA had the highest technical efficiency score of the larger Arkansas 
institutions of 0.69, indicating UCA was operating at 69% efficiency when compared to the 
efficient peers in the larger group. ASU had a technical efficiency score of 0.66, while ATU had 
the lowest of the three larger Arkansas institutions with a technical efficiency score of 0.6. In 
order for each of the institutions to be operating on the efficiency frontier given their existing 
level of output (bachelor’s degrees awarded), UCA would have to reduce the five inputs included 
in the study by 31%, ASU by 34%, and ATU by 40%. In the medium/smaller group, HSU had 
the highest technical efficiency score (0.53) of the Arkansas universities, while SAU’s had a 
technical efficiency score of 0.52 and UAM’s estimated efficiency score was 0.41. In order for 
each of the Arkansas institutions to operate on the efficiency frontier given their existing level of 
output (bachelor’s degrees awarded), HSU would have to reduce the inputs in the study by 47%, 




Through the second stage of the Simar and Wilson’s (2007) double bootstrap truncated 
regression approach, the bias-corrected technical efficiency scores of inefficient institutions, as 
calculated in the stage-one procedure, were regressed on the following environmental variables: 
per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) by state during 2012; net tuition share of operating 
revenues in 2011-2012; percentage of the state’s population (25 – 34 years old) with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher in 2012; higher education’s share as a percent of state’s total expenditures in 
2012; and, existence of state performance-funding program during 2011-2012. Separate analyses 
for the larger and medium/smaller groups were conducted. For both groups, GDP had a positive, 
statistically significant impact on technical efficiency when other variables were held constant, 
as indicated by the value of zero not falling within the 95% confidence interval. For the larger 
group, net tuition share was positive and significantly associated with efficiency, ceteris paribus, 
although it was not significant in the medium/smaller group. The share of total state expenditures 
on higher education was negatively and significantly associated with technical efficiency for the 
medium/smaller group, and was negative but not significant in the larger group. Neither the 
existence of performance funding nor educational attainment were statistically significant for 
either group. 
While the existence of a performance-funding program in a state during 2011-2012 was 
not a significant determinant of estimated efficiency for either group, an interesting finding in 
this study was that the sign in front of the performance funding bias-corrected coefficient was 
opposite for the two groups. In the medium/smaller group, the sign was negative, indicating that 
the existence of a performance-funding program decreased the technical efficiency of institutions 




the existence of a performance-funding program increased the technical efficiency of institutions 
in this group by 0.53 percentage points.  
A further review of the underlying data clarified why this discrepancy existed. The 
groups were similar in the proportion of inefficient institutions from states with performance-
funding programs, as the larger group consisted of 30% (46 of 152) and the medium/smaller 
group consisted of 34% (28 of 82) of institutions in states that had a performance-funding 
program in place during 2011-2012. However, the institutions in the larger group from states 
with performance funding had an average technical efficiency score that was higher (0.74 versus 
0.73) than the institutions from non-performance funding states. For the medium/smaller group, 
the average technical efficiency score for institutions from states with performance funding was 
10 percentage points lower than the institutions from non-performance funding states (0.61 
versus 0.71). In the larger group, the institutions from performance-funding states produced 8% 
fewer bachelor’s degrees (1,678 versus 1,840), on average, than their non-performance funding 
counterparts. A 25% discrepancy in average output existed in the medium/smaller group, as the 
average degree production from institutions within performance funding states was 739, as 
compared to the average of 990 bachelor’s degrees for institutions not in states with 
performance-funding programs.  
A review of the inputs also provided an indication as to why there was a difference 
between the large and medium/smaller groups on the direction of the impact of performance-
funding programs in the second-stage regression analysis. Across the five inputs included in the 
DEA model for the larger group, institutions from states with performance funding had an 
average of 16% less in resources in comparison to their counterparts not in states with 




the average number of full-time equivalent administrative staff, as the institutions in 
performance-funding states had an average of 23% fewer administrative staff members than 
institutions not located in performance funding states.  
In the medium/smaller group, however, the institutions from states with a performance-
funding program had, on average, 8% less in the way of resources across the five input variables 
included in the analysis. Much of this shift was due to the institutions from performance-funding 
states actually having, on average, 18% more full-time equivalent administrative staff than 
institutions located in non-performance funding states. In summary, the institutions in the larger 
group from states with performance-funding programs were more efficient (+1%) than 
institutions not located in performance-funding states, while institutions in the medium/smaller 
group from states with performance-funding programs were less efficient (-10%) in comparison 
to institutions not located in performance-funding states.  
Chapter Summary 
 The research conducted in this study provided a measure of efficiency for four-year 
public Master’s universities in Arkansas in comparison to a large proportion of the four-year 
public Master’s College and Universities in the United States. The results of this study fill a void 
in the existing performance-funding program in Arkansas that includes a variety of performance 
outcome measures, but fails to address the need to achieve those outcomes in an efficient 
manner. Given the decreasing proportion of state funding for higher education coupled with calls 
for greater accountability for outcomes and resource utilization, demonstrating the efficient 





 This chapter initially presented the different components that comprised the study, 
followed by a brief explication and discussion of the findings of the study. The primary findings 
of this study were that the six public Master’s institutions in Arkansas that were included in the 
study were found to be technically inefficient in producing bachelor’s degrees, given the inputs 
included in the model, during the 2011-2012 academic year. Much of the demonstrated 
inefficiency was due to pure technical inefficiency at the institutional level, as all six institutions 
were operating near optimal scale size based on scale efficiency scores above 0.94. The primary 
findings from the stage-two truncated regression analysis were that DGP was a positive, 
significant determinant of technical efficiency for both groups; higher education’s share of total 
state allocations was negative and statistically significant for the medium/smaller group of 
institutions; and the percentage of net tuition was positive and statistically significant for the 
larger group. The existence of performance funding was a not a significant determinant of 
technical efficiency in either group, although the variable had a different impact on each group as 
shown by the signs in front of the coefficients being flipped (+ for larger group and – for 
medium/smaller group). 
The presentation of findings were followed by a discussion of seven conclusions drawn 
from the study, which was followed by a brief summary of the limitations existing in this study. 
A section of recommendations for future practice and research consisted of six recommendations 
pertaining to the incorporation of the findings within the existing performance-funding program 
in Arkansas. Recommendations for future research included expanding the use of the analytical 
technique to different segments of higher education in the United States, as well as a suggestion 




data to measure change in institutional efficiency over time was also recommended for future 






Adelman, C. (2006). The toolbox revisited: Paths to degree completion from high school through 
college. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. 
ADHE. (2011). Arkansas 2025: Leading in the global economy by investing in education and 




Agasisti, T. (2011). Performances and spending efficiency in higher education: a European 
comparison through non-parametric approaches. Education Economics, 19(2), 199–224. 
Agasisti, T., & Dal Bianco, A. (2006). Data envelopment analysis to the Italian university 
system: theoretical issues and policy implications. International Journal of Business 
Performance Management, 8(4), 344–367. 
Agasisti, T., & Dal Bianco, A. (2009). Reforming the university sector: Effects on teaching 
efficiency—evidence from Italy. Higher Education, 57(4), 477–498. 
Agasisti, T., Dal Bianco, A., Landoni, P., Sala, A., & Salerno, M. (2011). Evaluating the 
Efficiency of Research in Academic Departments: an Empirical Analysis in an Italian 
Region. Higher Education Quarterly, 65(3), 267–289. 
Agasisti, T., & Johnes, G. (2009). Beyond frontiers: Comparing the efficiency of higher 
Education decision-making units across more than one country. Education Economics, 
17(1), 59–79. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09645290701523291 
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic 
organization. The American Economic Review, 62(5), 777–795. 
Alexander, F. K. (2001). Fiscal inequality and direct student aid policies: The impact of 
institutional choice on lower income students. Peabody Journal of Education, 76(1), 
136–149. doi:10.1207/S15327930PJE7601_08 
Alexander, W. R. J., Haug, A. A., & Jaforullah, M. (2010). A two-stage double-bootstrap data 
envelopment analysis of efficiency differences of New Zealand secondary schools. 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 34(2), 99–110. 
Archibald, R. B., & Feldman, D. (2006). State higher education spending and the tax revolt. The 




Archibald, R. B., & Feldman, D. H. (2008). Graduate rates and accountability: Regressions 
versus production frontiers. Research in Higher Education, 49, 80–100. 
doi:10.1007/s11162-007-9063-6 
Arrow, K. J. (1971). Essays in the theory of risk-bearing. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Company. 
Avkiran, N. K. (2001). Investigating technical and scale efficiencies of Australian universities 
through data envelopment analysis. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 35(1), 57–80. 
Bailey, T. R., Jaggars, S., & Scott-Clayton, J. E. (2013). Characterizing the effectiveness of 
developmental education: A response to recent criticism. Retrieved from 
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/item/ac:170236 
Banfield, E. C. (1975). Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 18(3), 3. 
Banker, R. D. (1984). Estimating most productive scale size using data envelopment analysis. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 17(1), 35–44. 
Banker, R. D., Charnes, A., & Cooper, W. W. (1984). Some models for estimating technical and 
scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis. Management Science, 30(9), 1078–
1092. 
Baum, S., & Ma, J. (2013). Trends in college pricing 2013. Trends in higher education series. 
College Board Advocacy & Policy Center. Retrieved from 
http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/college-pricing-2013-full-report.pdf 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (2009). Agendas and instability in American politics (2nd 
ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Berdahl, R. (1990). Academic freedom, autonomy and accountability in British universities. 
Studies in Higher Education, 15(2), 169–180. 
Bettinger, E. P., & Long, B. T. (2009). Addressing the needs of underprepared students in higher 
education : Does college remediation work? Journal of Human Resources, 44(3), 736–
771. 
Blake, P. (2006). Restructuring relationships in Virginia. Change: The Magazine of Higher 




Blalark, F. J. (2012). Utilizing principal-agent theory and data envelopment analysis to examine 
efficiency of resource utilization in undergraduate education for public and private non-
profit four-year research institutions. University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, MN. 
Bogetoft, P., & Otto, L. (2010). Benchmarking with DEA, SFA, and R (Vol. 157). New York: 
Springer. 
Bogetoft, P., & Otto, L. (2013). Benchmarking with DEA and SFA. 
Bogue, E. G., & Johnson, B. D. (2010). Performance incentives and public college accountability 
in the United States: A quarter century policy audit. Higher Education Management and 
Policy, 22(2), 1–22. 
Bonaccorsi, A., Daraio, C., & Simar, L. (2006). Advanced indicators of productivity of 
universities: An application of robust nonparametric methods to Italian data. 
Scientometrics, 66(2), 389–410. 
Breneman, D. W. (March 7, 1997). The privatization of public universities: A mistake or model 
for the future? The Chronicle of Higher Education, B4–B5. 
Breneman, D. W. (2011). The states and public higher education policy: Affordability, access, 
and accountability. In D. E. Heller (Ed.),  (2nd ed., pp. vii–ix). Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Breneman, D. W., & Kneedler, H. L. (2006). Negotiating a new relationship with the state: The 
Virginia experience. The New Balancing Act in the Business of Higher Education, 54–74. 
Brinkman, P. T., & Morgan, A. W. (2010). Financial planning: Strategies and lessons learned. 
Planning for Higher Education, 38(3), 5–14. 
Burke, J. C. (2002). Funding public colleges and universities for performance: Popularity, 
problems, and prospects. Albany, NY: The Rockefeller Institute Press. 
Burke, J. C. (2005a). The many faces of accountability. In J. C. Burke & Associates (Eds.), 
Achieving Accountability in Higher Education: Balancing Public, Academic, and Market 
Demands (pp. 1–24). San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons. 
Burke, J. C. (2005b). Reinventing accountability: From bureacratic rules to performance results. 
In J. C. Burke & Associates (Eds.), Achieving Accountability in Higher Education: 
Balancing Public, Academic, and Market Demands (pp. 216–245). San Francisco, CA: 




Burke, J. C., & Associates. (2005). Achieving accountability in higher education: Balancing 
public, academic, and market demands. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons. 
Burke, J. C., & Minassians, H. P. (2002). Policymakers’ reactions to performance reporting. In J. 
C. Burke and H. P. Minassians (eds.), Special issue: Reporting higher education results: 
Missing links in the performance chain. New Directions for Institutional Research, (116), 
59–76. San Francisco, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
Burke, J. C., & Minassians, H. P. Performance reporting: “Real” Accountability or 
accountability “lite” – Seventh annual survey (2003). Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute 
of Government, Higher Education Program. 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. (2014). Methodology: Basic 
Classification. Retrieved from 
http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/methodology/basic.php 
Caves, D. W., Christensen, L. R., & Diewert, W. E. (1982). The economic theory of index 
numbers and the measurement of input, output, and productivity. Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society, 50(6), 1393–1414. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., & Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision making 
units. European Journal of Operational Research, 2(6), 429–444. 
Cheslock, J. J., & Gianneschi, M. (2008). Replacing state appropriations with alternative revenue 
sources: The case of voluntary support. The Journal of Higher Education, 79(2), 208–
229. 
Coelli, T. J., Rao, D. S. P., O’Donnell, C. J., & Battese, G. E. (2005). An introduction to 
efficiency and productivity analysis. New York, NY: Springer. 
Conner, T. W., & Rabovsky, T. M. (2011). Accountability, Affordability, Access: A Review of 
the Recent Trends in Higher Education Policy Research. The Policy Studies Journal, 
39(S1), 93–112. 
Cooper, W. W., Seiford, L. M., & Zhu, J. (2011). Data envelopment analysis: History, Models, 
and Interpretations. In W. W. Cooper, L. M. Seiford, & J. Zhu (Eds.),  Handbook of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (2nd ed., pp. 1–39). New York, NY: Springer. 
Croissant, Y., & Zeileis, A. (2013). truncreg: Truncated Gaussian regression models. Retrieved 
from http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=truncreg 
Delaney, J. A., & Doyle, W. R. (2007). The role of higher education in state budgets. State 




Donaldson, L. (1990). The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and management theory. 
Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 369–381. 
Dougherty, K. J., Bork, R. J. H., & Natow, R. S. (2009). Performance accountability systems for 
community colleges: Lessons for the voluntary framework of accountability for 
community colleges. New York: Community College Research Center, Teachers College, 
Columbia University. 
Dougherty, K. J., Jones, S. M., Lahr, H., Natow, R. S., Pheatt, L., & Reddy, V. (2013). 
Envisioning performance funding impacts: The espoused theories of action for state 
higher education performance funding in three states. , Pub. L. No. CCRC Working Paper 
No. 63. New York: Community College Research Center, Teachers College, Columbia 
University. 
Dougherty, K. J., Natow, R. S., Hare, R. J., Jones, S. M., & Vega, B. E. (2011). The politics of 
performance funding in eight states: Origins, demise, and change. Community College 
Research Center, Teachers College, Columbia University. 
Dougherty, K. J., Natow, R. S., Jones, S. M., Lahr, H., Pheatt, L., & Reddy, V. (2014). The 
political origins of performance funding 2.0 in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee: Theoretical 
perspectives and comparisons with performance funding 1.0. , Pub. L. No. CCRC 
Working Paper No. 38. Community College Research Center, Teachers College, 
Columbia University. 
Dougherty, K. J., Natow, R. S., & Vega, B. E. (2012). Popular but unstable: Explaining why 
state performance funding systems in the United States often do not persist. Teachers 
College Record, 114(030301), 1–41. 
Dougherty, K. J., & Reddy, V. (2013). Performance funding for higher education: What are the 
mechanisms? What are the impacts? ASHE Higher Education Report (Vol. 39). San 
Francisco: Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
Doyle, W. R., & Noland, B. Does performance funding make a difference for students? (2006). 
Chicago, IL: Association for Institutional Research Meeting. 
Efron, B. (1979). Bootstrap methods: another look at the jackknife. The Annals of Statistics, 1–
26. 
Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. J. (1994). An introduction to the bootstrap (Vol. 57). CRC press. 
Ehrenberg, R. G. (2006). The perfect storm and the privatization of public higher education. 




Ehrenberg, R. G. (2007a). What’s happening to public higher education?: The shifting financial 
burden. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Ehrenberg, R. G. The future of government financing of higher education (2007). School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations. Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/142/ 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(1), 57–74. 
Ewell, P. T. (2002). An Emerging Scholarship: A Brief History of Assessment. In T. W. Banta 
(Ed.), Building a Scholarship of Assessment (pp. 3–25). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., & Logan, J. (1983). The relative efficiency of Illinois electric utilities. 
Resources and Energy, 5(4), 349–367. 
Färe, & Lovell, C. A. K. (1985). The measurement of efficiency of production. Boston, MA: 
Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., & Margaritis, D. (2011). Malmquist Productivity Indexes and DEA. 
Handbook on Data Envelopment Analysis (pp. 127–149). New York: Springer. 
Färe, Grosskopf, Lindgren, & Roos, P. (1994). Productivity developments in Swedish hospitals: 
A Malmquist output index approach. In Abraham Charnes, William Cooper, Arie Y. 
Lewin, & L. M. Sieford (Eds.), Data envelopment analysis: Theory, methodology and 
applications (pp. 253–272). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Farrell, M. J. (1957). The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series A (General), 253–290. 
Fields, R., & Parsad, B. (2012). Tests and Cut Scores Used for Student Placement in 
Postsecondary Education: Fall 2011. National Assessment Governing Board. 
Flannery, M. E. (2011). Overview. Thought & Action, 27, 5. 
Flegg, A., Allen, D., Field, K., & Thurlow, T. (2004). Measuring the efficiency of British 
universities: a multi-period data envelopment analysis. Education Economics, 12(3), 
231–249. 
Fried, H. O., Lovell, C. K., & Schmidt, S. S. (2008). The measurement of productive efficiency 
and productivity growth. In H. O. Fried, C. K. Lovell, & S. S. Schmidt (Eds.), The 
measurement of productive efficiency and productivity growth (pp. 3–91). New York: 




Gattoufi, Becker, Chandel, & Sander, M. (n.d.). deabib.org - a bibliographic database about data 
envelopment analysis. Version 0.8.1 - December 2, 2011. Retrieved from 
http://www.deabib.org/deabib.html 
Gerber, B. J., & Teske, P. (2000). Regulatory policymaking in the American states: A review of 
theories and evidence. Political Research Quarterly, 53(4), 849–886. 
Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good management practices. 
Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75–91. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Balkin, D. B. (1992). Determinants of faculty pay: An agency theory 
perspective. Academy of Management journal, 35(5), 921–955. 
Gonzales, L. D. (2012). Responding to mission creep: Faculty members as cosmopolitan agents. 
Higher Education, 64(3), 337–353. 
Gorbunov, A. V. (2013). Performance funding in public higher education: Determinants of 
policy shifts. Nashville, TN, Vanderbilt University. 
Gornitzka, Å., Stensaker, B., Smeby, J.-C., & De Boer, H. (2004). Contract arrangements in the 
Nordic countries—solving the efficiency/effectiveness dilemma? Higher Education in 
Europe, 29(1), 87–101. 
Greene, W.H. (2008). The econometric approach to efficiency analysis. In H. O. Fried, C. K. 
Lovell, & S. S. Schmidt (Eds.), The measurement of productive efficiency and 
productivity growth (pp. 92–250). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Haug, A. A., & Blackburn, V. C. (2013). Efficiency aspects of government secondary school 
finances in New South Wales: Results from a two-stage double-bootstrap DEA at the 
school level. Retrieved from http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/handle/10523/4566 
Hearn, J. C., Lewis, D. R., Kallsen, L., Holdsworth, J. M., & Jones, L. M. (2006).  Incentives for 
Managed Growth": A Case Study of Incentives-Based Planning and Budgeting in a Large 
Public Research University. The Journal of Higher Education, 77(2), 286–316. 
Heller, D. E. (2011). Trends in the affordability of public colleges and universities: The 
contradiction of increasing prices and increasing enrollment. In D. E. Heller (Ed.), The 
states and public higher education policy: Affordability, access, and accountability (2nd 
ed., pp. 1–9). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Henderson, B. B. (2009). Mission creep and teaching at the master’s university. College 




Henderson, B. B., & Buchanan, H. E. (2007). The scholarship of teaching and learning: a special 
niche for faculty at comprehensive universities? Research in Higher Education, 48(5), 
523–543. 
Hossler, D. (2004). Refinancing public universities: Student enrollments, incentive-based 
budgeting, and incremental revenue. In E. P. S. John & M. D. Parsons (Eds.), Public 
funding of higher education: Changing contexts and new rationales (pp. 145–163). 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Hougaard, J. L., & Tvede, M. (2002). Benchmark selection: An axiomatic approach. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 137(1), 218–228. 
Immerwahr, J., Johnson, J., Ott, A., & Rochkind, J. (2010). Squeeze play 2010: Continued public 
anxiety on cost, harsher judgments on how colleges are run. National Center for Public 
Policy and Higher Education & Higher Education and Public Agenda. Retrieved from 
http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/squeeze-play-2010 
Jacobs, J. (2006). The Colorado VOUCHER system. Change: The Magazine of Higher 
Learning, 38(1), 55–59. 
Jensen, M. C. (1983). Organization theory and methodology. Accounting Review, 64(2), 319–
339. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. 
John, E. P. S., & Parsons, M. D. (2005). The changing context in the states. In E. P. S. John & 
M. D. Parsons (Eds.), Public funding of higher education: Changing contexts and new 
rationales (pp. 75–77). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Johnes, J. (2006). Data envelopment analysis and its application to the measurement of 
efficiency in higher education. Economics of Education Review, 25(3), 273–288. 
Johnes, J. (2008). Efficiency and productivity change in the English higher education sector from 
1996/97 to 2004/5*. The Manchester School, 76(6), 653–674. 
Jones, D., & Snyder, M. (2012). Performance funding and strategic finance for higher education. 
Denver, CO: NGA Center for Best Practices Postsecondary Policy Academy. 
Kane, T. J., & Orszag, P. R. (2003). State fiscal constraints and higher education spending: The 





Kaplan, A. E. (2013). Voluntary support of education. New York: Council for Aid to Education. 
Kassiola, J. J. (2007). The erroneous accusation of research “mission creep” at master’s 
institutions: Why yeaching in the 21st century must be research-based. College Teaching, 
55(4), 139–144. 
Katharaki, M., & Katharakis, G. (2010). A comparative assessment of Greek universities’ 
efficiency using quantitative analysis. International Journal of Educational Research, 
49(4), 115–128. 
Kelderman, E. (May 1, 2009). Public colleges consider privatization as a cure for the common 
recession. Chronicle of Higher Education, 55(34). 
Kelderman, E. (2012). States push even further to cut spending on colleges. Chronicle of Higher 
Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com/article/States-Push-Even-Further-
to/130416/ 
Kempkes, G., & Pohl, C. (2010). The efficiency of German universities–some evidence from 
nonparametric and parametric methods. Applied Economics, 42(16), 2063–2079. 
Kiser, E. (1999). Comparing varieties of agency theory in economics, political science, and 
sociology: An illustration from state policy implementation. Sociological Theory, 17(2), 
146–170. 
Kivistö, J. (2007). Agency theory as a framework for the government-university relationship. 
Tampere University Press. 
Kivistö, J. (2008). An assessment of agency theory as a framework for the government–
university relationship. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 30(4), 
339–350. 
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. 
Kneip, A., Simar, L., & Wilson, P. W. (2011). A computationally efficient, consistent bootstrap 
for inference with non-parametric DEA estimators. Computational Economics, 38(4), 
483–515. 
Koelble, T. A. (1996). Economic theories of organization and the politics of institutional design 
in political parties. Party Politics, 2(2), 251–263. 
Kumbhakar, S. C., & Lovell, C. K. (2003). Stochastic frontier analysis. New York, NY: 




Lane, J. E. (2012). Agency theory in higher education organizations. In M. N. Bastedo (Ed.), The 
organization of higher education: Managing colleges for a new era (pp. 278–304). 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lane, J. E., & Kivisto, J. A. (2008). Interests, information, and incentives in higher education: 
Principal-agent theory and its potential applications to the study of higher education 
governance. In J.C. Smart (Ed.), Higher education: Handbook of theory and research, 
Vol 23  (pp. 141–179).  
Lassar, W. M., & Kerr, J. L. (1996). Strategy and control in supplier–distributor relationships: 
An agency perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 17(8), 613–632. 
Lee, B. L. (2011). Efficiency of research performance of Australian Universities: A reappraisal 
using a bootstrap truncated regression approach. Economic Analysis and Policy, 41(3), 
195. 
Leslie, D. W., & Berdahl, R. O. (2008). The politics of restructuring higher education in 
Virginia: A case study. The Review of Higher Education, 31(3), 309–328. 
Liefner, I. (2003). Funding, resource allocation, and performance in higher education systems. 
Higher Education, 46(4), 469–489. 
Lorber, J. (2001). Long-term effects of performance funding: A case study of 20 years at 
Tennessee Technological University. University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN. 
Lovell, C. A. K. (1993). Production frontiers and productivity efficiency. In H. O. Fried, C. A. K. 
Lovell, & S. S. Schmidt (Eds.), The measurement of productive efficiency: Techniques 
and applications (pp. 3–67). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lyall, K. C., & Sell, K. R. (2006). The de facto privatization of American public higher 
education. Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, 38(1), 6–13. 
Mason, D. S., Slack, T., & others. (2003). Understanding principal-agent relationships: Evidence 
from professional hockey. Journal of Sport Management, 17(1), 37–61. 
McCubbins, M., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Structure and process as solutions to the 
politicians principal-agency problem. Virginia Law Review, 74(2), 431–482. 
McLendon, M. K., Hearn, J. C., & Deaton, R. (2006). Called to account: Analyzing the origins 
and spread of state performance-accountability policies for higher education. Education 




McLendon, M. K., Hearn, J. C., & Mokher, C. G. (2009). Partisans, professionals, and power: 
The role of political factors in state higher education funding. The Journal of Higher 
Education, 80(6), 686–713. 
McLendon, M. K., Heller, D. E., & Young, S. P. (2005). State Postsecondary Policy Innovations: 
Politics, Competition, and the Interstate Migration of Policy Ideas. The Journal of Higher 
Education, 76(4), 363–400. 
McLendon, M. K., Mokher, C. G., & Doyle, W. (2009). Privileging’ public research universities: 
An empirical analysis of the distribution of state appropriations across research and non-
research universities. Journal of Education Finance, 372–401. 
McMillan, M. L., & Chan, W. H. (2006). University efficiency: A Comparison and consolidation 
of results from stochastic and non-stochastic methods. Education Economics, 14(1), 1–
30. 
McPherson, M., & Schapiro, M. (April 20, 2001). Preparing for hard times shows wisdom not 
pessimism. The Chronicle of Higher Education B, 24. 
Middaugh, M. F. (2010). Planning and assessment in higher education: Demonstrating 
institutional effectiveness. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Miller, M. A. (2002). Measuring up and student learning. San Jose, CA: National Center for 
Public Policy and Higher Education. 
Miller, M. A., & Ewell, P. T. (2005). Measuring up on college-level learning. San Jose, CA: 
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education. 
Mitnick, B. M. (1975). The theory of agency. Public Choice, 24(1), 27–42. 
Mitnick, B. M. (1980). The political economy of regulation: Creating, designing, and removing 
regulatory forms. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Moe, T. M. (1984). The new economics of organization. American Journal of Political Science, 
739–777. 
Morphew, C. C., & Eckel, P. D. (2009). Privatizing the public university: Perspectives from 
across the academy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Moynihan, D. P. (2008). The dynamics of performance management: Constructing information 




NASBO. (1997). 1996 State Expenditure Report. Washington, DC: National Association of State 
Budget Officers. 
NASBO. (2013). State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2011-2013 State Spending. 
Washington, DC: National Association of State Budget Officers. 
NCES. (2013a). Digest of Education Statistics, 2012. U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/ 
NCES. (2013b). The Condition of Education. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for 
Education Statistics. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=51 
NCES. (2013c). Digest of Education Statistics, 2012. U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/ 
NCHEMS. (2011). Increasing the competitiveness of the Arkansas workforce for a knowledge-
based economy: How do current higher education policies help or get in the way? 
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems. 
Nelson, S. J. (2009). The college presidency: An interview with Stephen J. Nelson. Journal of 
College and Character, 10(7). 
Ness, E. C., & Tandberg, D. A. (2013). The determinants of state spending on higher education: 
How capital project funding differs from general fund appropriations. The Journal of 
Higher Education, 84(3), 329–362. 
Nettles, M., & Cole, J. (2001). A study in tension: State assessment and public colleges and 
universities. In D. E. Heller (Ed.), The states and public higher education policy: 
Affordability, access, and accountability (pp. 198–218). Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Nicholson-Crotty, J., & Meier, K. J. (2003). Politics, structure, and public policy: The case of 
higher education. Educational Policy, 17(1), 80–97. 
OECD. (2013). Education at a glance 2013: OECD indicators. OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2013-en 
Offenstein, J., & Shulock, N. (2010). Taking the Next Step: The Promise of Intermediate 
Measures for Meeting Postsecondary Completion Goals. Sacramento, CA: Institute for 
Higher Education Leadership and Policy. 
Okunade, A. A. (2004). What factors influence state appropriations for public higher education 




Ortmann, A., & Squire, R. (2000). A game-theoretic explanation of the administrative lattice in 
institutions of higher learning. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43(3), 
377–391. 
Paradi, J. C., Yang, Z., & Zhu, H. (2011). Assessing bank and bank branch performance. In W. 
W. Cooper, L. M. Seiford, & J. Zhu (Eds.), Handbook on data envelopment analysis (2nd 
ed., pp. 315–361). New York: Springer. 
Parteka, A., & Wolszczak-Derlacz, J. (2013). Dynamics of productivity in higher education: 
Cross-European evidence based on bootstrapped Malmquist indices. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, 40(1), 67–82. 
Pastor, J. T., Ruiz, J. L., & Sirvent, I. (2002). A statistical test for nested radial DEA models. 
Operations Research, 50(4), 728–735. 
Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organizations: A critical essay (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Random 
House. 
Pratt, J. W., Zeckhauser, R., & Arrow, K. J. (1985). Principals and agents: The structure of 
business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. (2014). Vienna, Austria: R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from http://www.R-project.org 
Rabovsky, T. M. (2012). Accountability in higher education: Exploring impacts on state budgets 
and institutional spending patterns. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 22, 675–700. doi:10.1093/jopart/mur069 
Rizzo, M. J. (2006). State preferences for higher education spending: A panel data analysis, 
1977-2001. In R. G. Ehrenberg (Ed.), What’s happening to public higher education? (pp. 
3–36). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in political economy. New York, NY: Academic 
Press. 
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. The American 
Economic Review, 63(2), 134–139. 
Sanford, T., & Hunter, J. M. (2011). Impact of performance-funding on retention and graduation 





Sav, G. T. (2012). Productivity, efficiency, and managerial performance regress and gains in 
United States universities: A data envelopment analysis. Advances in Management & 
Applied Economics, 2(3), 13–32. 
Sav, G. T. (2013). Effects of financial source dependency on public university operating 
efficiencies: Data envelopment single-stage and tobit two-stage evaluations. Review of 
Economics & Finance, 3, 63–73. 
Schmidtlein, F. A. (1999). Assumptions underlying performance-based budgeting. Tertiary 
Education & Management, 5(2), 159–174. 
Shapiro, S. P. (2005). Agency theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 263–284. 
SHEEO. (2011). State higher education finance: FY 2010. State Higher Education Executive 
Officers. 
SHEEO. (2014). State higher education finance: FY 2013. State Higher Education Executive 
Officers. 
Shephard, R. W. (1953). Cost and production functions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Shephard, R. W. (1970). Theory of cost and production functions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Shin, J. C. (2010). Impacts of performance-based accountability on institutional performance in 
the U.S. Higher Education, 60, 47–68. 
Simar, Lè., & Wilson, P. W. (1998). Sensitivity analysis of efficiency scores: How to bootstrap 
in nonparametric frontier models. Management Science, 44(1), 49-61. 
Simar, Lè., & Wilson, P. W. (1999). Estimating and bootstrapping Malmquist indices. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 115(3), 459-471. 
Simar, Lè., & Wilson, P. W. (2000). A general methodology for bootstrapping in non-parametric 
frontier models. Journal of Applied Statistics, 27(6), 779–802. 
Simar, Lè., & Wilson, P. W. (2007). Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric 
models of production processes. Journal of Econometrics, 136(1), 31–64. 
Simar, Lè., & Wilson, P. W. (2008). Statistical inference in nonparametric frontier models: 




Schmidt (Eds.), The measurement of productive efficiency and productivity growth (pp. 
421–521). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Spence, M., & Zeckhauser, R. (1971). Insurance, information, and individual action. The 
American Economic Review, 380–387. 
Squire, P., & Hamm, K. E. (2005). 101 chambers: Congress, state legislatures, and the future of 
legislative studies. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press. 
Stone, D. A. (1989). Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. Political Science 
Quarterly, 104(2), 281–300. 
Suzuki, A., Amrein-Beardsley, A., & Perry, N. J. (2012). A summer bridge program for 
underprepared first-year students: Confidence, community, and re-enrollment. Journal of 
The First-Year Experience & Students in Transition, 24(2), 85–106. 
Tandberg, D. A. (2010a). Politics, interest groups and state funding of public higher education. 
Research in Higher Education, 51(5), 416–450. 
Tandberg, D. A. (2010b). Interest groups and governmental institutions: The politics of state 
funding of public higher education. Educational Policy, 24(5), 735–778. 
Tandberg, D. A., & Griffith, C. (2013). State support of higher education: Data, measures, 
findings, and directions for future research. In M. B. Paulsen (Ed.), Higher education: 
Handbook of theory and Research (pp. 613–685). Springer. 
Tandberg, D. A., & Hillman, N. W. (2014). State higher education performance funding: Data, 
outcomes, and policy Implications. Journal of Education Finance, 39(3), 222–243. 
Tandberg, D. A., & Ness, E. C. (2011). State capital expenditures for higher education: "Where 
the real politics happens. Journal of Education Finance, 36(4), 394–423. 
Thanassoulis, E., Portela, M. C., & Despic, O. (2008). Data envelopment analysis: The 
mathematical programming approach to efficiency analysis. In Harold O. Fried, C.A. 
Knox Lovell, & S. S. Schmidt (Eds.), The measurement of productive efficiency and 
productivity growth (pp. 251–420). Oxford University Press New York, NY. 
The Chronicle of Higher Education College Completion. (2014). Arkansas public colleges (4-
year). Retrieved from 
http://collegecompletion.chronicle.com/state/#state=ar&sector=public_four 





USDOE. (2011b). Meeting the nation’s 2020 goal: State targets for increasing the number and 
percentage of college graduates with degrees. Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
Volkwein, J. F., & Tandberg, D. A. (2008). Measuring up: Examining the connections among 
state structural Characteristics, regulatory practices, and performance. Research in 
Higher Education, 49, 180–197. 
Wall, A., Frost, R., Smith, R., & Keeling, R. (2008). Examining a higher education funding 
formula in a time of shifting currents: Kentucky’s benchmark approach. Journal of 
Education Finance, 33(3), 221–237. 
Waterman, R. W., & Meier, K. J. (1998). Principal-agent models: An expansion? Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 8(2), 173–202. 
Waterman, R. W., & Wood, B. D. (1993). Policy monitoring and policy analysis. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 12(4), 685–699. 
Whitney, K. M. (2006). Governance and the public good. In W. G. Tierney (Ed.), Governance 
and the Public Good (p. 29). Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Wilson, P. W. (2008). FEAR 1.0: A software package for frontier efficiency analysis with R. 
Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 42, 247–254. 
Wolszczak-Derlacz, J., & Parteka, A. (2011). Efficiency of European public higher education 
institutions: a two-stage multicountry approach. Scientometrics, 89(3), 887–917. 
Worthington, A. C., & Lee, B. L. (2008). Efficiency, technology and productivity change in 
Australian universities, 1998-2003. Economics of Education Review, 27(3), 285–298. 
Wright, M. C., Assar, N., Kain, E. L., Kramer, L., Howery, C. B., McKinney, K., Glass, B., et al. 
(2004). Greedy institutions: The importance of institutional context for teaching in higher 
education. Teaching Sociology, 32(2), 144–159. 
Yamada, T. (2010). Restructuring the California State University: A call to action. Thought & 
Action, 25, 91. 
Zemsky, R., Wegner, G. R., & Iannozzi, M. (1997). A perspective on privatization. In P. M. 
Callan & J. E. Finney (Eds.), Public and private financing of higher education: Shaping 
public policy for the future (pp. 74–77). Westport, CT: American Council on 




Zhang, L. (2006). Does public funding for higher education matter? Cornell Higher Education 
Research Institute (CHERI): Working paper. 
Zumeta, W. M. (2001). Public policy and accountability in higher education: Lessons from the 
past and present for the new millenium. In D. E. Heller (Ed.), The states and public 
higher education policy: Affordability, access, and accountability (pp. 155–196). 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Zumeta, W. M. (2004). State higher education financing. In E. P. S. John & M. D. Parsons 
(Eds.), Public funding of higher education: Changing contexts and new rationales (pp. 
79–107). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Zumeta, W. M. (2011). What does it mean to be accountable? Dimensions and implications of 
higher education’s public accountability. The Review of Higher Education, 35(1), 131–
148. 
Zumeta, W. M., & Kinne, A. (2011). Accountability policies: Directions old and new. In D. E. 
Heller (Ed.), The states and public higher education policy: Affordability, access, and 








Inputs and Outputs in DEA Studies of Higher Education 
Citation Inputs Outputs 
Johnes (2006) Undergraduate quality number of first degrees 
awarded 
 number of FTE postgrad 
students 
number of higher degrees 
awarded 
 number of full-time academic 
staff 
recurrent research grants  




 administrative expenditures  
Archibald & Feldman (2008) % of students in HS top 10% 6-year graduation rate 
 25th percentile ACT score  
 % full-time faculty  
 cost per undergraduate  
Flegg et al. (2004) number of staff research/consultancy income 
 number of undergraduate 
students 
number of UG degrees 
awarded 
 number of postgraduate 
students 
number of Grad degrees 
awarded 
 aggregate departmental 
expenditure 
 
Agasisti & Dal Bianco (2006) laboratories regional/national revenues 
 highly-qualified human 
resources 
international revenues 
 administrative personnel order-based revenues 
  yearly number of publications 
  number of doctorates 
awarded in cooperation with 
external funding bodies 
Johnes (2008) full-time academic staff UG degrees/qualifications  
 administrative expenditures Grad degrees/qualifications  
 academic expenditures research income 
 FTE undergraduate 
enrollment 
 





Citation Inputs Outputs 
Worthington & Lee (2008) FTE academic staff undergraduate completions 
 FTE non-academic staff postgraduate completions 
 non-labour input expenditure PhD completions 
 actual undergraduate student 
load 
national competitive grants 
 actual postgraduate student 
load 
industry and other grants 
  publications 
Agasisti & Johnes (2009) number of students bachelor graduates 
 financial resources/incomes masters graduates 
 number of PhD students external research 
grants/contracts 
 number of academic staff  
Agasisti & Dal Bianco (2009) total enrollments number of graduates 
 first-year students scoring 
high (9/10) on secondary 
school exam 
number of graduates in four 
or five year courses 
 number of regular students  
 total number of students  
 total staff  
 facilities/structures  
Lee (2011) FTE staff national competitive grants 
 capital expenditures industry grants 
  other public sector grants 
  research publications 




total academic staff number of graduations 
number of students number of scientific 
publications 
total revenues  
Sav (2012) teaching and research faculty AY credit hour production 
 administrative faculty  
 academic support  
 expenditures on capital 
equipment 
 





number of students number of publications 
total academic staff number of graduates 






Definition of Input, Output, and Environmental Variables Included in the Study 
Variables Definition – From IPEDS glossary unless specified 
Stage One: Output  
bachelor_degrees: Total number of awards conferred (baccalaureate or equivalent 
degree, as determined by the Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Education) that normally require at least 4 but not more than 5 
years of full-time equivalent college-level work. This includes 
all bachelor's degrees conferred in a 5-year cooperative (work-
study) program. A cooperative plan provides for alternate class 
attendance and employment in business, industry, or 
government; thus, it allows students to combine actual work 
experience with their college studies. Also includes bachelor's 
degrees in which the normal 4 years of work are completed in 3 
years. 
Stage One: Inputs  
undergraduates: The total number of undergraduate students.  
academic_staff: Persons identified by the institution as such and typically those 
whose initial assignments are made for the purpose of 
conducting instruction, research or public service as a principal 
activity (or activities). They may hold academic rank titles of 
professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, 
lecturer or the equivalent of any of those academic ranks. 
Faculty may also include the chancellor/president, provost, vice 
provosts, deans, directors or the equivalent, as well as associate 
deans, assistant deans and executive officers of academic 
departments (chairpersons, heads or the equivalent) if their 
principal activity is instruction combined with research and/or 
public service. The designation as "faculty" is separate from the 
activities to which they may be currently assigned. For example, 
a newly appointed president of an institution may also be 
appointed as a faculty member. Graduate, instruction, and 
research assistants are not included in this category. 
admin_staff: A primary function or occupational activity category used to 
classify persons whose assignments require management of the 
institution, or a customarily recognized department or 
subdivision thereof. Assignments require the performance of 
work directly related to management policies or general business 
operations of the institution, department or subdivision. 
Assignments in this category customarily and regularly require 




Variables Definition – From IPEDS glossary unless specified 
revenues: The inflow of resources or other enhancement of net assets (or 
fund balance) of an institution or settlements of its liabilities (or 
a combination of both) from delivering or producing goods, 
rendering services, or other activities that constitute the 
institution's ongoing major or central operations. Includes 
revenues from fees and charges, appropriations, auxiliary 
enterprises, and contributions and other nonexchange 
transactions. Revenues are reported net of discounts and 
allowances (that is, the revenue reported is reduced by the 
amount of discounts and allowances) for FASB institutions and 
for GASB institutions that have implemented GASB Statement 
No. 34. 
expenditures: Total education and general expenditures includes all core 
operating expenditures, including sponsored research, but 
excluding auxiliary enterprises. This variable was originally 
reported in IPEDS, but for recent years it is calculated by 
summing expenditures on instruction, research, public service, 
academic support, student services, institutional support, 
operations and maintenance, and scholarships and fellowships.  
Stage Two: Environmental  
GDP: A dollar amount representing the state’s per capita real GDP 
during 2012.
a 
net_tuition: The net tuition share of operating revenues (net tuition; federal, 
state, and local appropriations grants, and contracts; and private 
gifts, grants, and contracts). 
attainment: Percentage of the state’s population (25-34 years old) with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher in 2012.
b 
share: Higher education’s share as a percentage of state’s total 
expenditures in 2012.
c 
performance_funding: A dichotomous variable indicating the existence of an active 
state performance-funding program during 2012.
d 
a
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm) 
b
Source: NCHEMS Information Center (http://www.higheredinfo.org/) 
c
Source: NASBO (2013)  
d






Descriptive Statistics of Variables by Group, 2011-2012 Academic Year 
 
Mean StdDev Median Minimum Maximum 
Larger Group (n=167) 
     
bachelor_degrees 1,916.66 1,256.57 1,592.00 198.00 7,044.00 
undergraduates 9,917.61 5,859.88 8,696.00 1,450.00 31,747.00 
academic_staff_FTE 511.43 256.25 462.00 68.00 1,282.00 
admin_staff_FTE 76.99 51.19 64.00 5.00 387.00 
revenues ($) 104,726,068.63 60,463,602.42 88,943,766.00 8,357,805.00 339,915,957.00 
expenditures ($) 157,230,751.43 87,089,520.82 132,494,894.00 20,781,183.00 432,697,969.00 
GDP ($) 48,871.33 8,017.78 48,109.00 31,985.00 72,281.00 
share (%) 11.42 6.23 9.70 2.50 25.70 
attainment (%) 32.94 6.48 31.97 21.62 48.98 
net_tuition_share (%) 58.95 13.14 59.42 32.51 109.49 
Medium/Smaller Group (n=93) 
    
bachelor_degrees 928.20 561.54 785.00 106.00 2,691.00 
undergraduates 4,962.39 2,749.02 4,729.00 1,102.00 18,461.00 
academic_staff_FTE 260.42 120.08 239.00 70.00 639.00 
admin_staff_FTE 46.28 28.18 41.00 7.00 156.00 
revenues ($) 51,899,185.28 34,555,409.59 42,440,294.00 8,754,304.00 202,096,090.00 
expenditures ($) 76,260,774.05 37,509,270.92 68,897,925.00 21,833,013.00 184,758,406.00 
GDP ($) 48,027.92 8,714.11 47,634.00 31,985.00 72,281.00 
share (%) 12.16 5.66 10.90 1.80 23.10 
attainment (%) 31.78 6.70 30.73 21.62 48.98 










Returns to Scale, Master’s Medium/Smaller Institutions, 2011-2012 




University of Montevallo 0.537 0.492 0.916 drs 
Henderson State University 0.531 0.524 0.987 drs 
Southern Arkansas University Main Campus 0.515 0.492 0.956 drs 
California State University-San Marcos 0.901 0.738 0.818 drs 
Humboldt State University 0.753 0.685 0.909 drs 
Adams State University 0.442 0.432 0.978 drs 
Western Connecticut State University 0.617 0.571 0.925 drs 
Delaware State University 0.474 0.414 0.873 drs 
University of South Florida-Sarasota-Manatee 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
University of South Florida-St Petersburg 0.748 0.730 0.977 irs 
Albany State University 0.546 0.504 0.923 drs 
Southern Polytechnic State University 0.546 0.510 0.935 drs 
Indiana University-Northwest 0.339 0.338 0.996 drs 
Indiana University-South Bend 0.442 0.431 0.975 drs 
Washburn University 0.558 0.483 0.865 drs 
Grambling State University 0.558 0.495 0.887 drs 
Louisiana State University-Shreveport 0.585 0.576 0.985 drs 
Nicholls State University 0.572 0.528 0.922 drs 
Southern University at New Orleans 0.395 0.379 0.959 drs 
Westfield State University 0.948 0.805 0.849 drs 
Worcester State University 0.700 0.611 0.874 drs 
Northern Michigan University 0.605 0.549 0.907 drs 
Metropolitan State University 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Minnesota State University-Moorhead 0.893 0.886 0.991 irs 
Southwest Minnesota State University 1.000 0.756 0.756 irs 
University of Minnesota-Duluth 0.850 0.673 0.792 drs 
Winona State University 0.983 0.902 0.917 drs 
Truman State University 0.864 0.860 0.995 drs 
Alcorn State University 0.403 0.369 0.917 drs 
Mississippi Valley State University 0.549 0.523 0.954 drs 
Montana State University-Billings 0.413 0.385 0.933 drs 
Fayetteville State University 0.741 0.710 0.958 drs 
University of North Carolina at Pembroke 0.644 0.569 0.883 drs 
Winston-Salem State University 0.863 0.773 0.896 drs 
Minot State University 0.760 0.749 0.986 drs 
Ramapo College of New Jersey 0.920 0.884 0.961 drs 
The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey 1.000 0.853 0.853 drs 
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 0.644 0.476 0.739 irs 
Western New Mexico University 0.284 0.268 0.945 drs 
SUNY at Fredonia 0.886 0.835 0.942 drs 









SUNY Institute of Technology at Utica-Rome 0.782 0.775 0.991 drs 
Southeastern Oklahoma State University 0.611 0.589 0.964 drs 
Southwestern Oklahoma State University 0.492 0.471 0.957 drs 
Western Oregon University 0.778 0.759 0.976 irs 
Mansfield University of Pennsylvania 0.711 0.695 0.977 irs 
College of Charleston 0.895 0.758 0.847 drs 
The University of Tennessee-Martin 0.629 0.565 0.898 drs 
Angelo State University 0.582 0.513 0.882 drs 
Midwestern State University 0.771 0.735 0.954 drs 
The University of Texas at Brownsville 0.550 0.357 0.650 drs 
The University of Texas of the Permian Basin 0.725 0.657 0.906 drs 
Weber State University 1.000 0.722 0.722 drs 
Longwood University 0.768 0.746 0.971 drs 
Central Washington University 1.000 0.890 0.890 drs 
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire 0.922 0.768 0.833 drs 
University of Wisconsin-River Falls 0.823 0.776 0.942 drs 
University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point 0.861 0.788 0.915 drs 
University of Alaska Southeast 1.000 0.219 0.219 irs 
University of Arkansas at Monticello 0.407 0.382 0.940 drs 
California State University-Channel Islands 0.938 0.891 0.951 drs 
California State University-Monterey Bay 0.674 0.628 0.933 drs 
Colorado State University-Pueblo 0.792 0.760 0.960 drs 
Eastern Connecticut State University 0.847 0.828 0.978 drs 
Georgia Southwestern State University 0.652 0.640 0.981 drs 
Coppin State University 0.550 0.518 0.941 irs 
University of Maryland Eastern Shore 0.586 0.511 0.871 drs 
Bemidji State University 0.815 0.765 0.938 irs 
Lincoln University 0.383 0.356 0.930 drs 
Mississippi University for Women 0.821 0.808 0.984 drs 
Keene State College 0.996 0.912 0.916 drs 
Eastern New Mexico University-Main Campus 0.630 0.601 0.953 irs 
Fashion Institute of Technology 0.674 0.622 0.922 drs 
SUNY College at Geneseo 0.884 0.813 0.920 drs 
SUNY Oneonta 0.892 0.833 0.934 drs 
Cameron University 0.376 0.369 0.982 drs 
Langston University 0.449 0.422 0.939 drs 
Northwestern Oklahoma State University 1.000 0.605 0.605 irs 
Eastern Oregon University 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Cheyney University of Pennsylvania 1.000 0.479 0.479 irs 
Lock Haven University 0.703 0.698 0.993 irs 
Coastal Carolina University 0.758 0.694 0.915 drs 
Francis Marion University 0.596 0.566 0.950 drs 
Black Hills State University 0.596 0.573 0.961 drs 









Christopher Newport University 0.826 0.777 0.940 drs 
Virginia State University 0.588 0.495 0.842 drs 
Johnson State College 0.926 0.671 0.725 irs 
The Evergreen State College 1.000 0.942 0.942 drs 
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay 0.902 0.896 0.993 irs 
University of Wisconsin-Superior 0.690 0.647 0.938 drs 
Fairmont State University 0.559 0.511 0.915 drs 
Shepherd University 0.631 0.619 0.982 drs 
a






Returns to Scale, Master’s Larger Institutions, 2011-2012 





University of Alaska Anchorage 0.326 0.296 0.907 drs 
Alabama A & M University 0.460 0.448 0.973 irs 
Alabama State University 0.398 0.396 0.994 irs 
Auburn University at Montgomery 0.471 0.465 0.986 irs 
Jacksonville State University 0.654 0.653 0.998 irs 
Troy University 0.719 0.640 0.889 drs 
University of North Alabama 0.714 0.708 0.992 irs 
University of West Alabama 0.369 0.347 0.941 irs 
Arkansas State University-Main Campus 0.664 0.664 1.000 drs 
Arkansas Tech University 0.600 0.599 0.997 irs 
University of Central Arkansas 0.692 0.692 0.999 irs 
California Polytechnic State University-
San Luis Obispo 
0.850 0.821 0.966 drs 
California State Polytechnic University-
Pomona 
1.000 0.972 0.972 drs 
California State University-Bakersfield 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
California State University-Chico 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
California State University-Dominguez 
Hills 
0.881 0.872 0.989 drs 
California State University-East Bay 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
California State University-Fresno 1.000 1.000 1.000 drs 
California State University-Fullerton 1.000 0.977 0.977 drs 
California State University-Long Beach 1.000 0.958 0.958 drs 
California State University-Los Angeles 0.943 0.931 0.988 drs 
California State University-Northridge 1.000 0.955 0.955 drs 
California State University-Sacramento 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
California State University-San 
Bernardino 
0.888 0.871 0.982 drs 
California State University-Stanislaus 0.826 0.818 0.990 irs 
San Francisco State University 0.975 0.938 0.962 drs 
San Jose State University 0.877 0.848 0.967 drs 
Sonoma State University 0.900 0.894 0.994 irs 
University of Colorado Colorado Springs 0.746 0.744 0.998 irs 
Central Connecticut State University 0.827 0.775 0.937 drs 
Southern Connecticut State University 0.816 0.768 0.942 drs 
Florida Gulf Coast University 0.637 0.634 0.995 drs 









Armstrong Atlantic State University 0.544 0.540 0.993 irs 
Augusta State University 0.483 0.479 0.992 irs 
Columbus State University 0.470 0.469 0.996 irs 
Georgia College and State University 0.820 0.816 0.996 drs 
Kennesaw State University 0.752 0.648 0.862 drs 
University of North Georgia 0.707 0.698 0.988 irs 
University of West Georgia 0.643 0.642 0.998 drs 
Valdosta State University 0.657 0.654 0.996 drs 
University of Northern Iowa 0.941 0.886 0.942 drs 
Boise State University 0.659 0.632 0.959 drs 
Chicago State University 0.498 0.497 0.997 drs 
Eastern Illinois University 0.862 0.801 0.929 drs 
Governors State University 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Northeastern Illinois University 0.718 0.718 1.000 crs 
Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville 0.752 0.693 0.922 drs 
University of Illinois at Springfield 0.734 0.726 0.989 irs 
Western Illinois University 0.862 0.795 0.922 drs 
Indiana University-Purdue University-Fort 
Wayne 
0.440 0.440 1.000 drs 
Indiana University-Southeast 0.611 0.611 0.999 drs 
Purdue University-Calumet Campus 0.524 0.523 0.999 irs 
University of Southern Indiana 0.645 0.645 1.000 drs 
Emporia State University 0.707 0.704 0.997 irs 
Fort Hays State University 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Pittsburg State University 0.745 0.741 0.995 irs 
Eastern Kentucky University 0.655 0.598 0.912 drs 
Morehead State University 0.589 0.589 1.000 irs 
Murray State University 0.730 0.718 0.983 drs 
Northern Kentucky University 0.631 0.604 0.957 drs 
Western Kentucky University 0.701 0.642 0.916 drs 
McNeese State University 0.638 0.635 0.995 irs 
Northwestern State University of 
Louisiana 
0.593 0.590 0.996 irs 
Southeastern Louisiana University 0.652 0.648 0.993 drs 
Southern University and A & M College 0.481 0.479 0.995 drs 
University of Louisiana at Monroe 0.653 0.652 0.998 irs 
Bridgewater State University 0.819 0.817 0.998 drs 
Fitchburg State University 0.815 0.802 0.984 irs 
Framingham State University 0.737 0.723 0.982 irs 










University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth 0.624 0.611 0.980 drs 
Frostburg State University 0.721 0.712 0.988 irs 
Salisbury University 0.966 0.964 0.997 irs 
Towson University 0.990 0.933 0.942 drs 
University of Baltimore 0.640 0.634 0.991 irs 
University of Maryland-University 
College 
0.685 0.585 0.855 drs 
University of Southern Maine 0.831 0.816 0.982 drs 
Eastern Michigan University 0.653 0.591 0.904 drs 
Ferris State University 0.694 0.680 0.979 drs 
Grand Valley State University 0.915 0.827 0.904 drs 
Saginaw Valley State University 0.572 0.572 1.000 drs 
University of Michigan-Dearborn 0.646 0.645 0.999 irs 
University of Michigan-Flint 0.641 0.639 0.997 irs 
Minnesota State University-Mankato 0.850 0.829 0.975 drs 
Saint Cloud State University 0.868 0.846 0.974 drs 
Missouri State University-Springfield 0.829 0.811 0.978 drs 
Northwest Missouri State University 0.777 0.764 0.984 irs 
Southeast Missouri State University 0.682 0.681 0.998 irs 
University of Central Missouri 0.802 0.799 0.996 drs 
Delta State University 0.630 0.619 0.983 irs 
Appalachian State University 0.937 0.922 0.985 drs 
North Carolina Central University 0.552 0.546 0.990 drs 
University of North Carolina Wilmington 0.936 0.921 0.984 drs 
Western Carolina University 0.874 0.874 1.000 drs 
Peru State College 1.000 0.990 0.990 irs 
University of Nebraska at Kearney 0.652 0.646 0.990 irs 
Wayne State College 0.778 0.745 0.958 irs 
Plymouth State University 0.790 0.779 0.986 irs 
Kean University 0.750 0.729 0.972 drs 
Montclair State University 0.855 0.782 0.915 drs 
New Jersey City University 0.649 0.649 1.000 irs 
Rowan University 0.800 0.758 0.948 drs 
The College of New Jersey 0.888 0.878 0.989 drs 
William Paterson University of New 
Jersey 
0.763 0.750 0.984 drs 
New Mexico Highlands University 0.619 0.592 0.956 irs 
Buffalo State SUNY 0.732 0.719 0.982 drs 
College of Staten Island CUNY 0.515 0.501 0.973 drs 










CUNY Brooklyn College 0.877 0.862 0.983 drs 
CUNY City College 0.616 0.568 0.921 drs 
CUNY Hunter College 0.772 0.683 0.885 drs 
CUNY John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice 
0.695 0.691 0.994 drs 
CUNY Lehman College 0.689 0.684 0.993 drs 
CUNY Queens College 0.879 0.823 0.936 drs 
State University of New York at New 
Paltz 
1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
SUNY College at Brockport 0.920 0.919 1.000 irs 
SUNY College at Cortland 0.835 0.834 0.998 irs 
SUNY College at Oswego 0.870 0.868 0.997 irs 
SUNY College at Plattsburgh 0.883 0.880 0.996 irs 
SUNY College at Potsdam 0.754 0.746 0.990 irs 
Youngstown State University 0.455 0.451 0.990 drs 
East Central University 0.677 0.668 0.986 irs 
Northeastern State University 0.908 0.902 0.993 irs 
University of Central Oklahoma 0.687 0.657 0.957 drs 
Southern Oregon University 0.660 0.642 0.973 irs 
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania 0.774 0.766 0.990 drs 
California University of Pennsylvania 0.772 0.766 0.992 irs 
Clarion University of Pennsylvania 0.675 0.660 0.978 irs 
East Stroudsburg University of 
Pennsylvania 
0.843 0.826 0.980 irs 
Edinboro University of Pennsylvania 0.570 0.566 0.995 irs 
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania 0.811 0.811 1.000 irs 
Millersville University of Pennsylvania 0.822 0.815 0.991 irs 
Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania 0.792 0.788 0.995 irs 
Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania 0.965 0.959 0.994 irs 
West Chester University of Pennsylvania 0.882 0.879 0.997 drs 
Rhode Island College 0.685 0.685 1.000 crs 
Citadel Military College of South 
Carolina 
0.813 0.751 0.924 irs 
Winthrop University 0.766 0.754 0.984 irs 
Austin Peay State University 0.557 0.556 0.998 irs 
Tennessee Technological University 0.757 0.738 0.975 drs 
The University of Tennessee-Chattanooga 0.599 0.598 0.998 irs 
Prairie View A & M University 0.546 0.545 0.998 irs 
Stephen F Austin State University 0.704 0.703 0.999 irs 










Tarleton State University 0.849 0.846 0.996 drs 
Texas A & M International University 0.547 0.537 0.983 irs 
Texas A & M University-Texarkana 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
Texas State University 0.853 0.736 0.863 drs 
The University of Texas at Tyler 0.822 0.819 0.996 irs 
The University of Texas-Pan American 0.651 0.634 0.973 drs 
University of Houston-Clear Lake 0.964 0.963 0.998 irs 
University of Houston-Victoria 1.000 1.000 1.000 crs 
West Texas A & M University 0.791 0.784 0.991 irs 
Southern Utah University 0.608 0.602 0.990 irs 
James Madison University 0.986 0.917 0.930 drs 
Norfolk State University 0.500 0.495 0.990 irs 
Radford University 0.940 0.932 0.992 drs 
University of Mary Washington 0.984 0.951 0.967 irs 
Eastern Washington University 0.781 0.776 0.993 drs 
Western Washington University 0.967 0.956 0.989 drs 
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse 0.824 0.823 0.999 drs 
University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh 0.787 0.783 0.994 drs 
University of Wisconsin-Platteville 0.663 0.661 0.997 irs 
University of Wisconsin-Stout 0.746 0.746 1.000 irs 
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater 0.816 0.813 0.997 drs 
Marshall University 0.604 0.539 0.892 drs 
 a





 Appendix F 
Input Slacks for Inefficient Institutions, Medium/Smaller Group Institutions  
 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
 
University of Montevallo 0.00 23.29 0.00 33.96 11.21 
Henderson State University 0.00 27.20 0.00 16.84 14.26 
Southern Arkansas University Main 
Campus 
0.00 32.63 2.45 2.99 0.00 
California State University-San 
Marcos 
14.71 11.69 14.19 0.00 42.99 
Humboldt State University 0.00 10.40 32.23 0.00 41.62 
Adams State University 0.00 26.32 0.00 61.33 7.49 
Western Connecticut State University 0.00 33.69 0.00 32.15 37.20 
Delaware State University 0.00 34.24 0.00 24.24 32.71 
University of South Florida-Sarasota-
Manatee 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
University of South Florida-St 
Petersburg 
7.46 0.00 44.55 44.52 22.89 
Albany State University 0.00 7.46 0.00 16.01 6.91 
Southern Polytechnic State 
University 
0.00 19.02 37.76 30.37 0.00 
Indiana University-Northwest 0.00 21.59 0.00 12.28 3.25 
Indiana University-South Bend 0.00 32.97 0.00 14.85 2.45 
Washburn University 0.00 37.18 40.84 0.00 22.50 
Grambling State University 0.00 20.83 0.00 23.74 8.29 
Louisiana State University-
Shreveport 
0.00 1.01 0.00 13.65 6.10 
Nicholls State University 0.00 8.44 7.88 1.53 0.00 
Southern University at New Orleans 0.00 3.89 13.65 0.00 5.54 
Westfield State University 0.00 27.59 27.05 24.37 0.00 
Worcester State University 0.00 24.36 26.38 15.22 0.00 
Northern Michigan University 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.59 4.63 
Metropolitan State University 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Minnesota State University-
Moorhead 
0.00 26.12 0.00 44.91 14.03 
Southwest Minnesota State 
University 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
University of Minnesota-Duluth 0.00 12.89 46.12 6.69 11.62 
Winona State University 0.00 20.93 0.00 55.47 19.04 
Truman State University 0.00 34.97 0.00 53.23 26.43 




 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
Mississippi Valley State University 0.00 28.57 24.42 35.89 30.95 
Montana State University-Billings 0.00 13.96 0.00 16.58 1.10 
Fayetteville State University 0.00 33.55 48.09 0.00 45.24 
University of North Carolina at 
Pembroke 
0.00 37.05 29.00 0.00 24.69 
Winston-Salem State University 0.00 42.78 29.99 0.00 41.41 
Minot State University 0.00 43.42 0.00 44.93 28.84 
Ramapo College of New Jersey 0.00 26.65 0.00 67.72 35.35 
The Richard Stockton College of 
New Jersey 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology 
0.00 46.12 81.06 82.47 68.63 
Western New Mexico University 0.00 43.91 33.71 0.00 9.13 
SUNY at Fredonia 0.00 35.06 0.00 46.36 33.07 
SUNY Empire State College 24.72 43.35 39.17 0.00 41.39 
SUNY Institute of Technology at 
Utica-Rome 
0.00 23.03 0.00 44.53 45.29 
Southeastern Oklahoma State 
University 
0.00 11.77 0.00 16.70 6.93 
Southwestern Oklahoma State 
University 
0.00 24.31 0.00 18.69 18.71 
Western Oregon University 0.00 34.12 0.00 56.45 19.79 
Mansfield University of Pennsylvania 0.00 13.37 0.00 59.53 33.46 
College of Charleston 0.00 26.52 24.06 29.49 15.17 
The University of Tennessee-Martin 0.00 20.32 35.67 0.00 19.78 
Angelo State University 0.00 12.97 18.88 19.17 0.00 
Midwestern State University 0.00 15.75 0.00 25.01 23.11 
The University of Texas at 
Brownsville 
29.90 29.26 69.04 0.00 38.58 
The University of Texas of the 
Permian Basin 
0.00 11.10 19.91 0.00 19.16 
Weber State University 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Longwood University 0.00 30.66 0.00 69.82 32.31 
Central Washington University 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire 0.00 9.19 0.00 2.79 4.15 
University of Wisconsin-River Falls 0.00 11.04 0.00 38.19 10.67 
University of Wisconsin-Stevens 
Point 
0.00 4.35 0.00 5.48 7.34 
University of Alaska Southeast 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 





 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
California State University-Channel 
Islands 
0.00 5.96 0.00 27.30 53.02 
California State University-Monterey 
Bay 
0.00 8.15 21.81 0.00 50.99 
Colorado State University-Pueblo 10.57 36.88 0.00 54.56 23.04 
Eastern Connecticut State University 0.00 29.08 0.00 57.35 46.11 
Georgia Southwestern State 
University 
0.00 1.63 3.55 35.28 0.00 
Coppin State University 0.00 26.33 0.00 27.63 39.99 
University of Maryland Eastern 
Shore 
0.00 35.79 0.00 29.31 20.92 
Bemidji State University 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.15 8.47 
Lincoln University 0.00 39.75 27.64 0.00 32.81 
Mississippi University for Women 0.00 32.43 0.00 44.44 26.97 
Keene State College 0.00 30.07 0.00 61.83 15.74 
Eastern New Mexico University-
Main Campus 
0.00 2.59 0.00 32.84 23.00 
Fashion Institute of Technology 0.00 31.37 22.38 0.00 50.71 
SUNY College at Geneseo 0.00 19.75 0.00 39.91 25.43 
SUNY Oneonta 0.00 28.07 0.00 46.96 35.60 
Cameron University 0.00 2.36 38.08 0.00 6.32 
Langston University 0.00 37.45 37.99 8.72 33.13 
Northwestern Oklahoma State 
University 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Eastern Oregon University 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cheyney University of Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lock Haven University 0.00 13.03 0.00 62.24 30.44 
Coastal Carolina University 0.00 26.29 0.00 68.96 41.10 
Francis Marion University 0.00 31.15 0.00 26.57 25.77 
Black Hills State University 0.00 14.57 56.55 51.83 0.00 
Dakota State University 0.00 18.82 38.56 52.27 19.43 
Christopher Newport University 0.00 32.41 0.00 61.76 20.71 
Virginia State University 0.00 30.86 16.62 0.00 2.44 
Johnson State College 0.00 4.77 0.00 40.86 0.00 
The Evergreen State College 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay 6.48 0.00 37.61 52.73 22.53 
University of Wisconsin-Superior 0.00 20.15 0.00 28.50 18.41 
Fairmont State University 0.00 19.22 0.00 22.01 6.10 
Shepherd University 0.00 26.39 65.65 52.27 0.00 






Input Slacks for Inefficient Institutions, Larger Group Institutions  
 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
University of Alaska Anchorage 0.00 37.82 0.00 30.04 27.02 
Alabama A & M University 0.00 5.21 0.00 37.99 28.80 
Alabama State University 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.12 27.98 
Auburn University at Montgomery 0.00 8.41 52.65 20.19 0.00 
Jacksonville State University 0.00 10.63 54.15 2.94 0.00 
Troy University 3.95 17.97 87.12 25.84 0.00 
University of North Alabama 0.00 4.25 32.80 4.82 0.00 
University of West Alabama 0.00 0.00 49.56 60.90 21.67 
Arkansas State University-Main Campus 0.00 13.86 15.17 1.21 0.00 
Arkansas Tech University 0.00 23.60 50.03 8.57 0.00 
University of Central Arkansas 0.00 29.66 0.00 1.91 0.00 
California Polytechnic State University-
San Luis Obispo 
0.00 13.68 8.23 35.09 19.33 
California State Polytechnic University-
Pomona 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Bakersfield 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Chico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Dominguez 
Hills 
0.00 0.00 28.46 0.00 11.62 
California State University-East Bay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Fresno 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Fullerton 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Long Beach 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Los Angeles 9.82 25.02 0.00 0.00 21.60 
California State University-Northridge 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-Sacramento 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
California State University-San 
Bernardino 
0.00 0.00 21.86 10.15 25.33 
California State University-Stanislaus 0.00 12.09 0.00 0.00 22.22 
San Francisco State University 0.00 4.98 9.05 33.50 17.48 
San Jose State University 0.00 7.95 0.00 20.80 8.62 
Sonoma State University 0.00 0.00 25.74 16.93 0.00 
University of Colorado Colorado Springs 0.00 31.22 67.77 41.81 0.00 
Central Connecticut State University 0.00 31.92 0.00 37.11 23.35 
Southern Connecticut State University 0.00 40.72 0.00 47.06 25.24 
Florida Gulf Coast University 0.00 4.79 70.41 10.85 0.00 




 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
Armstrong Atlantic State University 0.00 21.03 54.50 17.71 0.00 
Augusta State University 0.00 26.54 46.78 0.00 0.00 
Columbus State University 0.00 9.44 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Georgia College and State University 0.00 5.50 0.00 24.70 6.94 
Kennesaw State University 7.30 20.51 63.80 19.70 0.00 
University of North Georgia 0.00 31.07 63.71 32.29 0.00 
University of West Georgia 0.00 23.66 38.98 19.74 0.00 
Valdosta State University 0.00 25.64 48.70 26.82 0.00 
University of Northern Iowa 0.00 20.92 40.09 42.06 14.87 
Boise State University 0.00 13.20 56.28 40.44 0.00 
Chicago State University 0.00 5.23 26.63 0.00 16.64 
Eastern Illinois University 0.00 24.62 36.67 37.71 19.84 
Governors State University 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Northeastern Illinois University 0.00 9.75 27.48 0.00 0.00 
Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville 0.00 25.75 42.24 49.85 35.87 
University of Illinois at Springfield 0.00 0.00 43.70 17.20 1.95 
Western Illinois University 0.00 25.53 61.56 41.42 23.91 
Indiana University-Purdue University-
Fort Wayne 
0.00 13.33 51.91 1.65 0.00 
Indiana University-Southeast 10.22 37.11 14.99 0.00 0.00 
Purdue University-Calumet Campus 0.00 11.25 33.49 0.00 0.00 
University of Southern Indiana 0.00 21.33 57.88 0.07 0.00 
Emporia State University 0.00 9.78 45.05 0.00 0.00 
Fort Hays State University 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pittsburg State University 0.00 19.20 50.96 0.00 0.00 
Eastern Kentucky University 0.00 29.27 73.42 39.42 23.72 
Morehead State University 0.00 1.25 4.68 0.00 0.00 
Murray State University 0.00 9.03 23.07 17.25 4.13 
Northern Kentucky University 0.00 18.70 52.52 31.36 10.27 
Western Kentucky University 0.00 25.40 44.21 31.06 17.37 
McNeese State University 0.00 25.68 37.91 0.00 0.00 
Northwestern State University of 
Louisiana 
0.00 13.95 3.35 0.00 0.00 
Southeastern Louisiana University 0.00 21.39 55.06 1.70 0.00 
Southern University and A & M College 0.00 8.37 18.95 0.00 3.30 
University of Louisiana at Monroe 0.00 2.25 2.60 1.06 0.00 
Bridgewater State University 0.00 18.87 70.22 23.29 0.00 
Fitchburg State University 0.00 18.47 50.93 8.58 0.00 
Framingham State University 0.00 4.02 55.72 20.43 0.00 
Salem State University 0.00 18.11 61.13 0.00 0.00 




 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
Frostburg State University 0.00 14.07 39.03 15.20 0.00 
Salisbury University 0.00 35.25 29.76 37.91 0.00 
Towson University 0.00 36.40 61.50 49.36 5.24 
University of Baltimore 0.00 0.00 35.82 32.80 3.58 
University of Maryland-University 
College 
8.99 1.53 58.64 46.92 0.00 
University of Southern Maine 0.00 35.08 0.00 63.71 39.54 
Eastern Michigan University 0.00 22.17 54.82 42.97 24.22 
Ferris State University 0.00 11.16 63.60 38.47 3.69 
Grand Valley State University 0.00 31.43 60.89 50.33 8.47 
Saginaw Valley State University 0.00 21.69 62.07 24.99 0.00 
University of Michigan-Dearborn 0.00 1.73 46.81 5.10 0.00 
University of Michigan-Flint 0.00 7.58 59.00 9.83 0.00 
Minnesota State University-Mankato 0.00 15.54 0.00 25.65 0.00 
Saint Cloud State University 0.00 19.95 0.00 19.86 0.00 
Missouri State University-Springfield 0.00 21.81 17.99 39.14 0.00 
Northwest Missouri State University 0.00 9.32 0.00 26.15 0.00 
Southeast Missouri State University 0.00 0.00 19.39 34.98 0.00 
University of Central Missouri 0.00 18.92 51.55 19.02 0.00 
Delta State University 0.00 12.50 26.55 8.08 0.00 
Appalachian State University 0.00 34.81 5.21 38.13 4.81 
North Carolina Central University 0.00 20.92 23.48 0.00 20.04 
University of North Carolina Wilmington 0.00 23.13 11.37 35.10 2.40 
Western Carolina University 0.00 17.87 14.74 0.75 0.00 
Peru State College 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
University of Nebraska at Kearney 0.00 28.85 19.37 14.10 0.00 
Wayne State College 0.00 23.60 55.12 13.09 0.00 
Plymouth State University 0.00 14.91 31.58 52.49 0.00 
Kean University 0.00 18.98 53.14 30.63 5.43 
Montclair State University 0.00 33.47 36.78 55.01 22.09 
New Jersey City University 0.00 5.72 0.00 0.00 3.65 
Rowan University 0.00 17.44 48.05 41.25 29.48 
The College of New Jersey 0.00 30.20 0.00 58.80 31.91 
William Paterson University of New 
Jersey 
0.00 28.95 0.00 39.34 15.76 
New Mexico Highlands University 0.00 0.00 32.40 18.41 9.54 
Buffalo State SUNY 0.00 8.23 34.33 5.14 18.72 
College of Staten Island CUNY 0.00 11.26 47.28 0.00 0.00 
CUNY Bernard M Baruch College 0.00 9.92 56.85 26.84 16.95 
CUNY Brooklyn College 0.00 30.77 51.38 3.44 26.80 




 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
CUNY Hunter College 0.00 42.42 58.62 42.16 34.44 
CUNY John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice 
0.00 13.63 57.13 0.00 13.57 
CUNY Lehman College 0.00 14.79 44.46 0.00 14.80 
CUNY Queens College 0.00 27.77 53.88 23.22 22.90 
State University of New York at New 
Paltz 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SUNY College at Brockport 0.00 6.50 0.00 0.00 1.61 
SUNY College at Cortland 0.00 3.84 36.95 14.27 0.00 
SUNY College at Oswego 0.00 0.00 36.68 26.53 0.00 
SUNY College at Plattsburgh 0.00 1.98 21.91 7.34 0.00 
SUNY College at Potsdam 0.00 3.77 24.15 7.48 0.00 
Youngstown State University 0.00 18.02 19.62 25.80 0.00 
East Central University 0.00 10.63 30.86 0.00 0.00 
Northeastern State University 8.58 35.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 
University of Central Oklahoma 0.16 13.09 77.71 0.00 0.00 
Southern Oregon University 0.00 21.14 0.00 26.02 0.00 
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania 0.00 6.18 0.00 47.55 2.83 
California University of Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 18.48 32.74 0.00 
Clarion University of Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.06 0.00 
East Stroudsburg University of 
Pennsylvania 
0.00 0.00 0.00 32.40 0.00 
Edinboro University of Pennsylvania 0.00 5.67 0.00 11.14 0.00 
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania 0.00 5.20 0.00 45.32 0.00 
Millersville University of Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 15.40 39.71 0.00 
Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 1.33 34.68 0.00 
Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.87 0.00 
West Chester University of Pennsylvania 0.00 20.73 0.00 46.99 3.47 
Rhode Island College 0.00 19.32 21.55 10.42 0.00 
Citadel Military College of South 
Carolina 
0.00 24.76 0.00 68.06 28.97 
Winthrop University 0.00 19.81 0.00 35.78 13.17 
Austin Peay State University 0.00 24.20 0.00 0.00 16.76 
Tennessee Technological University 0.00 13.72 0.00 7.24 0.00 
The University of Tennessee-Chattanooga 0.00 18.44 54.39 0.00 0.00 
Prairie View A & M University 0.00 0.00 4.33 1.15 0.00 
Stephen F Austin State University 0.00 10.72 0.00 28.12 0.00 
Sul Ross State University 0.00 0.00 40.99 18.41 0.00 
Tarleton State University 0.00 17.47 55.96 15.91 0.00 
Texas A & M International University 0.00 0.00 44.48 2.97 14.84 




 Input Variables (%) 
Institution x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
Texas State University 4.16 15.56 58.59 39.73 0.00 
The University of Texas at Tyler 0.00 11.90 13.05 0.00 0.00 
The University of Texas-Pan American 0.00 1.35 55.90 9.08 0.00 
University of Houston-Clear Lake 0.00 11.68 22.76 0.00 0.00 
University of Houston-Victoria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
West Texas A & M University 0.00 0.00 66.84 20.49 0.00 
Southern Utah University 0.00 0.00 64.96 0.00 2.34 
James Madison University 0.00 30.36 52.16 63.49 8.54 
Norfolk State University 0.00 0.00 70.11 34.71 0.00 
Radford University 0.00 29.25 0.00 47.30 0.00 
University of Mary Washington 0.00 30.87 0.00 47.33 0.00 
Eastern Washington University 0.00 5.79 69.86 33.90 0.00 
Western Washington University 0.00 9.10 19.87 48.10 0.00 
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse 0.00 20.32 38.42 34.76 0.00 
University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh 0.00 11.94 38.91 27.75 0.00 
University of Wisconsin-Platteville 0.00 13.27 35.67 26.30 0.00 
University of Wisconsin-Stout 0.00 3.53 40.71 22.74 0.00 
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater 0.00 17.38 32.73 37.01 0.00 
Marshall University 0.00 40.44 73.12 48.45 31.40 
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 Michael Miller 
   
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: New Protocol Submission 
 
IRB Protocol #: 14-09-091 
 
Protocol Title: Estimating the Efficiency of Four-Year Public Master's Universities 
in Arkansas using Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
In reference to the request for IRB approval of your project titled Estimating the Efficiency of 
Four-Year Public Master's Universities in Arkansas using Data Envelopment Analysis, the IRB is 
not authorized to oversee and approve such research. This protocol does not meet the definition 
of research involving human subjects in the federal regulations. (See the citation below.) You 
are free to conduct your research without IRB approval. 
 
45 CFR 46.102 (f) 
(f) Human subject means a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or 
student) conducting research obtains 
(1) Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or 
(2) Identifiable private information. 
If you have any questions do not hesitate to contact this office. 
 
